Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

April-June 1997
PB 34-97-2



Are You Experienced?

FROM THE EDITOR

Greetings! In his article "Do We Expect Too Much of the S2?", Major Ira Richardson makes the statement "*S2 operations* ***is warfighting, not support to warfighting*** ." Which is precisely why this issue of ***MIPB***, **Are You Experienced?**, is dedicated to presenting the tactical point of view in military intelligence and focuses on the S2. There are articles by more than eight present and former S2s, articles on taking command and on being successful lieutenants, and a discussion by a former battalion commander of what combat commanders want from their S2s. One think piece questions whether we need predictive analysis.

We regret the departure of the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr. He did so much for the MI Corps and has contributed greatly to ***MIPB*** over the years. We also offer our congratulations to Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, DCSINT. LTG Kennedy was nominated to the grade of Lieutenant General and the assignment as the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

We are always seeking articles. You may write about any topic that may be of interest to our readers. We always welcome articles from our sister Services and allied nations too. Upcoming issues will cover—

- ☐ More articles on Bosnia and support to or lessons learned from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and Zaire.
- ☐ Situational awareness.
- ☐ Tactical-level unit training, crew drills, unit standard operating procedures, "how to" tips and hints, and lessons learned from combat training center rotations.
- ☐ We always accept historical essays, lessons-learned articles (post-Haiti), and "think pieces."



Writers of the Year and Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce the 1996 winners of the Writer of the Year awards. Writer of the Year: LTC Collin A. Agee, "Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?," October-December 1996. Runner-up: CPT Michael W. Schellhammer, USAR, "Lessons from Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY," January-March 1996. **Honorable Mentions**: LTC John R. Brooks and LTC Steven L. Campbell, "The EXFOR: Intelligence in Force XXI," April-June 1996; COL Barbara G. Fast, "Mentorship: A Personal and Force Multiplier," July-September 1996; Timothy B. Hendrickson and MAJ Michael G. Knapp, USAR, "Project Pathfinder: Breaking the Barriers to More Effective Intelligence Analysis," January-March 1996; and LTC Kenneth H. Boll, Jr., and MAJ Jeffrey S. Holachek, "Force Projection Intelligence: A Year in Review," July-September 1996.

Captain Shawn C. Weed is our **Writer of the Quarter** (April-June 1997) for the article, "The S2's Ten Tenets for Success."

Congratulations to all our winners and many thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make ***MIPB*** the professional forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Article to MIPB

1. Select a relevant topic of interest to the MI community.
2. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs.
3. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**, if necessary.
4. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write "Congress cut the budget" rather than "the budget was cut by Congress." (See **DA Pamphlet 600-67**, **Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, paragraph 3-2,b[1].)
5. Send the article to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000 or E-mail mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. Please include with your article—
   - ☐ Pictures, graphics, and crests with an adequate description and photographer credits. (We can return photos if so requested.)
   - ☐ A computer diskette with the article in Microsoft Word, Word Perfect, or ASCII. Please do not use special document templates, and separate any graphics files from the text on the disk.
   - ☐ A release by your local security office stating that your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.
   - ☐ A short biography with the full names of all authors of the article. The biography should include each author's current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees, and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)
   - ☐ A cover letter with work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published.
6. Remember, content is the most important part of your article. When in doubt, **send us your article**—we can work out the details.

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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** quarterly under provisions of **AR 25-30** and the TRADOC Professional Bulletin policy letter. ***MIPB*** disseminates material designed to keep individuals knowledgeable of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, materiel, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil; or telephone (520) 538-1004/5 or DSN 879-1004.

Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $10.00 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $12.50 per year (Foreign). Send change of address and subscriptions (see page 41) to Commander, USAIC& FH, ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. ***Keep us informed of your changes of address!*** For further information, phone (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 or E-mail martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

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03273

VANTAGE POINT

by Brigadier General John W. Smith

Trends Reversal in Tactical Intelligence

This issue of ***MIPB*** focuses on intelligence operations at the tactical level. One might wonder what is left to say since the vast majority of our schoolhouse training as well as the focus of training in our Battle Command Training Programs and at the "dirt" Combat Training Centers (National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center) is really about evaluating performance at that level. Unfortunately, the lessons learned from those events repeatedly indicate either poor understanding or execution of the basics, sometimes both—and not just by the intelligence professional. Frequently, there is also cause to question whether the combined arms commander and the rest of his warfighting staff have an adequate appreciation of intelligence to leverage the capability at their disposal.

Last summer, in concert with NTC, other Training and Doctrine Command schools, and a number of field units, we looked at how to reverse some of the negative trends that have been observed at the CTCs—negative trends that presumably would also show up in a real operation. Interestingly, the chorus of comments from the field indicated that the doctrine is fine and that both unit commanders and their S2s know what to do.

So what is the problem? Overwhelmingly, time was cited as the main culprit—not just time to train, but a need to train in more time-constrained settings. Also, there is a great need for tools that can help the S2s and commanders gain and sustain experience in a more realistic (from an intelligence point of view) training environment.

Unit Intelligence Training

What is the answer? Mostly, hard work! The challenge will always be to structure training that replicates as closely as possible that which you think you will find in an operation. This training should include—

- ☐ Uncertainty.
- ☐ Difficulty in synchronizing all the players on the friendly side.
- ☐ An enemy that presents you with an information environment that constitutes the puzzle to be solved.

Developing training that meets these standards is tough, but not impossible. However, it means that

U.S. Army photo

the trainer must conspire to overcome all obstacles and be determined to practice collecting and moving information over all of the internal and external linkages that will come into play in a real operation. Thus, at the battalion level, S2s must champion not just planning but actually practicing reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations in the same context they would experience in a contingency operation. With the S3 and commander, they must not just work out unit tasking and reporting procedures, they must lead the way to practice them. If this is not done, the fit with the unit's battle rhythm will be accidental at best and R&S effectiveness spotty. The need to practice these lash-ups is important at every echelon. At corps, the vital importance of structuring training that forces practice in moving information from sources outside the corps can be seen in training for an AH-64 Apache deep strike. Knowledge of the presence of enemy air defense along the attack route will be essential to mission success. The electronic intelligence that will provide the vital near-real-time answer to the aviator will come from sources outside that unit, probably even outside the corps. Yet if this scenario is anticipated in war, assurance that the threat information will flow in time and over the desired path can only come from tough training: training that comes from practice and does not fake the hard parts. In training, it is easy to describe how things should be; it is quite another to do it. The delta can only be reduced through an unswerving devotion to see it done the right way. Many of the lessons that are repeatedly learned over the years are, I am certain, a result of **not** practicing the hard stuff.

Realistic Threat Simulation

While practice can help to reduce uncertainty and synchronize the players on the friendly side, it cannot adequately provide a realistic threat information environment. The MI Corps is working on that. In an era where the combined arms commander has scores of long-range, precision weapons at his disposal, he really needs to train to perform target tracking, engagement, and battle damage assessment at the entity level. Yet, the tools are not yet available. The Battlefield Intelligence Collection Model and the Tactical Simulation Software programs have served us well, but they are not up to the current challenge. The information environment needed to train the Force XXI tactical force is one that can realistically simulate the battlefield at the entity level and portray entities as visual outputs to the exercise commander in a way that replicates the feeds he will get from actual reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems in his tactical operations center (TOC). The objective solution to this challenge is WARSIM 2000 and its intelligence feeder, the WARSIM Intelligence Module (WIM). Unfortunately, this simulation will not begin to reach initial operational capability until the year 2000.

As a bridging strategy, we have pursued a simulation prototyping initiative that has been approved by Headerquarters, Department of Army as the experimental information environment for the Division Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) later this year. We call this effort FIRESTORM (Federation of Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting, Operations and Research Models).

In essence, FIRESTORM provides high fidelity, unclassified, visual and textual outputs. It deaggregates icon-level information from legacy simulations like Corps Battle Simulation, JANUS interactive computer simulation model, or the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation into entity-level information. That information can be viewed in the TOC by the commander and his staff on the same output devices that will carry the input of the real collectors—unmanned aerial vehicles, signals intelligence, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System, etc. The resulting information environment will enable not only vertical integration of information obtained from scout level to national level, but will facilitate realistic intelligence play in exercises. It will also permit the horizontal synchronization of operations within the information environment, enabling the precise exercise of battle command.

MI used this technology to extend the battlespace beyond the "live box" four times in 1996 at the NTC with great results. As this is written, we also will use the FIRESTORM technology to establish the battlespace outside the NTC live box for the brigade task force AWE in March and the division AWE later this year.

Conclusion

So far, the results have been positive. Commanders and S2s can expect to be rewarded or punished as a function of their ability to cope with a robust, realistic information environment—just as they will in war or a contingency operation.

While the jury will not be in on this initiative until the conclusion of the Division AWE, stay tuned. The intent is to revolutionize intelligence and battle command training by providing an information environment that constitutes a big part of that enemy puzzle to be solved.

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Randolph Hollingsworth

First Sergeant Richard A. Harris of Alpha Company, 306th MI Battalion, is my guest writer for this issue of ***MIPB***. He advocates mentorship in the enlisted ranks and explains how to develop a mentoring program. I ask that you consider what First Sergeant Harris has to say.

The Mentorship Program: A Hidden Weapon

*Editor's Note: **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**, discusses mentoring as an important part of a professional development program. Readers are encouraged to read **DA Pamphlet 600-35, Relationships Between Soldiers of Different Rank**, before initiating a mentoring relationship.*

The purpose of this article is to outline what a mentoring program is by—

- ☐ Defining the role of mentorship.
- ☐ Delineating its different types.
- ☐ Explaining selection of mentors.
- ☐ Suggesting steps in starting a mentorship program for junior and senior enlisted soldiers.

For years, men and women working in government, the military, and business have used an infor-

mal, voluntary system of counseling and advising younger men and women whom they considered worthy of career advancement. Older, usually more experienced individuals referred to as "mentors" help the younger personnel "learn the ropes," by introducing them to top leaders, giving them challenging or viable assignments and serving as their advocate within the organization.

Role of the Mentor

By definition, a mentor is one who coaches, counsels, teaches, and sponsors others. The **American Heritage Dictionary** describes a mentor as *"a wise and trusted teacher or counselor."* There is evidence that the concept is not a recent development: in Greek mythology, Odysseus asked his trusted counselor, Mentor, to become guardian and teacher of his son. Mentors can be seen as individuals who have been where you want to go in your career and are willing to act as guides and friends. Their task is to take individuals under their wings and direct them toward the next step in their careers.

As sponsors, mentors must create opportunities which allow their protégés to improve their unique skills and military occupational specialties (MOSs). In an organizational setting, this may mean the mentor will ask the protégé to help on a project, analyze a problem, or make a presentation to higher command levels. Some studies suggest that most successful leaders have had the benefit of such a sponsor. It is generally accepted and understood that even the brightest members of an organization will stagnate unless someone higher up the ladder notices them. As teachers, mentors often present hypothetical situations and ask for input or possible solutions. An important part of the teaching responsibility is explaining written and unwritten unit policies, general and special orders, and so forth, which pertain to specific situations. As devil's advocates, the mentors' charge is to challenge protégés to develop and use skills pertaining to command presence in the face of opposition, conflict, or disagreement. As coaches, mentors help to support dreams, assist in determining what is important, and in identifying skills the protégé has or could develop.

Types of Mentoring Programs

There are two types of mentoring programs, formal and informal. Most organizations use an informal approach. This involves a voluntary effort on the part of a senior NCO or any commissioned officer. These insightful individuals routinely recognize talent and potential, attempting to guide and develop those traits in others.

However, many forward-thinking private businesses, in an effort to operate at optimum effectiveness in today's competitive environment, have established formal mentoring programs. Such firms include Merrill Lynch and Company and Johnson and Johnson and its subsidiary companies.

The program at Merrill Lynch is called the Management Readiness Program (MRP). It is a six-month program designed to assist in career development and build bridges between high-level management and all other personnel. Provisions of the MRP require that—

- ☐ The mentor teach the protégé about the firm's history, culture, career opportunities, and possible future direction.
- ☐ The program must include a level within the organization's chain of command who know how to articulate the overall company mission.
- ☐ The mentor must volunteer for a six-month period.
- ☐ The participants agree to meet at least monthly.

The Johnson and Johnson program is quite similar to that of Merrill Lynch. The major difference is that the Johnson and Johnson program is geared directly toward promising female and minority employees. They are selected on a case-by-case basis by giving them additional responsibilities and special opportunities. Johnson and Johnson uses the premise that women and minorities have had significant difficulty in finding mentors which has widely hampered these group's ability to advance into top management positions. In fact, in one recent survey 44 percent of the managers questioned agreed that women and minorities have a harder time finding someone in their organization to nurture their professional growth. Moreover, when women have a mentor, that mentor is most often an older man, which unfortunately, typically contributes to negative gossip about the nature of the relationship.

Selecting Mentors

How does an organization instituting a formal mentoring program select mentors? The following guidelines should be used in the process:

- ☐ Superiors should not be mentors for soldiers in their direct chains of command.
- ☐ Mentors must be recognized as experts in their fields. This is normally determined by the obvious expertise they possess, reputations earned, or actual noted accomplishments.
- ☐ Mentors should be higher up the chain-of-command ladder than those they are mentoring. Exceptions could be cases of senior NCOs serving as mentors to junior commissioned officers.
- ☐ Mentors should be influential. Influence can be defined as the ability to get things done without apparent exercise of direct command. Soldiers must want to perform for their mentors.
- ☐ Mentors must exhibit a genuine interest in their protégés' personal growth, advancement, and development.

- ☐ Mentors must commit and expend time and emotion on the relationship.
- ☐ Mentorships may or may not be permanent.

Steps in Starting A Mentoring Program

A proposal for implementation of a mentorship program should include at least the following five steps. First, post a notice announcing the program and articulating its purpose. It should clearly name the program, for example, "leadership and development program" or "sponsorship, initiative and training program." The notice should indicate that a follow-up meeting will be forthcoming. Keep in mind that our finest soldiers will be motivated and interested in applying for this program.

Convene a meeting of all interested parties; potential mentors and protégés. Explain the program and its functions, and obtain background information on each individual. I point out this reminder—this should not be an easy program to enter nor one in which to be selected as a participant.

Third, create a committee to match individuals, based on MOS interests, background, hobbies, and so forth. When junior NCOs show ability to perform at a higher level, give those soldiers some experience to be a future leader in the U.S. Army.

The committee should notify participants who their mentors or protégés will be. Provide a copy of the requirements for the mentoring program to all soldiers and mentors selected.

Finally, ensure several follow-up meetings. Schedule informal social gatherings. Create a short form for each participant to fill out. Ensure that protégés are aware that the mentoring process grooms them for future leadership positions in tomorrow's Army.

Conclusion

If a mentoring program is established and the guidelines set forth herein are incorporated, the program is likely to be effective. It should prove to be a valuable asset for the organization, regardless of whether it is the U.S. Armed Forces or a private or public business. Typical and expected benefits to be derived from such programs include a faster promotion track for the soldier being mentored, higher efficiency ratings, a tendency toward more formal education, greater satisfaction in MOS assignments, highly motivated soldiers, and increased morale for the entire unit. The most important aspect of a mentoring program lies in the fact that it is an excellent tool in developing junior leaders, which leads to diversity at all levels in an organization.

First Sergeant Harris is currently the First Sergeant of Alpha Company, 306th MI Battalion at Fort Huachuca. His previous assignments include Senior Writer-Developer for Career Management Field 98C at Fort Huachuca, and Senior Electronic Warfare/SIGINT Advisor, Support Operations Team Alpha, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). Readers can contact thim at (520) 533-3774, DSN 821-3774, and via E-mail harrisr@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

LETTERS

To the Editor:

After spending the month of March at the National Training Center (NTC) involved in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment, I have some initial observations that I want to pass along:

- ☐ The military intelligence soldier will continue to be critical to mission success on the modern battlefield. Although we have many exciting new systems which allow our combat commanders better situational awareness than ever before, we continue to need well-trained, highly motivated MI soldiers to not only operate these new cutting edge systems, but also to analyze the information and create usable intelligence.
- ☐ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is still our most critical skill for success on the modern battlefield. As we continue to harness the tremendous power available through technology to track the enemy, our current IPB tenets are still valid and will be, well into the future. Analyzing terrain, understanding threat capabilities, wargaming possible courses of action, defining enemy decision points and weaknesses, and tracking the enemy all give the commander the info he needs to fight and win.

There is still a point of decision for the maneuver commander to commit forces during any battle. Utilizing technology and well trained MI soldiers, those decisions can come at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.

I encourage MI soldiers to stay current on technology, to remain founded in tactical planning, and learn about our MI systems like ASAS. Our future is bright, and we will continue to need bright MI professionals to keep our Army tactically sound and the finest in the world.

Major General
Charles W. Thomas
Commander, USAIC&FH
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The S2's Ten Tenets for Success

by Captain Shawn C. Weed

As intelligence professionals, our mantra is "Intelligence is for the Commander." The people who turn these words into action at the battalion and brigade levels are the S2 and intelligence section. After serving three tours as a battalion S2, I have compiled ten tenets I believe will put the new S2 on the road to success (see Figure 1).

Tenets for S2 Success

Manage Your Time Wisely. Anyone who has been an S2 has wrestled with the perennial dilemma of "too much to do and too little time." Most of us leave the basic or advanced course with a satchel full of field manuals, notes, and student texts all telling us that we have 37 overlays, matrices, briefing charts, and so forth to complete before the operations order is published. What we fail to realize, however, is that many times we have approximately six hours between change of mission and preparation for the next mission analysis briefing. Therefore, you must realistically determine the products your commander really needs. Prioritize them, and determine the time required to make them and who in the section will complete them.

Every S2 job is different based on the "wants" of the commander (see the next tenet) and the mission of the unit. The absolutes are that you must—

- ☐ Portray what "ground" (the battlefield area) looks like.
- ☐ Determine the threat (what the enemy has and what he plans to do with it).
- ☐ Create a collection plan that will find the enemy (or other information that your commander requires).

This applies to any unit, whether it is an air defense artillery (ADA) battalion or a ranger regiment.

Since you will never have enough time, I recommend leveraging technology to make completing recurring tasks easier and faster. S2s are now able to create course of action (COA) sketches, reports, intelligence estimates, orders, battle damage assessment charts, and more with the help of computers. For example, you know, as the S2, you will be required to review the intelligence estimate during mission analysis, and later the operations order, so why not put the estimate format into the computer on PowerPoint slides for the different missions you will likely face? Then it becomes merely a matter of filling in the blanks to complete, reproduce, and disseminate the estimate when the mission changes. This applies to other aspects of the command estimate process. Why not put your situation templates (SITEMP) on a 1:50,000 scale map that has been scanned into the computer? After receipt of the order, you can copy the SITEMP overlays and the digital map onto transparencies and distribute them as needed.

Never draw 12 copies on transparencies by hand when the computer can do it for you. When you are required to give an intelligence update one hour prior to crossing the line of departure, you can hand the company commanders transparencies containing the updated enemy situation that they can tape directly onto their maps (saving **them** time). Time savings will allow you to focus on what the enemy is doing or preparing to do, a rare luxury that may mean the difference between your unit's success and failure.

Give Commanders What They Want. It seems obvious, but S2s will avoid a lot of heartache by giving their commanders what they want. By virtue of their positions and experience, commanders know more about the battalion they are commanding than S2s do. They also know, hopefully, what information is needed to successfully fight that battalion. If the commander says he needs you to graphically portray the enemy disposition every 15 minutes beyond a certain phase line, there is probably a good reason for it. If you think it does not make sense or you have a better idea, speak up and state your case.

Disagreement is not disrespect. However, when he finally says he wants it, you had better produce. Conversely, if the boss says he does not want you to provide him a 15-minute dissertation on key effects of pollen count relevant to the operation, then do not do it. Remember, he, too, will never have enough time available to do all the things he needs to accomplish and every second you waste is a second that your supported unit does not have to plan, prepare, and rehearse for their mission.

Read Your Books. To have even a chance of being a successful S2, you must first know what you are required to do. The best place to start is with the ap-

plicable doctrinal publications. Sure, most of us would rather watch paint dry on the hood of a HMMWV than read a field manual, but the FMs, student texts, mission training plans (MTPs), and training circulars have good information and examples of the products you are required to produce.

We all have our own "Top 10 List" of favorite manuals (see Figure 2). Again, your list will vary, but the top three are the trio I carry everywhere. With these references, you can map out the friendly mission (such things as what a scout platoon really must do when you say "zone reconnaissance"). You will also know how a plan is developed, the S2's part in the development of the plan, the mechanics of creating products, and what the commander needs to know when fighting a battle.

If you are just relaying spot reports from your collection assets, you are nothing more than a historian recording the past

Some S2s I know carry a foot locker with 130 different references with them to the field, and can never find the one they really need. I believe S2s should focus on key documents needed to support the battalion's mission. I have never fallen short because I did not have a copy of **FM 3-12 (Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense)** in my kit bag.

Know the DTLOMS of Your Battalion. Many S2s are not successful because they spend most their time looking at Kraznovian or Atlantican order of battle charts. It is imperative to learn your battalion's particular composition: doctrine, training, leaders, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS). Knowing the types and quantities of equipment, and that equipment's capabilities is just as important as knowing how many BMP-2 infantry vehicles are in the enemy's Forward Security Element.

1. *Manage your time wisely.*
2. *Give your commanders what they want.*
3. *Read your books.*
4. *Know the DTLOMS of your battalion.*
5. *Fish or cut bait.*
6. *Always think ahead.*
7. *See the ground.*
8. *Know the enemy.*
9. *Be a team player.*
10. *Be honest with youself and others.*

Figure 1. The Ten Tenets for S2 Success.

The battlefield is not a chessboard on which each side moves one space at a time. Adversaries are trying to out-smart each other and gain the advantage for the decisive blow. Therefore, knowing the capabilities and weaknesses of your unit will directly affect how the enemy will organize and fight. For example, if you are in an armor battalion task force attacking in the defiles of Korea against a light force, you should know the climbing capabilities of your unit's vehicles, the elevation parameters for the weapon systems, and that Bradley IFVs will have fewer dismounted soldiers on-hand than they have on paper. **You** should know this because the **enemy** will know and will execute a COA intended to exploit these limitations and vulnerabilities.

Additionally, your knowledge of the unit DTLOMS will help ensure that you convey the mission accurately to the responsible unit. For example, if you want the scouts to identify enemy activity at two key road intersections and you draw a box and say you need a zone reconnaissance, that scout platoon leader will refer to his MTP—which outlines the specific tasks required to execute a zone reconnaissance—and drive on. However, you will have squandered valuable time and resources by having the scouts execute more than the required mission.

Fish or Cut Bait. Perhaps more than any other officer on the staff, the S2 is infamous for tap dancing and just plain avoiding giving a definitive answer. A few examples are—

- ☐ *Sir, the enemy will attack within 12 to 36 hours.*
- ☐ *Sir, there is a 63 percent chance of rain within the next 24 hours.*
- ☐ *Sir, the advanced guard main body has between 3 and 6 tanks and 12 to 20 BMPs left.*

The S2 is paid to give precise answers at critical times to the commander, enhancing his ability to make decisions.

The above are not accurate answers. If the information is inconclusive, give your best analytical judgment (not guess) and explain your reasoning. For example—

Sir, I believe the enemy will attack with two companies on line across Phase Line Brown in 90 minutes. I base this on the report of Bravo Company's engagement of the enemy's combat reconnaissance patrols in the south and the fact that before-morning-nautical-time is two hours away and the enemy has no night vision capability. This will allow him to move under the cover of darkness and attack with enough light available to engage targets out to the maximum effective range of his priority killing systems.

Of course, you can add to this proposed COA based on the real situation, but the point is to give

ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process.

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.

FM 100-5, Operations.

FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence.

FM 34-2, Collection Management.

ARTEP 71-2-MTP, MTP for the Tank and Mech Infantry Battalion Task Force.

FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade.

FM 11-95, Cavalry Operations.

The Ranger Handbook.

Figure 2. My Most Useful Manuals.

the commander an analysis of what has happened in the past and how that affects what will happen in the future.

Always Think Ahead. No one drives through the forest at 60 miles an hour with their lights off, so why work that way? Yes, commanders need to know what has just happened and what is happening now, but to win battles they need to know what is going to happen so they can develop plans, allocate resources, and execute in time. If you are just relaying spot reports from your collection assets, you are nothing more than a historian recording the past. Try to put yourself into the head of the enemy commander and think about his intent, task, and purpose.

See the Ground. Intelligence officers really love maps: large-scale maps, small-scale maps, digital maps, joint operational graphics, three-dimensional renderings, and All-Source Analysis Systems products. I submit to you that none of these is as good as taking a pair of binoculars, a rifle, and an MRE and walking over the ground with an expert from your battalion. Your NCOICs are likely choices as they are sergeants first class or master sergeants who have been squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and tank or Bradley commanders. Ask questions like *"could you get a Bradley up here?"* and *"could you dig in your squad in this type of dirt?"*

This is common sense information. You may not know it by virtue of your experience, but it can be invaluable in distinguishing ground truth from the map's ink. Maps are notoriously inaccurate. Many times, terrain features on the map no longer exist. I have seen an S2 passionately brief how the enemy would launch an attack over a certain Korean bridge only to have one of the company commanders raise his hand to say that particular bridge fell down during the last monsoon. The result of this faux pas was that everyone thought the S2 clueless.

> ...where I have witnessed the weakest S2 performances are those with combat support or service support missions, specifically MI battalions

Know The Enemy. This is the bread and butter of what S2s do. If you do all the physical security, crime prevention, and automated data processing security requirements flawlessly, but cannot tell the commander what the enemy disposition of forces looks like at the objective, you are of little value. The good S2s I have seen really got into the heads of the enemy. They knew his strengths, weaknesses, weapons systems and doctrine, and thought through how they would fight his battle against their own units.

The organizations where I have witnessed the weakest S2 performances are those with combat support or service support missions, specifically MI battalions. I have rarely seen an MI battalion S2 present any more detail on the enemy situation than what they received from higher echelons. I have also never seen an MI battalion S2 look at **all** the specific missions of his supported battalion and present an intelligence estimate that addresses them all. Remember, the intelligence estimate begins with the mission statement. Regardless of a unit's mission, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield cycle applies. Be imaginative. If you are an ADA battalion S2, you must know the enemy's air assets, but you also need to know the enemy's ground plan as he will likely use his air assets to support it. Think of yourself as the S3 of the enemy unit you will be fighting. Consider **his** seven battlefield operating systems and how he will synchronize them to achieve his mission. At a minimum you must know and be able to efficiently convey (remember the first tenet) the following analysis based on the threat:

- ☐ What the enemy has (his personnel, weapons and equipment, and their performance parameters).
- ☐ What are the capabilities and limitations of his equipment opposing ours?
- ☐ What is his mission?
- ☐ Where is his equipment?
- ☐ How will he try to accomplish his mission in accordance with his doctrine?

This list is not all-inclusive, but if you can answer these questions, you will provide your commander and your unit with the information they need to fight and win.

Be A Team Player. There is no "I" in team. The intelligence officer is one of several players who helps turn missions into success on the objective. If S2s have some personality disorder which

(Continued on page 57)

Becoming an Effective Battalion S2

by Captain Jeffrey E. Jennings

To be an effective battalion S2, you must be well founded in doctrine and where you fit into the staff planning process, understand the threat, understand your commander, and trust in your subordinates to do their jobs. Your job is to predict what the enemy will do so your commander can prepare. This means you write a viable enemy plan based upon your adversary's doctrine, weapons and abilities.

Doctrinal Foundation and Staff Planning

The staff planning process is the meat and potatoes for you as the battalion S2. A fundamental understanding of what your unit does in combat is crucial. Know your unit's mission and get a feel for your commander early. The best way to get this knowledge is to first read and comprehend the doctrine in the 34-series field manuals. These are available in every S2 shop. **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, is one of your most important tools. IPB is the foundation of everything you do. Your understanding of IPB is the basis of your success, no matter what type of battalion you support.

This basic knowledge of your doctrinal tools and your unit's mission can be easily obtained and understood. Sit down with the battalion (or brigade) XO and discuss the missions for which you will plan. The XO is your closest link to the commander and the most experienced officer on staff (after the commander).

As an S2, you have a wealth of information available to you within the staff itself. As you prepare the threat picture, consult closely with the special staff which includes the Air Defense Officer, Engineer, Fire Support Officer (FSO), and Battle Captain. These subject matter experts can give you keen insight into what the enemy can do and may do. Each has a unique understanding of the systems within their battlefield operating system (BOS). Examples of how to use these experts' knowledge in the process include the following.

- ☐ The Air Defense Officer can build air avenues of approach, select the best locations for using shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), show you the best sites for missile caches and truck-mounted SAMs, and give you a sketch of a SAM site including firing positions.
- ☐ The Engineer is able to provide the composition of obstacles based on the amount of time the enemy has had to prepare them. He will also show you the best fording sites based on the terrain, likely ambush locations, and good defensive terrain for obstacles, and give you a laydown of enemy engineer capabilities.
- ☐ The FSO can show you the best firing locations within range of friendly positions and can sketch a layout of artillery positions including the distance between weapons, and cache locations. He may also identify effective mortar positions within range of **your** positions.

- ☐ The Chemical Officer can tell you if the use of chemical weapons is probable and the most likely targets. He tracks the weather closely and understands its effects. This officer is the expert on smoke emplacement and downwind hazards (it affects the enemy the same way it affects us).
- ☐ The Air Liaison Officer (ALO) (fixed and rotary) can help confirm best air avenues of approach (with the Air Defense officer). The ALO can give you the most likely enemy air targets and times of attack. Air Force officers know the capabilities of enemy fixed-wing aircraft and Army aviators know the capabilities of enemy rotary-wing aircraft.
- ☐ The Battle Captain knows the unit and how it fights. This officer can give you good feedback on the tactical viability of your enemy course of action (COA) and is a good surrogate subordinate commander for reviewing products needed at the next lower echelon.

As the S2, you create the enemy picture that the planning staff will use to write the operations order. This initial picture is critical to the planning process. The S3 will take your threat picture and build a plan for how your unit will fight. Your IPB will drive all subsequent work done by the staff. By involving the special staff (examples above), you not only get their expertise within their BOS, but they will have a very intimate knowledge of the enemy capabilities and likely COA at the beginning of the planning process.

As you conduct initial IPB (a process which never ends), consult often with the S3. You are the enemy commander, the S3 will be your best expert with whom to "fight the battle." This process of talking through the fight with the S3 allows you to fine tune the enemy battle against an opponent, and will get the S3 into the enemy plan early. This process is formalized during the wargaming which comes later in the planning process. The exchange between you and the S3 will turn into the operations order when the process is complete.

As you work through the battle with the S3 and special staff, the assistant S2 and intelligence analyst are preparing the IPB products. These include the modified combined obstacles overlay, the situation template, the event template, and so forth. It is critical to work closely with the S3 and staff, as well as keeping your subordinate commanders and S2s (if brigade or higher) informed during this process so they all have a common picture of the enemy situation. Remember, the next higher S2 has done this process earlier, and you will have those products when you begin to plan.

Know the Threat

The second critical part of your job is to understand the threat. This learning never ends. You must be current on the abilities of possible enemies within the theater of operations your unit will support. Your brigade and division will furnish you with threat information. The division Analysis and Control Element (ACE) has the most up-to-date information. Periodically, go to the ACE and get an update on the "top five" potential contingency countries for your unit. Without an understanding of how your potential enemies fight, it is hard to put on the "red hat" and give your commander a viable enemy COA against which to plan. You cannot know every existing threat model, so seek guidance from your commander, the brigade S2, and the division G2.

Understand the Commander

The third important function is to understand your commander. Though this takes time and experience with your boss, the XO can be your key to success. He is also a senior combat arms officer with a wealth of knowledge and experience, and will give you great insight into your commander's information needs. As a primary on the staff, you have access to the commander—do not hesitate to ask him what he wants. Within your unit, there are also subordinate commanders who are the recipients of you products. They will execute the order which comes from your enemy predictions. Talk to the company commanders about the kind of information they need to enable them to attack or defend successfully. Filling their information requirements is one of the most important things you do.

Trust Your Subordinates

As a battalion S2, you will never have the time you need to do all there is to do. Your assistant S2 and intelligence analyst are critical to your success. Train them. They are experts in IPB so give them direction and trust them to complete their tasks. Take time each month to sit down with them and go through pieces of the planning process until they understand the way you think. Make sure your analyst and assistant are also up on the most current threat. They too must know and understand the latest technology available to you. If these individuals are not up to speed during long field exercises or operations, you will get no rest and not be useful to your commander.

...your commanders expect you to give them the enemy COA. You will not always be perfect....You are, however, the expert on the enemy

At the battalion level, you will have a senior NCO in your shop. This soldier will have many years of experience upon which you can draw. Use his specific knowledge to understand how the enemy may fight. Your NCO knows

that good defensive terrain is good for both us and the enemy.

Conclusion

As we approach the 21st century, we are becoming more and more sophisticated. Using the All-Source Analysis System and its remote work station will continue to make your job easier. These new tools will add more science to what we do in MI. Keep current with technology. Your divisions will have many of the new tools, so get your hands on them. Do not wait until your battalion or brigade goes through its new equipment training.

Finally, your commanders expect you to give them the enemy COAs. You will not always be perfect and few commanders will expect you to be. You are, however, the unit's expert on the enemy and how he fights. Know and understand him, use the tools described above, then give the commander a viable enemy COA against which to plan.

The author wishes to thank Captain Michelle Schmidt for her assistance in writing this article.

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Do We Expect Too Much of the S2?

by Major Ira R. Richardson, Jr.

Being a maneuver unit S2 is the essence of being an intelligence officer. The controversy such a statement generates is manifested in many forums.[1] I believe a personnel management change is required to achieve combat commanders' expectations of S2s. I believe an MI personnel management change would debunk the rivalries that exist in the intelligence disciplines, which do not recognize being an S2 as an "INT." The current MIOAC structure trains S2s as one of its priorities (see Figure 1). There is no technical solution to the human requirement to "make the team." I offer a people-management strategy for debate and consideration.

Warfighting With Intel XXI

S2 operations **is warfighting**, not support to warfighting. It requires a teambuilding approach that is much different from signals intelligence (SIGINT), counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) operations. S2 operations require combat arms to laterally transfer force structure to MI. Therein lie the teambuilding challenges. For example, the direct support MI company's Analysis and Control Element (ACT), providing the maneuver brigade combat team leveraged battlefield visualization may supplant Modified Table of Organization and Equipment ground scout assets. Having more MI systems means more soldiers to operate them. MI adds lethality to the battlefield. The force structure must respect the value-added of Intel XXI. The lethality, survivability, and combat potential we offer is enormous if S2s are allowed a resourced and rehearsed chance. We see some of that selflessness in **Intel XXI** and in the Combat Training Center Instrumentation System build.[2]

Intei XXI is a good first step embracing an institutional-collective unit-creative personnel investment empowering combat arms warfare as never before.[3] Intel XXI respects the many MI disciplines, and mandates a truce among the "INTs," and envisions battlefield operating system (BOS) integration cost-sharing. Most important, Intel XXI does not perpetuate prevailing myths that—

- Competent **Joint Task Force Watch Officers** confident in obtaining info from joint systems capable of predictive operational analysis in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW), and skilled briefers
- Capable Analysis and Control Element **Battle Captains** confident in building a divisional intel architecture, able to supervise All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) operations, capable of predictive tactical analysis in war and MOOTW, and skilled briefers
- Outstanding **S2s and Analysis and Control Team Chiefs** very confident in brigade intelligence electronic warfare operations, able to drive ASAS/and Common Ground Station operations, effective wargamers and predictive analysts in war and MOOTW, and skilled briefers

ACE Battle Captains

Bde S2s and ACT Chiefs

Figure 1. Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course Goals.

YEARS	ASSIGNMENTS
0-.5	MI Officer Basic Course
.5-2.5	MI Bn (CEWI) Platoon Leader
2.5-4.5	Battalion Battlefield information coordination center
4.5-5	MI Officer Advanced Course
5-7	Brigade IEW Staff Officer/ACT Chief
7-7.5	Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3)
7.5-9.5	MI Battalion (CEWI) Company Commander
9.5-11.5	Battalion S2
11.5-12.5	Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
12.5-14.5	Brigade S2
14.5-16.5	G2 Staff Officer/Analysis and Control Element Chief
16.5-18.5	MI Battalion (CEWI) Primary Staff Officer
18.5-20	Deputy G2/MI Battalion Executive Officer
20+	G2/MI Battalion (CEWI) Commander

Figure 2. Tactical Intelligence Management Program.

- ☐ A SIGINT mafia rules.
- ☐ HUMINTers do not participate in maneuver unit staff planning processes.
- ☐ S2s are soldiers that cannot do real intelligence.
- ☐ New equipment can overcome **any** personnel shortfalls.

Under Intel XXI, echeloned "elitism," whether found at a battalion or at a national defense agency, disappears as core investments are made in all intelligence organizations.

Personnel Management Jamming

I propose personnel management "jamming" (PMJ), a creativity that recognizes and respects MI Corps diversity.[4] Very few MI soldiers should ever be S2s, and we should not encourage everyone to be an S2. The enabling number of S2s required is about 30 percent of the MI force structure, but you have to fence that 30 percent at division and below for their first twenty years (see Figure 2). I believe there needs to be a tactical intelligence personnel management program, similar to the existing SIGINT-specific and CI/HUMINT-specific personnel management programs. This program will, in practice, "grow" tactical intelligence officers.

PMJ focuses the assessed MI soldiers to an exacting standard: maximum intelligence production and minimum retraining throughout their careers. That notion requires some in-house, MI Corps humility and MI respect of discipline diversity. We should start by recognizing the S2 business—tactical intelligence—as an intelligence discipline and function. Pragmatic, tailored PMJ is a contemporary possibility[5] that recognizes individual skills, potential and limitations. It reduces staff turnover velocity,[6] a common sense investment. It commands BOS integration.[7] The MI force structure synergy will produce results from bottom to top.

Enabling Investments

Three key enabling PMJ investments need to be made to achieve our great expectations of S2s. First, make maneuver brigade S2s MEL 4, resident CGSC graduates. Given 10 maneuver brigade S2s (not counting aviation, division artillery, and division support command), PMJ would target 30 of the 80 MI resident CGSC students in any given class. Currently, none of the approximately 80 CGSC resident MI students will likely be assigned to maneuver brigade S2 jobs after graduation. The other 50 resident CGSC graduates would continue to fill echelons corps and above requirements, including joint requirements. This strategy will create maneuver S3 staff peers—the single most important variable in tactical intelligence mission accomplishment.

Having CGSC graduates in brigade S2 jobs leverages the tremendous intelligence system of systems down to the first echelon of combined arms warfare. It embeds empathy at successive higher echelons of assignment (shaft of the spear) for intelligence support at the point of the spear. Maneuver battalion S2s will remember their roots and mentor those who come behind them. Combat arms soldiers will win with intelligence rather than reclama with lessons learned in an after-action review (AAR) system structured to "flog the S2" rather than dissect the maneuver tactical plan. G2s are mentors, grounded as former maneuver brigade S2s rather than operational-level technocrats. The tactical intelligence team of teams is perpetuating and synergistic.

Second, gain Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel support for contemporary promotion criteria that reward leadership in other than command positions. The job of S2s should be recognized by promotion boards as equal to MI battalion XO and S3 positions. Two-year primary-staff-tours stabilization will enable the S2 to build an S2 section team, team-build with the combat arms team, and resource and rehearse the Intel XXI functionality. MI demonstrates the **essence of intelligence**, that is *"the definition and presentation of the relationship between the enemy, terrain, weather, and friendly mission."*[8]

PMJ would promote regimentalism, a career of focused production excellence. Sitting corps G2s get selected for general officer; you can see the top from the bottom. Success in tactical intelligence would not be a sibling

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ADA S2 Survives Warfighter: The Untold Story

by Captain Howard V. MacCready

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The purpose of this article is to briefly relay the experiences and lessons learned following my graduation from the MI Officer Advanced Course (OAC). They culminated with a successful exploitation of the Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Communications Intelligence System in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Warfighter 96.

During the OAC, I found out that my follow-on assignment was S2, 2d Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion, 44th Artillery Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Naturally, I asked all the prior ADA branch-detailed officers how I could prepare for my new assignment above and beyond what we were learning in OAC. The majority of my classmates responded, *"Oh man, you'll have it easy. ADA S2s are just security managers. I don't think our S2 really was involved in mission analysis or even wrote an intelligence estimate. Work on your golf game because you're going to have a lot of time on your hands."* Boy, were they wrong!

Within my first month as the S2, we changed battalion commanders. I met Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, our new battalion commander, as he graduated from Air Assault School. I do not think either of us will ever forget the first words that he said to me: *"Great to have you aboard; looks like we are going to have to teach you your job."* At the time I did not know that—

- ☐ LTC Eikmeier had just completed a three-year rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) as the senior air defense observer/controller.
- ☐ He had written a book about his experiences there which included an entire chapter concerning intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the role of the S2.
- ☐ He knew better than I that my OAC education had not prepared me for the expectations that he would place on me in the coming months.

Good Resources

LTC Eikmeier began my education as an S2 with a list of resources that I wish to pass on to future ADA S2s. I began to read a publication that was originally developed by Fort Huachuca but somehow ended up in the hands of the Air Defense School. The publication title is **Air Defense Artillery Military Intelligence Officer Handbook**. If you try to get it from Fort Huachuca, you must ask for **SHO TIXADA**, June 1992, or from Fort Bliss, **ST 44-34-80**. This publication, although slightly dated, will give all MI officers an understanding of exactly what the third dimension of the battlefield means to the ADA commander. My next reading assignment was Chapter Two of LTC Eikmeier's **NTC Notes**.[1] Chapter Two discusses the doctrinal terms of IPB, explaining them with an ADA twist for focusing intelligence. I soon found out that the **FM 100-5, Operations**, definitions for area of interest (AI), area of operations, battlespace, named area of interest (NAI), and decision support template (DST) had to be further refined to meet my target audience's expectations.

Definitions With an ADA Twist

For an ADA S2, the AI is defined by which aircraft may be employed within the specific combat region. The AI is further refined by the locations of all aircraft that could be involved, including any possible third-party nations, even if they are halfway around the world. In a broad sense, your AI is determined by the air support your foe may receive from his allies and the location of his organic airframes.

To define battlespace, you must first leave behind the OAC test answer—

> *the area defined by the maximum distance that your weapons systems and collection assets can reach including those used in the electromagnetic spectrum. Battlespace is thinking space.*

For ADA commanders, it is the time they have to make decisions based on the threat picked up by the Air Force's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) as far away as 400 kilometers (km).

To get a real feeling for battlespace in the realm of ADA, draw a circle 330 km from the center around a single point on a l:250,000 map. This circle reflects the 20-minute early-warning line for fixed-wing aircraft flying at a combat ingress speed of 540 knots (roughly 1080 km per hour (kph)). Now draw a circle l08 km from the same point. You now have the 6-minute early-warning line for the same fixed-wing attack platform, your 20-minute early-warning line for the same fixed-wing attack aircraft, and your 20-minute early-warning line for rotary-wing aircraft in the attack mode flying at roughly 120 knots (240 kph). Finally, draw a circle 40 km from that same point; this gives you the rotary-wing six-minute early-warning line. These early-warning lines allow the commander to make changes in his states of alert and give localized early warning for air attack. By doing the above exercise, you have also laid the ground work for your NAIs and DST. Before we

Photo provided by Boeing

Boeing's lightweight Avenger Air Defense System.

discuss NAIs and the DST any further, I feel we must cover the nebulous topic of air avenues of approach (AAA).

To determine your AAAs, you must know four key things:

- ☐ What is the level of training and proficiency of the threat pilot force?
- ☐ What is the predominant command and control (C^2) system used by their air force for air mission execution?
- ☐ What are the capabilities of the threat airframes?
- ☐ From where do you expect the air threat to be staging?

After you know the answers to the above questions, you can apply this knowledge to the terrain specific to your conflict. AAAs typically follow major terrain features, both natural and manmade. In a desert environment, AAAs follow roads, pipelines, power lines, major wadis, river basins, and so forth. In jungle terrain, AAAs would follow such things as mountain ridge lines, valleys, major road networks, rivers, and coastlines.

Your AAAs are simply your best guess at what terrain feature the enemy pilot is using to navigate his aircraft from his location to your location. AAA development is an art that requires extensive knowledge of the terrain at hand with respect to the threat air force's ability to navigate both by day and night. For the most part, you can get a jump on your enemy air assessment and AAAs by reading Annex G (Air Defense) to a division or higher level unit's operations plan and operations order. I find that most divisions and corps put all air intelligence-related information in Annex G rather than Annex B (Intelligence). This is a mistake; intelligence and terrain analysis belongs in Annex B. You can find more detailed information about enemy airframes and capabilities in **Jane's All the World's Aircraft**, **Jane's All the World's UAVs**, **Multi-Command Manual 3-1**, **Volume II**,[2] (a classified Air Force study on aircraft and air defense missile systems), and open source Internet sites, country studies, and lastly, your local public library.

Now that you have your AAAs, you can draw your early-warning circles directly on that overlay. I learned that the early-warning circles also serve as NAIs. I could deny or confirm an enemy course of action based on whether aircraft passed these lines. I depended on the AWACS to monitor my NAIs 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The AWACS downlink to the 2-44 ADA Battalion comes through a system known as the Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Communications Intelligence ($FAADC^3I$) system. To best describe the system without going into the "technogeek" level, it gives you a picture of all airborne moving target indicators for 400 km from the AWACS. The downlink will tell you if the aircraft being displayed are—

- ☐ Hostile, friendly, or unknown.
- ☐ Single, a few (2 to 3 ships), or many (4 or more).
- ☐ Current location, heading and speed (in meters per second).

The $FAADC^3I$ system gives you real-time intelligence. The system, coupled with an analysis of the terrain, will allow you to target exactly the enemy's operating base and help determine what he is doing on the battlefield. The $FAADC^3I$ system will help you correlate enemy air movement with potential ground force movement. A well known but rarely remembered fact is that aircraft operate in support of ground maneuver forces. Thus the threat's ground maneuver plan is generally made clear by the location and activity of his rotary- and fixed-wing forces.

Now back to our discussion of NAIs. I draw early-warning and NAI circles around what I perceive to be the enemy commander's high-priority targets. For the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the threat will usually target our fire support elements first. These elements include—

- ☐ Our helicopters and means to support them.
- ☐ Organic and attached artillery.
- ☐ Air defense systems.
- ☐ C^2 nodes.

Geographically, these assets are found in the tactical assembly area (TAA), forward operating bases (FOBs), and other key locations on the battlefield such as flight landing strips (FLS) and forward air refueling points (FARPs).

For each of these locations on the battlefield, I construct three NAIs. Any enemy aircraft activity passing through these NAIs will help deny or confirm enemy intention to attack these critical areas of the battlefield. I then template where I believe the enemy aircraft operating base is and what possible FARPs, FLSs, FOBs, drop zones, and helicopter landing zones he would use in a conflict against us. I found that by plotting the enemy ADA coverage with special emphasis placed on the bigger air defense systems (including the SA-11 and SA-12 missiles), I could narrow my search with considerable accuracy. Enemy forces protect their assets with air defense in much the same way we do. Large, long-range systems protect aviation and the means to support it.

Shoulder-fired and bullet systems are placed forward in a reactionary role protecting soldiers and their equipment. By templating based on the enemy air defense laydown, you can now establish more traditional point NAIs for FARPs, FOBs, TAAs, FLSs, and so forth.

The circular early-warning lines also serve as your time phase lines. Generically, the most likely air attack times occur during before morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and early evening nautical twilight (EENT). Without going into great detail, the BMNT and EENT times coincide with the most favorable air density, visibility, and winds. The **Air Defense Artillery Military Intelligence Officer Handbook** explains the effects of weather on aircraft better than I ever could. Based on these most probable flight times, where the enemy aircraft are staging, the distance from the enemy airfield to the target, the aircraft combat ingress speed, and the early-warning circles, you can estimate at what time and where enemy aircraft will be employed on the battlefield. To get to the graduate level of this analysis, you must have an in-depth knowledge of how your enemy employs his aircraft, namely his doctrine. (Hint: If your enemy is specifically the forces from the Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Training Program, you can find all that you need to know in the FM 100-60-series opposing force (OPFOR) manuals. These include the—

- ☐ **Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR: Operational Art (Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth Pamphlet 350-14/FM 100-61).**
- ☐ **Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR: Tactics (Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth Pamphlet 350-16/FM 100-62).**
- ☐ **Infantry-Based OPFOR: Operations and Tactics (Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth Pamphlets 350-15 and -17/FM 100-64).**

It took me eight months to fully understand what my commander wanted and needed from me as the S2. We in MI preach that the "commander drives intelligence." I feel that in addition to being the conductor of the train, the commander must also be teacher and mentor. If he is not, the train he drives will surely derail because the S2 will not know where to lay the track.



Photo provided by authour

CH-47 Chinook transporting the Avenger.

Warfighter Exercise

With respect to our recent Warfighter exercise, our battalion targeted the enemy for close air support and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). On five separate occasions we denied him the opportunity to lift his air assets to interdict our operations. We did this by using the FAADC^{3}I system, coupled with the products of traditional IPB, threat doctrine, detailed terrain analysis, and a lot of luck. As an ADA S2, you are the division's subject matter expert on enemy air. Currently in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), we are undergoing a reformation of our IPB thought process. Enemy air is now every S2's concern. For too long, maneuver S2s have turned to their ADA liaison officers in the tactical operations center (TOC) and asked, *"What is the enemy air going to do?"* No maneuver commander would allow you to turn to an armor officer and ask him what the enemy tanks can do, or at what point in the battle they will be employed.

The MI Corps must take the responsibility for training future S2s in the entire IPB process, not only that segment dealing with ground activity. Air defense is not blameless in the current separation of ground- and air-related IPB. The air defenders have become accustomed to being the air threat experts. It is a hard pill to swallow, but we as MI professionals owe it to the force as a whole to become the experts for both air and ground IPB.

The l0lst Airborne Division (Air Assault) has made great strides in the past year. FAADC^{3}I is not just an ADA early-warning tool. We have remoted the air picture from the air defense shelter into every brigade TOC, G2 and G3 operations, and the Analysis and Control Element. The Division as a whole is becoming better with every exercise at integrating the air and ground IPB into a seamless process.

Conclusion

I can now say, without a doubt, that LTC Eikmeier taught me how to be an S2. I hope the lessons I learned will help other MI officers searching for the answer to the question, *"So what does the ADA S2 do?"*

Endnotes

1. LTC Eikmeier's book, called **NTC Notes**, has not yet been published. Interested readers can inquire through their ADA battalion (a copy was furnished to each). If you cannot locate a copy, contact Captain John Spencer via E-mail at afzb-kh-b@campbell.emh1.army.mil for help in obtaining a copy. (You can call him at (502) 798-5302 or DSN 635-5302 if you do not have E-mail.)
2. **Multi-Command Manual 3-1, Volume II, Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics.** Contact Senior Airman Willbanks at DSN 682-7852 for details on distribution.

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The Redleg S2:
The Fire Support-Intelligence Link

by Captain Jameson R. Johnson

Editor's Note: The terms "operations other than war," "low-intensity conflict," and "LIC" used in this article are no longer doctrinally accurate within the Army. Precise terminology in discussing peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and operations in aid of civil authorities should replace "OOTW." This guidance was released in a message from the Joint Staff, DJS, 311514Z AUG 95.

The field artillery (FA) battalion S2 is one of the most overlooked and least used assets on the modern MI battlefield today. This article will address the FA battalion S2's assets, examples of good use of the FA battalion S2, and some suggestions for units.

Often, the standard MI collection assets and the scouts can completely handle the brigade's collection plan. Once an operation is under way, reports come in from a variety of battlefield operating systems (BOSs), and an "information landslide" may overwhelm the S2s. This leaves "real" vital intelligence overlooked or ignored. In today's changing face of warfare, a key to success for the brigade intelligence effort is to diversify the overall collection plan, and use as many different assets as possible.

Some of the most diversified and most numerous assets on the battlefield belong to the direct support FA battalion intelligence officer. Like that of a brigade, the equipment possessed by the FA battalion S2 spans the entire brigade sector. The difference is that the FA battalion S2 has direct control over all of the assets as well as direct communications with each asset in the battle. Due to the mission of the artillery and the table of organization and equipment assets, the FA battalion S2 has the unique ability and responsibility to monitor the entire battlefield and all of the engagements on it, from the forward line of troops (FLOT) to the rear. The assets of the FA battalion S2 comprise two different categories—equipment and personnel.

Equipment

The AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radar, designed as a countermortar radar, was later updated to counter artillery fire as well. Using a horizontal beam, the TPQ-36 can acquire with pinpoint accuracy any type of artillery round that penetrates that beam, from a .50-caliber bullet up to and including many air defense weapons. With indirect fires, the TPQ-36 can predict where the rounds will impact and give prior warning of incoming artillery to a protected area.

The TPQ-36 is an excellent predictive analysis tool in large-scale warfare. With only a few enemy acquisitions, the FA battalion S2 can accurately predict the placement of the regimental or divisional artillery groups (RAGs or DAGs). Once the RAG or DAG has been identified, the S2 can easily template the rest of the enemy force using doctrinal distances.

During LIC, the TPQ-36 can play an even greater role. A few well-placed mortars can bring an entire task force to a standstill. The TPQ-36 is the most effective way to identify the position of those mortars, and to analyze the patterns of the mortar crews. Once identified, the target can be attacked with artillery or by a Quick Reaction Force which can destroy the mortar, crew, and cache site.

The FA battalion S2 is the best intelligence officer on the battlefield to track those mortar crews and predict where to send in a mortar attack force. In OOTW, the TPQ-36 can identify mortars, heavy machine-guns, and air defense weapons. In built-up areas, this is an invaluable asset to the patrolling force because it focuses the effort in an often congested and confusing environment.

The Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) is an organic fire-direction system that digitally links all the levels of the artillery BOS. TACFIRE allows for the expedited clearance of fires, fire planning over the radio, and the ability of the user to send text messages to any of the subscribers. The key importance of the TACFIRE system to the FA battalion S2 is that this officer has a digital communications link in the tactical operations center that provides broad communications. The system gives the S2 the ability to obtain information from the soldier in the observation post (OP) or battle position (BP), and to talk directly with the fire support officers (FSOs) at any level. This ability to communicate digitally with both maneuver and support elements at the same time facilitates a greater analytical ability for the FA battalion S2.

Fire support communications are legendary. "Battles" are often fought over fire support nets because they are often the only nets open for communication. This is due to both the maintenance of the radios and their dispersion over the battlefield.

The Global Positioning System (GPS), Ground/Vehicular Laser Locating Device (GVLLD), thermal sight, and laser rangefinder of the Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT), can be one of the most accurate information packets on the battlefield. If the COLT is given survey support or a GPS, they can establish a known point on the ground. With the GVLLD and the thermal sight, they are able to acquire targets up to 5000 meters away. Then, using the laser rangefinder in the GVLLD, the team can send an S2

a ten-digit grid coordinate for a target with absolute accuracy. There are also GPSs and laser rangefinders with forward observers (FOs) down through platoon level.

For a battalion in the attack, the ability to pinpoint an entire defense is invaluable. For the S2 trying to watch an named area of interest, or fight the counterreconnaissance battle, the accuracy of the GVLLD allows for the easy and accurate targeting of the enemy reconnaissance elements.

Personnel

The FA forward observer, military occupational specialty 13F, understands the operations of both the artillery and the maneuver element, and integrates both elements. The FSOs' ability to use those legendary communications, and their presence in every battalion, company, and platoon, allows the FA battalion S2 to talk directly with any element on the battlefield. This allows the FO to conduct targeting at a very accurate level, as well as sending information to the FA battalion S2 directly from an OP or BP. There are fire support elements (FSEs) in each infantry, armor, and cavalry battalion. There are also FSEs in the aviation brigade, attack squadrons, and the brigade support area. The amazing fact is that at **every** level from the division commander's side to a battalion scout OP, there is an FO with whom the FA battalion S2 can speak at any moment. No other intelligence element operates with that ability to gather information.

The COLT is a brigade asset that allows a direct artillery strike on a specific vehicle or target using a laser and a Copperhead round. COLTs operate throughout the entire brigade sector and often are used as scouts in the defense. The fire support net also links them to the FA battalion S2. This allows the S2 to speak with yet another element on the battlefield that is able to see the entire battlefield. The COLT can also play the role of an air-to-ground ordinance controller; using the GVLLD, the team can match pulse-repetition-frequency codes with jet aircraft and guide munitions onto the target directly. This is invaluable to an S2 as a targeting tool.

The survey platoon is another element that moves over the entire battlefield, and is controlled solely by the artillery. This platoon provides an accurate location to any element on the battlefield, and is primarily used by the firing batteries of the artillery. The platoon may be used by the mortar platoons, COLTs, or maneuver elements.

What the survey platoon brings to the intelligence battle is the ability to operate all over the sector in areas not covered by standard collection assets. They can provide critical information about the dead space or the geographical center of the battlefield, especially the routes and conditions of roads within the sector. Firing batteries can also play a role in route selection, as they move around constantly between the FLOT and the rear. Battery commanders spend a great deal of time searching for new firing positions within the brigade area of operation. These two elements can provide excellent reconnaissance information on areas not often watched.

The meteorological team (METT) provides the FA battalion S2 with an accurate and readily accessible weather report. Each division artillery (DIVARTY) has its own METT. An S2 does not have to depend on the Air Force, local sources, or old data, when data less than an hour old is available 24 hours a day, directly from the area of interest or operation.

Examples of Artillery Asset Use

Support in Somalia. Somalia offers an example of nontraditional use of artillery assets. Despite the lack of artillery guns in the country, the forces deployed there took the larger AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). The radars were primarily brought to acquire primitive artillery employed by the warring factions. There were no artillery strikes by the forces of Mohamed Farah Aideed. What his forces did do well, however, was their employment of "technicals," mortar tubes mounted in the back of pickup trucks. Aideed's crews, through the use of handheld radios, were able to bring in limited mortar fire on coalition forces. The TPQ-37 radar stationed at the airport was able to monitor the entire city of Mogadishu. Not only was the TPQ-37 able to track the mortars and give the maneuver elements the ability to set up roadblocks and apprehend the mortar trucks, but it proved useful in finding heavy machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades, and air defense weapons used against coalition aircraft.

NTC Rotation. One of the most successful links between the fire-supporter and intelligence that I have seen was a light-heavy rotation at the National Training Center in February 1993. As the battalion FSO for the 5th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, I placed an outstanding FO sergeant with the battalion scout platoon during the train-up, and on a deployment to Japan for Exercise Keen Edge. This sergeant was able to become part of the platoon. He participated in physical training and in daily training. In return, we had a personal scout who reported back to the FA battalion.

Simultaneously, I took the time to build a good relationship with both the infantry S2 and the FA battalion S2. The result of our relationship was the ability of either S2 to call on the radio and get a spot report on the enemy situation 10 to 12 kilometers beyond our present positions. This led to the scout platoon "killing" in one night with indirect fires 43 light fighters infiltrating our defenses,

an enemy artillery battery, and a motorized rifle company. The communications link allowed the two S2s to drive the deep fight long before a light TF could formally engage us.

JRTC Rotation. Another successful use of the FA battalion S2 in the overall collection plan was a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation of the 2d Brigade, 6th Infantry Division, in October 1993. The Brigade Commander determined that the destruction of the enemy's mortar systems was the key to the success of the initial operation. Therefore he included the TPQ-36 radar, a firing battery, and an entire platoon of infantry to guard them in the initial air entry. Further, the brigade S2 and the FA battalion S2 established a designated counterfire net with the other S2s in the TF.

On this net, the S2s used the acquisitions from the TPQ-36 and reports from patrols—as a complete intelligence community—to recommend an entire battle plan to the brigade and battalion commanders en masse. Once the concept was accepted, the S2s were able to direct the effort of ground forces, aviation assets, and indirect fires. The result was a 50-percent kill ratio of the enemy mortars before the rest of the TF was on the ground. Within 24 hours of the TF's arrival in country, we had shut down the enemy indirect capability for the rest of the LIC operation. The direct line between the brigade S2 and the FA battalion S2 continued to be effective as the assets in the artillery battalion played a regular role in the entire brigade collection plan. They did route and area reconnaissance and limited patrolling, while continuing to dominate the enemy's indirect-fire capabilities. The artillery played a continuous role in the intelligence cycle, giving the brigade new weapons and eventually, victory.

Suggestions For Units

Below are some suggestions for TFs planning deployment to either a training center or, more important, a real-world mission. Units should make use of artillery assets in collecting intelligence information by—

- ☐ Tying the TPQ-36 and the TPQ-37 into the brigade collection plan as key assets.
- ☐ Linking the FA battalion with MI intercept and jamming assets to add a two-pronged attack capability to the counterbattery fight.
- ☐ Encouraging the maneuver battalion FSO to talk regularly with the FA battalion S2.
- ☐ Linking the survey platoon into the brigade collection plan.
- ☐ Designating a counterfire net for the artillery and the task force S2s to use for planning and coordination.
- ☐ Using the COLT as "deep eyes," and tying them into the intelligence process.
- ☐ Placing FOs in the scout platoons as permanent party and tying them into the FA battalion S2 nets.
- ☐ Educating commanders that triangulation is equal to "eyes on," and should be used by the artillery for shooting.

Conclusion

On today's modern battlefield, the key to success is coordinating all assets to gain the maximum effects of their capabilities, and delegate the workload to all the different BOSs. No other combat arm has more "eyes," "ears," and radios in more places than the artillery does. No other combat arm has more organic killers and links to killer systems than the artillery. Because of the assets and unique abilities of the FA battalion S2s, they can bring new depth and width to the brigade task force battle. At present, however, they are a vital but under-used link in the intelligence makeup of today's battlefield.

Captain Johnson is currently the Executive officer of the 721st MI Battalion, 702d MI Group. His previous assignments have included command and staff positions in Alaska and Turkey, as well as service in Operations DESERT STORM, DESERT SHIELD, and PROVIDE COMFORT. Captain Johnson has a bachelor of arts degree in History from the Citadel. Readers can reach him at DSN 780-9175 or via E-mail at johnsonj@grsoc.gordon.army.mil.

Technology Navigator "Beta Test" Operation

The Technology Navigator (TN) responds to a key recommendation of a 1996 intelligence community study to promote information sharing and reuse across national security community organizations. The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) is sponsoring the TN effort as an information sharing service using the Internet and the Government's intranets. The TN prototype was demonstrated at two INTELINK conferences in June 1996 and currently can be viewed in its initial "alpha version" demonstration mode on the Internet at http://www.mews.org/jto.

The new beta version capability will be available on 1 June 1997 and is intended to provide government analysts, resource managers, and technologists with current information on relevant information technologies, related studies, products, programs and initiatives within the government, the commercial sector and academia. The core of the TN is a searchable and browsable database, organized by technology areas of interest with links to people and organizations. A "bulletin board" service allows government project managers and senior analysts to exchange information on problem areas, possible solutions and upcoming technology-related events or activities.

For more information, you can contact the Project Manager, Mr. Edward Dandar at (703) 696-1304, DSN 426-1303, or E-mail at edandar@dtic.mil.

Back to the Basics:
The Battalion S2

by Captain Norman H. Fuss, III

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The most important mission of combat battalion S2s is to provide their commanders enough timely information to allow them to make critical decisions on the battlefield. While in the field, this mission far outweighs all others. If the S2 succeeds, the battalion is almost always successful; if the S2 fails, the battalion is almost certainly doomed to defeat and the unnecessary loss of American lives. As the lowest echelon of tactical intelligence, the battalion S2 has the most direct influence on the basic building blocks of tactical warfare: platoons, companies, and the battalion task force (TF).

Bearing this in mind, the battalion S2 must have access to and the support of higher intelligence channels and products. However, while potentially useful, intelligence from higher echelons is not always responsive or accurate enough for battalion or lower level operations. (At the National Training Center (NTC), practically all of the opposing force's (OPFOR) intelligence comes from scouts—not from the electronic warfare (EW) platforms at higher echelons or secondary imagery dissemination systems.) The picture the chief of reconnaissance develops comes from spot reports, a map, and an alcohol pen: the most basic low-technology approach. Battalion S2s owe it to their commanders and the soldiers they support to be able to provide enough information about the enemy disposition to allow their commanders to make correct and timely decisions with the assets they have on hand ***and nothing else***. In order to do this, the S2 must go back to the basics.

Battalion Rules of Employment

Regardless of the make-up or control of a battalion TF's scout platoon, certain rules of employment should not be broken. Seven of these rules follow.

Scouts are reconnaissance assets. They are the "lookers," not the "killers." When scouts die, the S2 looses eyes and potentially valuable information. Commanders should always minimize the scouts' killing role during the counterreconnaissance fight unless they want to be surprised the next day.

Scout platoon leaders are (or should be) the subject matter experts on employment of the platoon. They must be integral players during any reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) or counterreconnaissance planning. They know who the strong and weak crews are and limitations of the soldiers and the equipment. The scout platoon leaders should be graduates of the Scout Platoon Leader Course (SPLC) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and must be given the time to practice their skills as much as possible. Scouting skills are perishable.

Battalion S2s should control and task the scout platoon. They should also be SPLC graduates (if possible) so that they know the capabilities and limitations of the battalion's only taskable intelligence-gathering asset. Allow the S2s to train with the scouts and practice their skills as much as possible. The scouts' skills of identifying the enemy and his equipment are also perishable.

Plan for battalion reconnaissance throughout the sector. This may stretch scout assets and may necessitate sending individual vehicles rather than sections to observation post (OP) locations. Plan to have **battalion** eyes cover the critical named areas of interest that answer the battalion commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Do not rely on higher echelons to do it for you. Have a plan for redundant coverage of critical areas and a plan for the repositioning of assets to replace ones who die.

Dismount! Scouts should fill dismounted OPs at least a few hundred meters from their vehicles. A vehicle is much easier to find and kill than one or two scouts with PRC-77 or PRC-126 radios.

Ensure the S2 can talk to the furthest scout from the tactical operations center (TOC). Plan for and use a radio retransmission system. Be sure to bring the signal officer into the R&S planning process.

Enforce communications security. You would not believe the amount of information given in the clear over friendly forces' scout nets. Practice passing information over unsecure communications nets. Use good brevity codes and secure communications.

These are just a few of the basics. Few are taught at the intelligence school. Battalion-level operations were presented only during the MI Officer Transition Course and, I assume, the MI Officer Basic Course. Since many of the MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) graduates will go on to become battalion S2s, perhaps it would be a good idea to incorporate the tactical level of planning and operations into that course. Either that or create a battalion S2 course that stresses what they should know and do, and teach it to prospective S2s just before they go off to their new units. As a battalion S2, I would have been better served by taking the Tran-

sition Course after the MIOAC so that the information presented there would have been fresher in my mind. Regardless of where one learns the rules of employment, either in school or through experience, there are specific things to consider depending on the type of operation being conducted.

Movement to Contact

By nature, a movement to contact must be flexible—although not unpredictable. The intelligence officer must template likely avenues of approach and the most likely areas of defensible terrain, where the enemy may stop and set up a hasty defense to await his still moving opponent. This type of battle, dubbed the "movement to hasty defense," is becoming popular at the NTC. The commander must have a plan to counter any possible enemy courses of action (COAs) throughout the zone of attack. The R&S plan must provide coverage throughout the zone to give the commander enough time to prepare for whichever option the enemy executes.

The keys to the movement to contact reconnaissance fight are as follows:

- ☐ Speed the scouts in; they are less likely to be caught while moving by enemy scouts or counterreconnaissance teams.
- ☐ Push assets to the objective or until the enemy assembly area or laager site is found (depth). If the laager is located early enough, certain COAs can be invalidated and the S2 may have to redistribute reconnaissance assets in depth. Make the R&S plan flexible enough to take this into account.
- ☐ Keep dismounted OPs close to vehicles. They may have to remount quickly if the vehicle has to "shadow" the enemy force throughout the zone.
- ☐ Make certain the scouts know the maneuver plan. They can predict where the battle will to take place and suggest options to the commander. They can also vector friendly forces to exposed enemy flanks or weak spots.
- ☐ Ensure the S2 knows the maneuver plan and look for the critical pieces of information. For example, if the criteria to commit the main body in the north is the commitment of the enemy's second TF in the south, the S2 can focus his attention on those assets that can see deep to the north and south.
- ☐ Incorporate the scouts into the indirect fire plan. Make sure that scouts know which targets are in their areas of responsibility. This would be especially critical during the deep fight when scouts provide the only eyes on deep targets.
- ☐ Tell the scouts the locations of the friendly family of artillery scatterable mines (FASCAM), chemical strikes, etc. This is self-explanatory.
- ☐ Track the enemy by teams or companies. When facing an enemy motorized rifle battalion, track motorized rifle companies (MRCs). Do not get wrapped up about tracking a "doctrinal" 10 tanks and 31 BMP armored personnel carriers. Just find all the MRCs and the numbers will take care of themselves. Reports on MRCs rather than numbers of vehicles also take up less time on crowded command nets.

Above all, the S2 must be able to communicate with all the scouts throughout the entire depth of the battlefield.

Defense

During the defense, the scouts must be **incorporated into** (not solely responsible for) the counterreconnaissance plan. Doctrinally, the S3 is responsible for planning and executing the counterreconnaissance fight, but the S2 plays a big part in it. The counterreconnaissance plan must be coordinated in detail among the S2, the S3, the fire support officer (FSO), the scout platoon leader, and any commander supplying troops to the counterreconnaissance fight. The following are four key elements of the counterreconnaissance.

OP Positions For Scouts. Scouts should be delegated to the "hunter" role as much as possible. "Killer" teams should be employed to kill enemy reconnaissance vehicles. The S2 must ensure that the scout platoon leader has the frequencies of the unit providing the killer force. Allowing the scouts to directly vector in the killer teams is much more efficient and responsive than is coordinating through the TOC. The S2 must monitor the battle, however, in order to track enemy reconnaissance strength and discern the enemy reconnaissance plan (if any).

Limited Visibility Plan. Scouts should be assigned to conduct patrols of choke points through which enemy reconnaissance vehicles must traverse. Patrols can be covert or overt. Covert patrols are best conducted with thermal-sight-equipped vehicles, either individually or in sections. These vehicles can set ambush positions along their patrol routes. Enemy BMPs sometimes conduct overt patrols using searchlight drills to seek our reconnaissance vehicles along constricted terrain.

> It only takes a little information, properly interpreted, to discern the enemy defensive plan

This also has the effect of causing friendly reconnaissance to go to ground. OP positions should also be shifted or collapsed to account for their limited observation range in darkness or other conditions of low visibility.

Illumination Plan. Indirect illumination support should be coordinated beforehand with the FSO. Illumination should be both on call and fired according to a fixed, but unpredictable schedule to ensure

constant illumination within the scouts' area of observation. Nothing will ruin a stealthy scout's night more than an illumination round popping above him. Plan illumination points over choke points and likely infiltration routes.

Reporting Plan. Scouts and the "killer" teams should know their positions and responsibilities in relation to each other. Once an OP picks up an enemy scout, it should know who will pick up contact once the enemy moves out of its observation range. A contact should be tracked until it is killed. If a contact is lost between assets, the TOC (which should have been monitoring all along) can detail other assets to search for and kill the enemy, or at least template where the enemy will emerge or has gone to ground.

The key to defensive battles is to keep eyes alive throughout sector and track enemy movements into the main defensive area while denying him "eyes on" your own defensive preparations. Coordination among the S2, S3, maneuver commander, and FSO is critical for success in the counterreconnaissance battle. No one staff officer or commander should be left alone to fight it.

Offense

Conducting an attack against a defending enemy is where the battalion or TF S2 can most visibly make a difference. If time permits, the information from the scouts can aid in constructing a good picture of the situation leading to more informed decisions. The defending enemy is hindered by the same elements that make him stronger: his static positions. While giving him strength, these positions dictate where he will fight and telegraph his intentions if observed. Without fully successful counterreconnaissance fights, the enemy must always assume we know where he is and what he will do. It only takes a little information, properly interpreted, to discern the enemy defensive plan. Key elements for reconnaissance in the offense include the following eight elements.

Plan initial reconnaissance throughout the sector. Do not sell yourself on one enemy COA. Plan for your reconnaissance assets to observe throughout the sector and all probable enemy COAs. The area you discount may very well be where the enemy is planning to defend.

Plan to use dismounted OPs. Just one two-soldier OP team can provide all the information needed to plan an attack. A counterreconnaissance effort that destroys all of the known enemy reconnaissance vehicles may well overlook one or two dismounted teams. Ensure that OPs have the means to talk back to the TOC and make sure they have enough supplies to last through the duration.

Know what to look for. Many analysts do not know what an actual defensive position or battle position looks like on the ground. S2s, analysts, and scouts should be given the opportunity to either take part in or observe defensive preparation. They should know how to plan and site individual fighting positions, and how to combine them with others to create a kill zone or "fire sack." Often, one or two holes (vehicle fighting positions) being dug can allow for correct templating of an entire TF defensive plan. Holes are not mobile. They are usually too time-intensive to dig to be part of a deception—blade hours are too valuable to waste. Likewise, complex wire obstacles are not likely to be moved. Holes and more than single-strand wire obstacles will lock in a suspected enemy template.

Ensure spot reports are complete. Reports on holes must contain orientation, what is digging them, and what is "proofing" the hole (tank, infantry fighting vehicle, etc.). Reports on obstacles must contain type, length, orientation, lanes through or bypasses, and if any overwatch forces are present. Reports of laager sites should contain composition of the force and if the enemy is conducting any rehearsals. A laager to the rear of prepared positions could be a reserve; movement to parts of the battlefield and back to the laager show where commitment of the reserve is planned.

Account for all subelements of the enemy force (MRCs or teams). Company-size elements will have semi-independent missions (their own battle positions or a reserve mission, for example) and are easier to track than platoons or individual vehicles. The enemy will also likely reposition whole companies at a time rather than smaller elements.

Require exacting detail at the planned point of penetration. Once the decision is made to attack a certain point of the enemy's defense, concentrate your reconnaissance assets on that point. A large-scale sketch of all enemy vehicle or fighting positions, as well as the obstacles in the area, is invaluable in the final planning process. I do offer you this warning: do not become fixated on this point. Maintain eyes throughout the sector. Plans can change, and the enemy can and does reposition his forces.

Address Verification

Due to new postal regulations, we are updating our mailing lists for the MIPB. The Post Office now requires building numbers, street addresses, and nine-digit zip codes. APO addresses should include unit, box, and CMR number as appropriate. Other overseas or non-U.S. addresses should be complete, including postal and country codes and names. Please review and update your mailing label. If your address is not correct or incomplete, please notify us by E-mail at martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. Include both your incorrect and correct addresses. You can also call us at commercial (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015.

Be flexible in your thinking on enemy defensive doctrine. Do not force incoming information to fit your preconceived template

Know what you do not or cannot see. Identify gaps in your intelligence picture and attempt to fill them by repositioning assets. Template what you do not see in the worst possible light—that is probably exactly what the enemy is doing.

Ask questions. Do not assume your scouts can see over the ridge or into the draw. Ask them if they can, and ask while there is still time to correct any problems (this usually means before the sun comes up). Ask for updates on new forces, compositions, and anything that does not make sense. The information is almost always out there; it is your responsibility to ask the question so that the answer is in a form you can use. There is always more information to gather about an enemy defense. Although you may be able to make a successful plan with a 70-percent solution, always strive for the total picture. The more you know, the better off you will be. Keep the commander constantly informed of new information that may change the complexion of the enemy's plan. Do not, however, burden him with details that will not alter his decision. A water buffalo laager may indicate a static support area and help to confirm your template, but the commander does not need to know that over the command net as he is approaching his chosen point of penetration.

Be flexible in your thinking on enemy defensive doctrine. Do not force incoming information to fit your preconceived template of what is right. Apply the common sense rule: if it makes sense and it can adversely affect you during your attack, that is probably exactly what he is doing. Give your enemy the credit he is due.

Parting Thoughts

Today's combat battalion S2 must be the master of the asset he can actually control: the battalion scout platoon. He must intimately know their capabilities and limitations and be able to exploit these to their full advantage. The S2 must know what the commander expects of him and when it is expected. Few combat arms commanders will be impressed with fancy R&S graphics or overhead imagery reports when it is time to cross the line of departure if they do not have a good feel for the enemy. Your responsibility is to give the commander that knowledge of the enemy and, if you cannot give that to him with your own assets, you may very well disappoint him someday.

Commanders owe it to their S2s to verbalize their expectations of their intelligence officers early on. They must also realize that not all S2s will have the same experience they do when it comes to combat operations. The commander may have to familiarize new S2s with basic combat operations. Although the S2 may be school-trained, things look very different on the ground.

Intelligence from higher echelons is good and sometimes necessary, but national assets get retasked, good communications security defeats or deceives EW assets, and bad weather grounds unmanned aerial vehicles. G2s and brigade S2s have a much bigger piece of real estate to worry about than just your TF sector.

The battalion S2 is responsible for telling his commander what is in front of him, what he is going to have to fight and kill, and telling him in enough detail to allow him to accomplish his mission with a minimum loss of soldiers' lives. To be assured of accomplishing this mission, the battalion S2 must be a master of the basics and a master of his organic reconnaissance assets. The price of depending on what you cannot control may be too high to pay.

Captain Fuss is currently at the Defense Language Institute in the Presidio of Monterey, California. He has served as an Assistant Brigade S2 (OPFOR); OPFOR Regimental Chief of Reconnaissance; and Commander, Detachment C, 203d MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence). He has a bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy in Foreign Area Studies. Readers can contact him via E-mail at Scubafuss@aol.com.

Roster of Reserve MI Training Institutions

Having trouble contacting Reserve MI training institutions? The old Reserve Forces intelligence schools have changed their designations. The following table provides old and new unit designations, school codes, and phone numbers.

OLD	NEW	SCHOOL CODE	PHONE
1st RFI	6th Bn (MI) 98th RGT 3d Bde (CS) 98th Div (IT)	A 301	C: (508) 796-6071 DSN: 256-6071/81
2d RFI	6th Bn (MI) 108th RGT 3d Bde (CS) 108th Div (IT)	C 301	C: (910) 396-6837 DSN: 236-6837
4th RFI	2d Bn (MI) 84th RGT 3d Bde (CS) 84th Div (IT)	E 301	C: (608) 388-4102 DSN: 280-4102
5th RFI	6th Bn (MI) 95th RGT 3d Bde 95th DIV (IT)	F 301	C: (210) 295-7738 DSN: 421-7639
6th RFI	5th Bn (MI) 104th RGT 3d Bde 104th Div (IT)	G 301	C: (520) 538-2311 DSN: 879-2311/12

So You're Taking Command...

by Captain Philippe J. Crettol

All professional officers look forward to taking command. They see it not as a "ticket punch" to promotion or branch qualification, but as a venerable duty. In effect, you are going to be responsible for between two and two hundred (or more) lives. There is no set way to initiate your command. No two commanders think, act, or feel alike. They will each handle things differently based on their judgment and past experiences. What works for me may not work for you, but it will give you another perspective as you begin your command.

Before you take command, do a quick self-examination. How is your family life? Are you having marital troubles? Is your spouse or a child seriously ill? Are there any other "personal problems" to consider? If there are, you might want to rethink taking command. As a commander, you need to have your life in order because you will devoting nearly every waking moment to the soldiers in your command. This does not mean that you give up your family during command, but you must be focused on your soldiers first.

You also need to think over your command philosophy. What are your views on—

- ☐ Soldier care issues?
- ☐ Maintenance?
- ☐ Supply discipline?
- ☐ Training?
- ☐ The role of your subordinates within the company?
- ☐ Management philosophy?

Set your views down on paper at least thirty days before you take command. Compare them with your battalion and brigade commanders' command philosophies for consistency. Also show it to other officers whom you respect for their views.

Your First Thirty Days

As the incoming commander, you will be in the company for approximately two to three weeks before you take command. For the most part, you will be involved with inventories and reviewing the company's mission essential task list (METL) and previous quarterly training briefs (QTBs). Remember during this time that you are not in command. Set the standard: look and act like the future commander. If the commander is doing things or has polices with which you do not agree, you should not say anything. Soldiers will also ask you about your opinion on various policies and so forth. Do not fall into the trap of telling them that you will change a specific policy the day you take command. Do not be the one who subverts the commander during his last weeks of command.

The change-of-command inventory is your first real chance to appraise the company's standards. Is the inventory included on the training schedule? Is there a published operations order that covers who will do what and when? This is your first glimpse of your company and how it runs. If the appearance of the change-of-command inventory is "fly-by-night," then the odds are that the company as a whole operates in this manner.

As you go through the inventory process, examine everything. Inspect all equipment for both accountability and serviceability. Ensure that you physically see all items for which you are to sign; if you do not see it, do not sign for it. Do not accept the old *"it is in maintenance"* or *"we do not have a technical manual for it."* Demand to see everything. No matter how familiar you may be with a piece of equipment, make the soldiers produce the documents that identify the components. If they do not have them, then it is a sign that they have not been doing proper inventories. If it needs to be coded out or direct-exchanged, then have the supply sergeant do it right then and there. Your goal is to view 100 percent of the property and that you sign for and possess only the equipment that is serviceable.

At the end of each day, meet with the supply sergeant, executive officer (XO) (if you have one!), departing commander, and 1SG to discuss the day's inventory and view the updated handreceipts. Stand tough on supply. It is the first standard that you will set and it allows you to set yourself up for success by starting out with all of your property inspected and properly sub-handreceipted. One last thing: the current commander needs to be present during this meeting. Do not let him off the hook. If the inventory is on the training schedule and is covered by an operations order, then there is no reason he cannot be there.

During the thirty days, also look at your company's METL and the past two QTBs. Become familiar with the unit's mission and the company's performance. Though no two units do QTBs the same way, all of them discuss the METL and various unit statistics such as the weapons qualification, linguist proficiency, and so forth. This will give you a "paper" view of the company that you will then fuse with what you have seen during the change-of-command inventory.

The final angle you will want is the view from higher levels. Talk

There are two approaches: no changes for the first thirty days...and changes within the first hour. This is totally up to you

with the battalion command sergeant major, XO, S3, S1, S2, S4, and chaplain. (I assume that you already talked with the battalion commander about your future company.) Ask what they perceive to be the strengths and weaknesses of your company. You will have a pretty good feel for how your company stands in terms of training, supply, maintenance, and soldier living-conditions. Finally, attend all unit meetings (company and battalion training, and battalion command and staff) with the current commander. Let him do the talking and use the time to get a feel for how the unit operates both at the battalion and company levels.

Determine Your Goals

You should now have a very good feel for your unit. The next major step is to determine where you want to go. Your commander will have some ideas (philosophically as well as via the QTB) on what you should accomplish. There are two approaches: no changes for the first thirty days (sit back and watch approach) and changes within the first hour. This is totally up to you. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. My view is that this is your unit, and your company directly reflects you. You are responsible for everything, good, bad, right, or wrong from the moment that you take command. If you are uncomfortable with a policy or procedure, then change it.

You Are In Command

Take your 1SG to lunch the first day and discuss what you have seen and what you think of the company. See if the 1SG has the same "read" of the unit. Let your 1SG know what you want to do and why. Regardless of personalities, you two must work as a team toward a common goal. Its critical that the two of you are on the same sheet of paper and represent a united front.

Afterward, take your key leaders (platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, etc.) to lunch and have the same type of conversation. See what they think. There is always resistance to change so be prepared to hear why they cannot change. If they have good reasons—great. If not, let them know what the plan is and have them implement it.

The final piece to this is talking to the company as a whole. Assemble the unit in a post theater or battalion classroom, the mess hall, or wherever you can get everyone together. Let them all know your command philosophy and what you expect from them.

Finally, do not view your fellow commanders as "the competition." In today's Army, it is easy to feel that you must outdo everyone else to get ahead. While you want to do the best job that you possibly can, do not forget to work with your fellow commanders. Each commander will have skills or experiences that can help you. You will also have certain techniques or policies that will help them. Work together and share the information. Try to meet each one every week or two and discuss what is new and any problems that you may be having. They may be able to give you a different twist on how to handle a certain situation.

Conclusion

Command is the best experience that the Army has to offer. The workload can be tremendous, but then, so can the satisfaction. Remember, the bottom line of command is taking care of soldiers. Set them up for success by ensuring that they can fight, win and survive on the battlefield. Do your part, do it well, do it with the interests of your soldiers first and foremost, and you will be successful.

Captain Crettol is currently the Commander of Alpha Company, 326th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He has served in various armor and cavalry units before being detailed to MI. Captain Crettol has a bachelors degree in European History from Boston University. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-6583, DSN 821-6583 and via E-mail at Crettolp@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame. Anyone can nominate an individual for induction into the MI Corps Hall of Fame. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination.

A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI which reflects favorably on the MI Corps. In certain isolated instances (particularly in the case of junior soldiers), the nomination may be based on heroic actions rather than other documented contributions.

Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the time of their nomination. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. An annual Hall of Fame Board convenes to review nominations and make recommendations to the Chief of MI, who is the final approving authority for inductions into the Hall of Fame.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (Hall of Fame), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; call (520) 533-1178 or DSN 821-1178; or send E-mail to chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

The Successful Lieutenant

by Captain Christopher J. Courtney

The lieutenant years are the time we officers get our first real lessons in leadership, training, maintenance, supply, and soldier care. Though many people talk about the trials and tribulations of being a lieutenant, there is little written today on how to do it right. The purpose of this article is to pass along some helpful hints which I learned on my own and some which were passed on to me by older and wiser officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Ten Rules for Success

Lead From The Front. The privilege of leading U.S. Army soldiers is an honor you should not take lightly. Your first priority must be to become worthy of leading them. Lead by example every day and in everything you do, whether it is at physical training, on field exercises, or on the range. Face it, you will have to prove yourself every day as a lieutenant. Put yourself in their shoes and take a hard look at yourself. Would you follow a person with your standards? Would you follow a person with your level of tactical and technical expertise? Do not be a hypocrite. If you expect the soldiers to meet a certain standard, ensure you exceed it. Stay cool under pressure and be a calming presence in the platoon when things get stressful. Remember this when you arrive as a new platoon leader, you are like a transplanted organ. The body (platoon) either accepts or rejects you based on your professionalism and attitude.

Put The Troops First. This rule is perhaps best summarized in a quotation from Field Marshal Sir William Slim. He was the commander of the British 14th Army in the Burma Campaign of World War II.

> *I tell you* ***as officers****, that you will not eat, sleep, smoke, sit down, or lie down until your soldiers have had a chance to do these things. If you hold to this, they will follow you to the ends of the earth, if you do not,* ***I will break you in front of your regiments****.*

Quite simply, you put the needs of your troops ahead of your own with every chance you get. As a platoon leader, I had a simple rule—in the field, no squad leader could eat until all of his soldiers had eaten, the platoon sergeant could not eat until all of the squad leaders had eaten, and I could not eat until the platoon sergeant had eaten. On the surface it appears a minor gesture but to the soldiers it cements the bond between the leader and those led. Spare no effort to praise and reward soldiers for outstanding performance—it costs nothing and gains everything. Help them solve their problems and you will earn their loyalty. Remember, soldiers are smart and can smell a phony a mile away. Get to know the soldiers in your platoon. After three months, you should know their names, names of family members, home towns,and any unique problems with which you can help. Showcase your good soldiers to the company and battalion commanders. This way, when it comes time to approve their awards, they will remember the soldiers and approve them. If you take good care of your soldiers they will take care of you.

Lead Through Your NCOs. You must do everything you can to empower, support, and resource your platoon sergeant and squad leaders. Let them execute your orders without excessive guidance and interference. You do this best by issuing clear, concise orders which give your NCOs the information they need to successfully accomplish the mission. Believe me, they want to accomplish the mission as much as you do. It may be tempting to do everything yourself because you are not comfortable delegating. If you follow this course, you are sure to fail. Platoon leaders who play the "sponge" and soak up all duties and responsibilities will drop the ball on many missions because they cannot do it all. Delegate responsibility to your NCOs and let them execute. Delegation is all about trust: you trust your NCOs to accomplish the mission and they trust you to give the right orders. They will make some mistakes (as you will, trust me) but will learn and grow from the experience.

You should seldom, if ever, give an order directly to an individual soldier. As a rule of thumb, you

Lead from the front.
Put the troops first.
Lead through your NCOs.
Training is your number one priority.
Inspect what you expect.
Know what you do not know (and do something about it).
Guard your integrity.
Understand the roles of other leaders.
Learn to make do with scarce resources and personnel.
Remember to have fun and never lose your sense of humor.

Figure 1. Ten Rules for Successful Lieutenants.

give orders to the platoon sergeant and squad leaders who execute the mission. In addition, do not let your soldiers jump their chains of command to see you, except in rare cases, such as equal opportunity or sexual harassment. Allowing soldiers to jump the chain of command cheats your NCOs out of the chance to lead and weakens the overall leadership of the platoon. Be aware that soldiers may try to play you and your platoon sergeant against one another. You can prevent this through continuous, open, two-way communication. Remember, you and your platoon sergeant can disagree behind closed doors, but must present a united front to the platoon.

Training Is Your Number One Priority. Focus your training on the platoon mission essential task list (METL) and do whatever you can to reduce training distractions. Push your soldiers hard to make them the very best but do not burn them out. Everything you do should prepare the platoon to conduct its wartime mission. Remember, soldiers fight the same way they train, so make training as realistic as possible. For example, preventive maintenance inspection should be conducted wearing Kevlar and load-carrying equipment, under the same conditions as the range. If you have a platoon battle drill which must be conducted at night, ensure you train it at night. Train your platoon to execute battle drills and prepare for deployment on "autopilot" where everyone knows exactly what to do and when. A well-trained platoon in action is a sight to behold. In addition, study both **FM 25-100**, **Training the Force**, and **FM 25-101**, **Battle Focused Training**, until their principles become second nature.

Inspect What You Expect. One of the greatest favors my first platoon sergeant did for me was to teach me how to inspect the platoon. We went to the motorpool for two days and I learned how to inspect every piece of equipment and he showed me ways soldiers would sometimes take shortcuts. Armed with this knowledge, I was able to inspect weapons and equipment to see if the unit was doing proper preventive maintenance checks and services, field recovery, and so forth. For example, my platoon's generators were becoming nonmission-capable because they kept blowing seals. Soldiers were often reading the wrong side of the dipstick and overfilling them, resulting in many blown seals. The solution was simple—squad leaders ensured the soldiers knew how to read the dipstick so they knew the standard. I knew how to read both the hot and cold sides of the oil dipstick on the generator so the NCOs and I put special emphasis on generators at the normal platoon Friday inspection before the platoon was released. Generators overfilled with oil had to have the excess oil removed before that crew could go home. Needless to say, generators stopped going down for blown seals. It was important that the platoon leader inspect the vehicles and equipment along with the squad leaders. Soldiers need to see you getting your hands dirty and checking things. It is human nature that people will do their best at something that will be checked. If you do not check something, your soldiers probably will think it is not important to you.

Know What You Do Not Know (And Do Something About It). It is a cardinal error for a lieutenant to be a "know-it-all." Nothing turns off the troops faster—or brings down morale more—than a know-it-all lieutenant. Yes, those of you with prior enlisted service, this includes you too. Work hard to learn the unit's tactical standard operating procedure, battle drills, field standards, maintenance procedures, and regulations. You will never know it all. Admitting to your platoon sergeant that you do not know something is not a sign of weakness, it is a sign of honesty. Weakness is the lieutenant who does not take the time to learn their profession and asks the platoon sergeant about **everything**.

Professional development is something you should constantly pursue. Any good program of self-development should include vigorous professional reading. The military qualification standard reading list is a great place to start but do not stop once you have finished those selections. Books I recommend that every lieutenant reads include **Platoon Leader** by Jack MacDonough, **The Defense of Duffer's Drift** by E.B. Swinton, and **The Armed Forces Officer** by S.L. Marshall (**DA Pamphlet 600-2**). I particularly like **The Armed Forces Officer** for its chapters on leadership, morale, and training. Professional development also comes in many guises other than formal schooling, such as—

- ☐ Appointment as a Report of Survey or "15-6 officer."
- ☐ Taskings to Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighter exercises
- ☐ Normal rotations to one of the combat training centers.

When I think back on the times I learned the most, they were not often in a traditional school environment but rather at the Army's school of hard knocks.

Guard Your Integrity. An officer must have impeccable integrity in word and deed. Your soldiers must trust you because in combat they are trusting you with their lives. Never compromise your integrity. It is perhaps best stated by Captain Peter G. Kilner in an article titled "Developing a Cohesive Unit" he wrote for the May-June 1995 issue of ***Infantry***:

Some people think integrity means to refrain from lying. They are right, to an extent—about 10 percent. Integrity is much, much more than simply not lying. It means telling the whole truth, unsolicited, even when it hurts you or someone else. It means not allowing someone to be misled or

misinformed. Integrity is proactive.

You will face numerous ethical dilemmas as a lieutenant and must maintain your integrity in each situation. Some situations will seem so murky you have a difficult time telling right from wrong. When in doubt, trust your instincts to do what is right.

Understand the Roles of the Other Leaders. You should understand the roles other leaders play in your success as a lieutenant. The following are some to whom you should pay particular attention; they include the first sergeant, commander, and your peers.

First sergeants are a great untapped source of guidance since many lieutenants do not take advantage of their expertise. The 1SG has already been a successful platoon sergeant and trained many lieutenants just like you. The 1SG can be particularly helpful when you and your platoon sergeant are having a personality conflict or you need help writing NCO Evaluation Reports.

Friendly rivalries can be good...as long as you keep it in perspective. Remember, there is plenty of room at the top

The 1SG is the commander's right hand and totally loyal to the commander. If you have any type of disagreement with the first sergeant, ensure it stays at a professional level and that neither of you says or does anything to compromise the other's position with the troops. Ensure you do not ever force your commander to choose sides between you and the 1SG—you will lose.

The company commander wil have the greatest impact on your growth as a lieutenant. Your commander should be your mentor, leader, coach, and counselor. Company commanders in MI units are generally more senior than those in the combat arms. Like you, they had to interview for their positions and were chosen for their outstanding potential. Luckily for you, this all means your commander is very qualified to develop you and guide you in your growth as an officer. Expect your commander to be hard on you and give you what seems like an impossible number of tasks to accomplish. Your commander will never give you a task you cannot accomplish. You can prove yourself best to your commander by working hard and taking care of the platoon.

You may end up serving under a commander you think is not a good leader or who is only looking out for himself. If you do, keep your mouth shut, work hard, take care of the soldiers, and do your best to make the unit successful anyway. If there is unethical or criminal activity, talk to the battalion executive officer or chaplain.

In almost all cases, your commander will be an outstanding officer you can look up to and learn from. Good commanders counsel you for good and bad performance and set goals for you to achieve. You will make some mistakes and should expect to be counseled for them either formally or informally. Take this counseling to heart but do not get down on yourself. What your commander is looking for is to see if you make the same mistake twice. Your job is to ensure you do not.

The camaraderie you develop with other lieutenants in your unit will stay with you the rest of your life. Work together and share ideas so you all will be successful. Whatever you do, never try to undermine another lieutenant to make your platoon look better. For one thing, that is both unprofessional and unethical. In addition, that lieutenant's troops will not appreciate it (and troops have funny ways of letting you know this). No one likes a backstabber. Friendly rivalries can be good for all of you as long as you keep it in perspective. Remember, there is plenty of room at the top.

Learn to Make Do With Scarce Resources and Personnel. Lieutenants today must make do with fewer resources and personnel than many of us did as lieutenants. In the past, the platoon was almost always overstrength, fuel was plentiful, and our class IX (repair parts) budget seemed limitless. In today's world of dwindling resources and personnel shortages, leaders must be more creative and resourceful. This means you and your NCOs take on more additional duties and cross-train in more skills than ever before. You must figure out how to come up with two MI systems crews when you only have personnel for one. You and your NCOs must figure out how to maintain six vehicles and ensure their servicing, etc., is completed with personnel for only three vehicle crews. Remember too that these are the same soldiers who are taking on these extra duties, cross training on everything else, pulling post details, going to the range, and pulling staff duty.

Remember to Have Fun and Never Lose Your Sense of Humor. Serving as an Army officer is very rewarding and can be fun if you keep your perspective. It all depends on your attitude. Your attitude is a choice you make every day and has a great effect on your troops. An officer's negative attitude will spread throughout the platoon and lower morale. Keep a positive attitude—it can be contagious. When it is freezing cold and rainy in the field, look like you are having the time of your life. Your troops may say *"that lieutenant is crazy,"* but they will have a better attitude and work better as a team. If your troops and peers play harmless jokes on you, look at it as a good sign; it means they think you are OK.

And Finally

The lieutenant years are some of the most rewarding and memo-

(Continued on page 51)

What a Combat Commander Expects of His S2

by Colonel Henry L. Kinnison

"What will he expect from me?" you wonder. The note the Brigade S2 just handed you says that you are to report in two months to Lieutenant Colonel Smith of the 1st Battalion, 808th Infantry. His S2 officer will move to a new job in the division's intelligence battalion. LTC Smith has a reputation as the best battalion commander in the division. You have heard the Brigade S2 say several times that Captain Jones is the best S2 she has ever seen. The battalion has made several tough deployments overseas plus rotations at both the National and Joint Readiness Training Centers.

"How will I ever measure up to LTC Smith's expectations?" you wonder. Reading the concern on your face, the Brigade S2 smiles. *"You are probably wondering how to prepare yourself,"* she says. *"Well, I've made an appointment for you to meet tomorrow with LTC Smith. I thought it would help if you heard from him what he expects from an S2."*

Commander's Expectations

Reporting to the battalion commander the next afternoon, you feel nervous and excited. He quickly puts you at ease. He asks what you expect to accomplish as the battalion S2, and about your family, hobbies, sports, and schooling. You begin to think this will not be so hard. Finally he asks if there is anything you would like to know. *"Well,"* you say, *"what do you expect from your S2?"*

LTC Smith reflects for a moment and says that it is really simple if you understand that intelligence drives operations and, in this outfit, he directs intelligence. The XO and the S3 can help him direct the battalion's operations. You, as the S2, will serve as the principal staff leader for the intelligence effort. You must be the expert in everything involving the intelligence activities of this battalion. I will trust my S2 to help the leaders of the battalion visualize the enemy and understand what he might do. You will have to make a lot of hard calls. He says, *"To make those calls stick, for us to believe you, you'll have to know your business."*

The commander will expect you to have a well-run shop with well-rehearsed procedures

The S2 helps lead the decisionmaking process and also the commander's preparation of the battlefield. LTC Smith continues, *"In some outfits, this is called the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), but here the process belongs to me and—to a certain degree—to every commander and staff officer in the 1st Battalion."* As the S2, you will be the officer expected to orchestrate the staff's efforts to understand the enemy and the terrain on which the battalion will fight. I will expect my S2 to obtain answers to my priority information requirements (PIR). You will focus the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) to collect information essential to answering the questions asked in the PIR. You will help ensure the targeting process hits the enemy in a way that will help the tactical plan. You must aggressively argue the enemy's point of view as the brigade develops and executes its plans. Sometimes the S3 or even I will see the enemy situation differently than you will. It is important that you aggressively argue how **you** see the enemy until the decision to act is made.

"Sir, what personally will you expect of me?" you ask. You should come to this job in excellent physical condition. You must know the IPB process and possess an intimate knowledge of the 34-series of field manuals. You should also have a practical working knowledge of the military decisionmaking process.

LTC Smith says that there are actually a number of areas within the S2's arena he thinks are very important. These include the following:

- ☐ Helping in the preparation of the battlefield or IPB as it is often shown in the manuals.
- ☐ Planning the battalion R&S.

- ☐ Focusing assets providing intelligence and electronic warfare.
- ☐ Supporting the battalion targeting process.

I will expect you to have a well-run shop with well-rehearsed procedures. You will also overwatch the scout platoon's training to ensure you intimately understand that key R&S capability. You will serve as the senior observer/controller (O/C) for the scout platoon's training evaluations. In fact, you will serve as the officer-in-charge and principal O/C for all of their live-fire maneuver exercises. You must possess an intuitive feel for the challenges faced by the scouts.

Critical Areas in the Decisionmaking Process

LTC Smith says that while he will expect excellence in all of these areas, he recommends that you focus your studies for now on three critical areas in the decisionmaking process. These three areas are where the commander will have to rely heavily on your abilities as an S2. In fact, the battalion's success or failure will depend on your performance in the areas of—

- ☐ Mission analysis.
- ☐ The wargame.
- ☐ The presentation and issuance of the order.

You will be successful in these areas if you do the following.

In mission analysis, you will succeed if you used the collective knowledge and expertise of the staff to educate and prepare the staff for course of action (COA) development during the S2's portion of the mission analysis briefing. This will mean that you will have given your boss a clear understanding of the impacts of weather, terrain, and the enemy. Your presentation will reflect a product of the entire staff, not just your section's effort. For example, your terrain analysis must show the input of the battalion engineer, the signal officer, and the S3. Your projection of the enemy's most probable and dangerous COA must take into consideration the entire staff's analysis in their areas of expertise. This might include input from the commander or leader from units attached to the battalion such as a tank company and perhaps elements of an Air-Ground-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

In wargaming, you will face a real challenge, but you must meet it "heads up." You will have to organize your S2 shop down to the task, condition, and standard for the production of each intelligence product necessary for a completely successful wargame. By the end of every wargame (which I expect to last no longer than an hour and a half), you must have refined our collection and R&S plans. You will also have helped translate the battalion's high-value targets into high-payoff targets. Unless you are told different, these plans will always focus on the enemy's most probable COA. You must drive the wargaming process. Otherwise, the battalion will not develop a tactical plan designed to defeat what the enemy will most likely do. You must understand this process and the products you will need, before you deploy in tactical operations. I myself or the XO may run the wargame.

In the presentation and issuance of orders, you must focus your remarks and written input to guide and direct the company commanders and the leaders of the battalion's special platoons, sections, and all attached units. Sometimes staff officers think they are giving the battalion order to the battalion commander. In this battalion, you will help me give my order to the leaders and subordinate commanders.

In your presentation, you will succeed if you present the enemy's most probable COA in a way that each platoon leader and special platoon squad leader of the battalion can grasp easily. You must make your presentation so clearly and concisely that they will understand the enemy's actions (the COA he is following) when they are on the ground under fire. They will want to hear you talk about the enemy that **they** will face, not necessarily the one the battalion or brigade will have to meet. In all of your products and your presentation of enemy strengths and vulnerabilities in your part of the commander's order, you must focus on the folks who will be at the point of contact. Always ask yourself if your products are saving time and making the enemy situation clearer to the commanders and leaders of the battalion.

Conclusion

As LTC Smith talks quietly, quickly, with words carefully chosen, notes begin to fill your note pad. After an hour, he concludes simply, *"What other questions do you have?"* Holding a sheaf of hastily scribbled notes, you answer, *"None, sir, but I might after I have had a chance to review what you told me."* With an easy smile, LTC Smith responds, *"Of course, this will be the first of many conversations about intelligence and the last to be so one-sided. If it's okay with the Brigade S2, why don't you come back next week, and we'll talk about your questions?"* Outside the battalion's headquarters, you pause and think, *"Well, at least I know what this warfighter expects from his S2."*

I owe special thanks in the preparation of this article to LTC Mike Flynn, Mr. Steve Florich, and Colonel (Retired) Ward Miller. Errors in the application of doctrine or technique belong solely to me.

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Predictive Intelligence: Do We Really Need It?

by Major Forrest Lamar Davis

In the extremely volatile "futures" market, Wall Street's mainframes, analysts, and extensive collection network struggle to predict the growth of a single soybean plant, achieving a degree of exactness which leads many observers to call futures the most speculative of all investments. With tremendous data, files, and experience, many sportcasters attempt the same, establishing a similar record of mixed success. Many French generals predicted *"Germany will attack through Belgium as they did during the Great War."* We all know what happened when the Panzers breached the Ardennes.

Predicting the future is difficult; some would argue impossible. U.S. Army intelligence doctrine currently embraces a "capabilities-intentions" school of thought which demands not only an assessment of enemy capabilities, but an estimate of the enemy's "most likely" or "most probable" course of action (COA). The S2 should tell us what the enemy can do and **what he will do**. The S2 can and should predict the future.

Yet, by our own doctrinal definitions, the requirements for predictive accuracy are so stringent as to render prospects for success virtually nil. We cannot predict the future, but we can guess. And we do—every time we brief the enemy's most likely or probable COA.

The purpose of this essay is to argue that we can no more predict future enemy actions than Wall Street can precisely plot the demand for the soybean. "Predictive" in our context should mean anticipatory, future-oriented, and proactive—though often it purports a definitive description of what will be. The difference is subtle, yet very significant. One definition feeds initiative while the other fuels reaction. In this essay, I wil briefly outline three intelligence schools of thought, argue that we are straddling the "capabilities-intentions" fence, and then highlight why our current position promises significant risks with virtually no potential benefits. My conclusion is simple: we should cease the consideration of the "most likely" enemy COAs during our deliberate decisionmaking processes.

Three Intelligence Schools of Thought

Commanders and intelligence officers tend to embrace one of three intelligence schools of thought in terms of analysis. They are the descriptive-, capabilities-, and intentions-based approaches.[1]

The descriptive school states that S2s should describe the battlefield in factual terms—weather, terrain, and enemy order of battle—and let the commander form his own estimate. This school asserts that **only** the commander can appropriately assess the battlefield in its entirety, and intelligence is just one of the many sources of factual information. Critics of this system argue that this mindset makes the intelligence officer nothing more than a historian: they are probably right.

The capabilities school encourages S2s to extend their analysis to enemy capabilities relative to the friendly mission. Like descriptive adherents, these intelligence officers study the variables of weather, terrain, and enemy order of battle. They extend their analysis to answer a specific capabilities question: *"What could the enemy do to keep us from accomplishing our mission?"*

The intentions school suggests that S2s should go further still, not only ascertaining enemy capabilities relative to the friendly mission, but enemy **intentions** as well. S2s who follow this school of thought strive to answer the difficult "where, when, and in what strength" caveats which often garnish our priority intelligence requirements. They should design not simply enemy COAs, but "most likely" or "most probable" enemy COAs. S2s in this category "predict."

> We conduct capabilities analysis because it is in the realm of the possible. We emphasize intentions because our consumers demand more

The three schools seldom exist in isolation and, due to their complementary nature, some overlap is common. S2s most comfortable with the descriptive school may at times venture into capabilities analysis, following essentially a "descriptive-capabilities" type of approach. S2s who are primarily capabilities adherents sometimes build products more akin to the intentions school, following a "capabilities-intentions" methodology. Current Army intelligence doctrine embraces the school of capabilities-intentions, with particular emphasis on intentions.

Straddling the Fence

Any commander given the choice between what the enemy "can do" or "will do" will choose the latter. "Can do" (capabilities) tells the commander what possibilities the enemy enjoys, each offering varying degrees of risk.

"Will do" (intentions) gives the commander a single COA to counter, allowing him to reasonably concentrate his forces and avoid or mitigate risk. Perhaps this explains our current doctrinal position. We conduct capabilities analysis because it is in the realm of the possible. We emphasize intentions because our consumers demand more. We straddle the fence: one leg in the possible, the other in the unlikely.

Our doctrine is capabilities-based, but intentions-oriented. Our capstone manual, **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, plainly says—

> *predictive intelligence should tell the commander what the enemy is doing, can do (capabilities), and his **most likely** course of action (intentions).*[2] *[emhasis and parentheticals are the author's.]*

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, follows this lead and charges S2s with *"identifying and developing threat courses of action in order of probability of adoption."*[3] **Command and General Staff College Student Text 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes**, institutionalizes the concept further by requiring *"COAs open to the enemy and the probable order of their adoption."*[4] In short, intelligence doctrine requires the S2 to consider all **possible** enemy COAs and, next, leap from this analysis to provide most likely COAs, probability assessments, or, rather, predictions. I say "leap" from analysis to predictions as this is almost certainly what the intelligence officer will be forced to do.

According to **FM 34-1**, the analyst can be assured of effective predictions only when a number of overlapping conditions are met. These include the following:

- ☐ The analyst must have *"identified every characteristic of the battlefield environment that might effect the operation."*[5] Colonel Trevor Dupuy, in **Numbers, Predictions, and War**, identified 73 variables impacting the outcome of any battle, ten of which are intangible (e.g., intelligence, leadership, morale)[6]. Meeting this first requirement for accurate predictions means that the analyst must comprehend at least the majority of DuPuy's variables, collect all the appropriate information, and place them in relational balance with each other.
- ☐ The intelligence officer must have *"identified the opportunities and constraints the environment offers to both friendly and enemy commanders."*[7] Stated differently, this standard requires that the analyst thoroughly understands the seven battlefield operating systems of the opposing forces, their relative combat power, and the effects of the weather and terrain on system proficiency. If our goal is to move, shoot, and communicate against a living enemy, true predictive accuracy requires the analyst to be an experiential expert of weapons and weapons support systems, foreign and domestic.
- ☐ The S2 must have *"thoroughly considered what the threat is capable of and what he prefers to do in like situations."*[8] This standard is the most daunting of all—as it requires the S2 to essentially "be" the enemy commanding general, telescoping the totality of the general's different, life-long experiences into a comprehensible mental model, and think, feel, and decide like the thirty-year veteran. To the degree that the S2 captures the thinking of the threat commander, that S2 will correctly anticipate or predict the threat commander's decisions.

We are smart and our intelligence machines are the finest in the world, but we have not arrived at perfection yet

While our intelligence collection and analysis systems are the finest in history, we still lack the capability to satisfy these three requirements of predictive accuracy. Our machines do not give us a holistic view of the moral and physical domains of war; rather, they give us some snapshots of the enemy in various stages of deployment or redeployment. By analogy, our machines replicate the effects of a strobe light on a dance floor, leaving the analyst to determine if the awkward, sometimes contradictory images of the enemy represent attack, defend,



Descriptive	Capabilities	Intentions
• Weather • Terrain • Enemy	• Weather • Terrain • Enemy • Capabilitites	• Weather • Terrain • Enemy • Capabilitites • Intentions

Figure 1. Intelligence Schools of Thought.

reinforce, or withdraw—where, when, and in what strength.

The variables defining how two opponents will act and react in a battle to the death are, I believe, too varied for human comprehension. Predictive accuracy requires perfect intelligence. We are smart and our intelligence machines are the finest in the world, but we have not arrived at perfection yet.

Risks of Predictive Intelligence

Given the likelihood that our predictive estimates will not prove accurate, what risks are we taking by continuing to straddle the capabilities-intentions fence? I see two. Given our prospects for predictive "inaccuracy," where is the value-added in demanding our S2s provide most likely or most probable COAs? I see none. Ironically, the risks predictive intelligence supposes to mitigate are in fact increased with its use.

First, to the degree that commanders accept their S2s' predictions as reasonably accurate and plan accordingly (*"the S2 said the enemy would come down avenue of approach A, so our main effort is here"*), the command assumes mission risk. Through infiltration or combined arms maneuver, the enemy can attack from the north, south, east, west, and vertically in virtually any scenario and, unless the S2 can read the enemy's mind, we had best prepare for each. Weighing the main effort should stem from our assessment of the terrain, our capabilities, the enemy's capabilities, and our mission. We should weigh our main effort based upon facts, not on what we think the enemy **might** do.

Second, by linking friendly actions to supposed enemy actions, we risk passing the tactical initiative to the enemy. Agility and initiative demand that we move quickly inside the enemy's decision cycle and stay there. We do not react to him; he reacts to us. **We** seize and retain the initiative. Linking friendly actions to supposed enemy actions contradicts these most basic warfighting tenets.[9]

So where is the value-added in demanding most likely enemy COAs? Do they help us weigh the main effort? Not without substantial risk. Do they enhance our abilities to execute doctrine? No.

In fact, most likely COAs are no more probable than any other COA open to our thinking opponent. Most likely COAs are simply COAs, and should be considered equally with every other enemy COA capable of denying friendly accomplishment of the mission. The only value-added in pursuing this product of predictive intelligence is the illusion of certainty, which promises to evaporate the moment the first foot crosses the start point.

Conclusion

Our concern is not so much *"what will the enemy do?"* but *"what can the enemy do to keep us from killing his soldiers, breaking his equipment, or seizing important pieces of terrain?"* The difference is subtle, yet significant. This difference stems from two schools of thought; one seeks intentions, while the other looks for capabilities.

I argue that we need to plant our feet squarely in the realm of capabilities, leaving the pursuit of enemy intentions to those graced with holistic collection machines, integrated battlefield synchronization skills, and the rare ability to see the world through another's eyes. Predictive intelligence enhances risk and detracts from our execution of doctrine. There is no value-added in continuing to straddle the capabilities-intentions fence.

Commanders need to know. Demand that the S2s produce a most likely enemy COA, and you will receive their best estimates. Make that estimate the basis of plans, and you have leveraged your command toward risk. As an Intelligence Corps, we *"see through a glass darkly"* and cannot predict the future. But we can guess, and we do—every time we brief an enemy **most likely** course of action. We would do well to eliminate most likely or probable assessments from our deliberate decisionmaking process.

Endnotes

1. I have borrowed generously from Colonel Elias Townsend's **RISKS: The Key to Combat Intelligence** (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), especially with respect to "capabilities and intentions schools." My use of the term "descriptive school" stems from 1993 personal conversations with Colonel Richard D. Quirk, then Commander, 525th MI Bde, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
2. **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, 27 September 1994, 2-7.
3. **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, 8 July 1994, 1-7.
4. **CGSC Student Text 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes**, 1-4.
5. **FM 34-130**, 1-3.
6. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, **Numbers, Predictions, and War** (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1985), 33.
7. **FM 34-130**, 1-3.
8. Ibid.
9. **FM 100-5, Operations**, June 1993, 2-6 through 2-9.

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Keys to a Successful NTC Rotation

by Captain Frederic P. Filbert

During my tenure as a battalion S2, the Brigade S2 tasked me to brief Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., then Commander of the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. I was to brief how the S2 section prepared for our National Training Center (NTC) rotation and how we executed a specific battle during that rotation. This article is intended to disseminate the preparations for our rotation to the MI community.

Preparation of Personnel

Preparation for the upcoming rotation was multifaceted. Home station preparation began with platoon- to battalion-level combined arms and staff evaluations of Task Force 3-37 Armor. Interspersed with the evaluations, the S2 section participated in an NTC workshop conducted and evaluated by the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) G2 Training Section. The workshop emphasized training in intelligence-related tasks for the soldiers without the added stress of a commander or S3 being present. The workshop required the soldiers to develop intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) templates under the guidance of the assistant S2 (Tactical Intelligence Officer or TIO). The S2 acted as the observer/controller (O/C) and let the section do their work. After completing their planning, they communicated battle information by FM radio. The section was required to track the information as if they were at the NTC. After a few hours, the end of the exercise was called, and an after-action review (AAR) followed. The initial AAR comments focused on **our** exercise; then we viewed NTC AAR tapes showing how a unit at the NTC conducted their IPB for the same mission. The soldiers enjoyed this intense training and looked forward to the NTC rotation to test themselves.

At the battalion staff level, the Task Force (TF) Commander, Operations Officer, and I attended the U.S. Forces Command Leaders Training Program (FLTP) at the NTC. Through classroom instruction and observation of battles in progress, this week-long training program gave us a perspective on how the "Krasnovian" opposing forces (OPFOR) fought. Additionally, I used the trip to take photographs of vehicles and terrain, and interviewed personnel who worked at the NTC. I planned to create a Krasnovian database upon my return to home station.

In the effort to get as many of the intelligence soldiers to the NTC before the rotation as possible, I sent my TIO on a TF tactical exercise without troops to become familiar with the terrain. Fortunately, I had already been to the NTC for the FLTP course and had lived at the NTC for two years. My NCOIC had already been through an NTC rotation and was familiar with Fort Irwin, California. Our familiarity with the terrain proved beneficial to thorough operational planning during the TF's rotation.

After attending the FLTP, I had the opportunity to attend an OPFOR mobile training team program that the 1st ID G2 hosted at Fort Riley, Kansas. I attended this course along with the battalion's scout platoon leader. The class was a modified version of the one taught at the NTC OPFOR Academy. Russian doctrine, and vehicle usage was stressed. We were also evaluated on our ability to prepare for an operation at the NTC using Russian doctrine and graphics.

Krasnovian Database and Battle Book

Simultaneous to unit preparation, the S2 section prepared a database on the Krasnovian OPFOR and the area of operations. The NCOIC started the Krasnovian database by developing a 35-mm slide presentation for the companies in the TF. This helped in identifying Krasnovian vehicles and their Russian counterparts. Also included were slides of the NTC terrain and basic Krasnovian doctrine. Along with the slide classes, we disseminated fact sheet updates to increase the soldiers' knowledge of OPFOR doctrine and vehicle disposition. We also created an NTC OPFOR battle book.

Since enemy doctrine had been changing so dramatically, attempting to continuously update the book would have been difficult. For this reason, the battle book omitted doctrine.

The battle book contained three sections:

- ☐ NTC maps with pictures of key terrain pasted on the other side.
- ☐ Pictures and descriptions of all visually modified (VISMODs) vehicles and actual Russian vehicles used at the NTC.
- ☐ Descriptions of the units, drawings of their crests and patches, and pictures of uniforms and badges, and a map and description of the fictitious island continent where the Krasnovians lived.

The battle book also included information on the Pahrumpian guerrillas. All pictures and maps were in color so that soldiers viewing the book could see vehicles and terrain; images that are not as clear in black-and-white pictures. The book took two months to complete, with the help of the Division's 548th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) and telephone conversations with NTC staff. To make up for the lack of doctrine in the battle book, I maintained a copy of the NTC Tactical Reference Guide produced by the 1st ID G2 training section. The guide contained OPFOR doctrine and information in sufficient detail to allow us to concentrate on



Figure 1. Situational Template for the Attack.

the other areas covered in the battle book.

The section used many sources in creating the database for this rotation. Among the sources used were—

- ☐ Pictures from previous rotations.
- ☐ Former OPFOR soldiers now assigned to our task force.
- ☐ Weekly phone calls to the NTC.
- ☐ Information from other 1st ID units preparing to go to the NTC.

We then disseminated this information to both the TF and to other units in the division that would be going to NTC within a few months of our return.

Two-Team Planning Concept

Before deploying to the NTC, the TF commander levied two requirements related to two-team planning and situation template validation. The first requirement was to develop a TF "1st team-2nd team" concept to take advantage of the five- to six-hour time lag between change of mission and the beginning of the AAR. This was a requirement for the executive officer (XO) and staff. We tested the concept designed during the TF evaluation, and then executed it at the NTC.

The concept worked as follows: upon completion of the brigade orders brief, the fire support officer (FSO) returned to the TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) with a copy of the operations order to start the planning process. The orders group, consisting of the commander, S3, and S2—designated the 1st team—met with the company and team commanders and issued a warning order for the new mission. Meanwhile, the 2nd team, consisting of the TIO, S3 Air, Engineer, FSO, and other staff members, began work on the TF order. When the 1st team returned to the TOC, a second warning order was issued with the basic TF plan. By the time the primary staff and commanders departed for the AAR, further guidance had been issued to the 2nd team for planning purposes. After the AAR was over, 70 to 80 percent of the plan was completed; modifications to complete the plan were made when the 1st team arrived back at the TOC. This process worked well and allowed the company and teams more time to create their plans.

To assist the team commanders in planning, we designed a concise, one-page intelligence annex (Annex B) (see the sidebar on the next page). During the course of several field exercises, we discussed exactly what intelligence the company and team commanders wanted and began shaping the annex based on their recommendations. With the addition of a one-page reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan, a situational overlay, and an R&S overlay, the annex was short and to the point. The whole idea behind a small annex was to be specific and to ensure that the annex would be read by the commanders. Concise documents will be read, and maximize planning time at all levels, thus maintaining the one-third to two-thirds planning rule. Additionally, the commanders could brief their platoon leaders directly from the situation template that the TF commander used to create his plan.

The intelligence annex consisted of five paragraphs—

- ☐ Weather and light data.
- ☐ Enemy situation.
- ☐ Most likely enemy course of action (COA).
- ☐ TF commander's priority intelligence requirements.
- ☐ Terrain.

In the limited time available, it was more important to get specific information to the commanders on the estimated most likely enemy COA, based on current intelligence and mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T), than on doctrinal *"this is what he normally does."*

FM 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, states that the intelligence annex should be as brief as possible. This is not always the case. During most field exercises, the annex ends up very long to write, brief, and disseminate to the company and teams. With short planning time, following doctrine by drawing conclusions for three COAs, briefing a long terrain assessment, and making a conclusion is not possible. The majority of the planning occurred in my head. To decrease wasted planning time, I combined current intelligence, knowledge acquired from training, and the most likely enemy COA to create my analysis. This approach may not work with all commanders. Each commander is different—some may want to see the entire intelligence process to gauge how the S2 formu-

lated the basis for the assessment. In the end, do not spew doctrine, present information.

Do not overlook terrain. Detailed knowledge and analysis of terrain must be stressed to accomplish combined staff planning. Bypass routes and ways to "move up" on the enemy may become readily apparent through detailed terrain analysis. The engineer attached to the TOC is critical in this aspect and his capacity to provide this analysis is often overlooked. Engineer preparation of the battlefield is an important aspect of the total IPB process.

Situation Template Validation

The second requirement levied by the commander tasked me, the S2, to develop a method for confirming or validating the situation template. The result of this was twofold. First, with intelligence dumps directly over the TF command net, analyzed intelligence was rapidly passed to all elements of the task force. This alerted everyone to the most current intelligence, analysis of enemy actions and, in a few cases, allowed some units to move from under an artillery barrage. The use of current intelligence in such a direct mode contributed to the decreased size of the intelligence annex by providing up-to-date intelligence. This rapid dissemination of intelligence assisted in validating the situation template by confirming, or denying, enemy operations. Modifications to the plan were then issued by the TF commander based upon new intelligence.

The second part of this validation was the creation of a "Real-Time Event Template." All the spot reports, higher-echelon intelligence, and adjacent-unit intelligence were integrated on an overlay to create a graphic picture of the most current intelligence. This gave the TF commander an up-to-date, accurate picture. The overlay was later used in planning future operations. As we made more overlays, an enemy operational database developed; it assisted in developing future situation templates.

A Concise One-Page Intelligence Annex

Weather: Partly cloudy, rain expected in the afternoon. Winds SW to NE, 10-15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. Temperature: max-75o min-40o.

Light Data:

DATE BMNT BMCT SR SS EECT EENT MR MS Start/Stop NVG % ILLUM

Enemy Situation

Enemy Forces: Forward of 2d Bde, the 201st MRR is establishing a defense oriented on the Whale and Whale Gap. The MRBs are at 75-85% strength, composed of 20-22xT72M1, (with and without reactive armor), 80-90xBMP-1s (possible BMP-1Ps), up to 6xAT-5s, and 4-6xMT-12s, unknown number of BTR-60s, and up to 100 dismounts.

NBC: Chemical strikes of persistent and nonpersistent agent have been used in sector. Expect use to continue. Possible strike locations vicinity: NK4401, NJ465984, NJ515942.

Air: HIND-Ds, HIPs, expect 14 rotary-wing sorties. Krasnovian MiG-29s, expect 8 sorties.

Artillery: In the RAG: 14-18x2S1s, 28-36x2S3s, and a battery of BM-21s. In the DAG: 18-24x2S5s and a battalion of BM-21s. Each MRB has a battery of (8) 120-mm mortars

Reinforcements: The regiment will have a combined arms reserve to reinforce the main defensive belt. This can occur in 6-12 minutes. A U/I tank battalion, from the 239th TR, is able to reinforce in 20-30 minutes.

Recent Activities: Recently, the enemy has been seen emplacing obstacles and building revetted positions around the south side of the Whale and Whale Gap.

Most likely COA: *The enemy will defend with an MRB to the south of the Whale/Furlong Ridge with a company forward. Dismounted infantry through the forward area and CSOPs covering withdrawal routes. A 2nd MRB defending west, vicinity 4689, and a 3rd MRB in the main defensive belt. A combined arms reserve to reinforce the MRB and a tank battalion to reinforce the regiment. Expect DRT teams and regimental reconnaissance forward with MRBs arrayed two up, one back. Expect CSOPs forward, and a possible MRC(+) in defensive positions south of the Whale and Whale Gap.*

Commander's PIR

- Where is the dismounted company defending on Furlong Ridge?
- Where are the gaps in the enemy's obstacle belt?
- Where are the enemy's AT weapons?

Terrain: Terrain slopes down from the Siberia wadi system into an open salt plain. The Whale and Furlong Ridge are the dominate hill masses to our south, broken only by the Whale Gap. South of these two hills the ground is relatively flat, broken by series of north-south running wadis.

The intelligence collection process did not end upon arrival at the NTC. I walked all over post interviewing soldiers, staff, civilians from the different units, and civilian contractors, and took more pictures to update our threat database. These pictures included new VISMODs under development and additional terrain pictures. Face-to-face information-gathering works well at any level. Additionally, establishing a series of contacts aids in preparation for multiple NTC rotations.

Besides creating a Krasnovian database, I had my TIO develop a continuous R&S plan. During constant operations, this would provide a basic plan for all R&S assets to execute during offensive and defensive operations. Modifications, when required, would then be issued over the radio net. A complete R&S plan followed the initial plan when the operations order was given. This plan worked well as our TF's rotation began with four days of continuous contingency operations.

Our Preparations Led to a Successful Battle

The fifth battle of our rotation truly demonstrates the effect of predeployment preparations on the success of operations. TF 3-37 Armor had just completed four days of continuous contingency operations with four other battalion TFs. Now we were to begin the force-on-force phase of the rotation. The first battle of this phase was an attack on the Brown-Debham pass complex. It turned out to be one of the most successful battles the TF fought. The S2 section correctly templated the enemy to within 90 percent or greater accuracy. As a result, the enemy was all but destroyed when a change of mission was received in the TOC.

We were able to template the enemy with such accuracy by using several well-trained assets. Initially, the TIO and the section NCOIC worked together to develop the brigade situation template and modify it for the terrain. The TIO generated an initial R&S plan for the scout platoon's execution and the delta team had a covering force mission forward of the TF. Once the initial situation template was complete, the TIO and I, using information from the scout platoon and the covering force team, worked the template to produce a completed product. We then briefed this template, along with a specific R&S plan, to the TF.

Once we completed the operations order, it was important to disseminate a copy of the annex, R&S plan and overlay, and situation template to critical members of the TF. Critical members included the company and team commanders, the scout and mortar platoon leaders, and the Administrative-Logistics Operations Center or alternate TOC. Not only did this information provide them the commander's intent, the R&S plan, and the most likely enemy COA, it also allowed the team commanders to focus on the operations order brief rather than half listening and attempting to copy overlay information and thus missing the briefing. A copy of the situation template also gave the commanders the ability to plan with an accurate intelligence product rather than a hastily copied one. The other staff elements, engineer, FSO, and air defense officer received a copy of these products if time permitted. Otherwise they worked from the S2 or S3 copy in the TOC.

Disseminating the situation template to the team commanders was an attempt to "kill two birds with one stone." Not only would they get the most likely COA in graphic form, but the inclusion of highlighted intervisibility lines—which is key terrain at the NTC—allowed them to better plan their scheme of maneuver. With the addition of individual enemy weapon's range arcs, and dead space on the terrain, the enemy kill sacks were more clearly defined.

Figure 1 is an example of the situation template I briefed for the attack. It incorporated the enemy situation with intervisibility lines in the TF sector. We included the intervisibility lines to give the commanders in the TF a perspective of the terrain. The intervisibility lines were colored blue, the enemy red, obstacles green, and possible contaminated areas were yellow.

Due to the time constraints at the NTC, rehearsals and proper asset tasking of the R&S plan became key. Initially, no rehearsal was done and Murphy's Law began to take over. During an earlier mission, the R&S plan was given out, and the scout platoon leader was to execute the plan without having participated in the TF rehearsal. Although the plan appeared sound, there were not enough assets to execute it and large holes appeared in the task force's intelligence. Corrective action included incorporating the R&S rehearsal in the beginning of the TF rehearsal. Although this sounds like common sense, too often it is not done. The rehearsal added synchronization to the plan, laid the plan out to the TF and detailed where the R&S assets would be.

A key point that goes hand-in-hand with the rehearsal is knowing what assets are available for tasking. Before this mission, the R&S plan tasked the scouts and ground surveillance radars (GSRs) to operate five observation posts and screen two specific areas with GSRs. The problem was that only one scout Bradley and one GSR were available to execute the plan. Somehow, the tracking of deadlined vehicles had become the XO's problem and not an important element of the staff planning procedure. During the attack on Brown-Debham Pass, the R&S plan had been revised to task the scouts and GSRs with the assets they currently had, not with what they normally had. Also, I noted an unexpected asset while at the NTC that I had not focused on at our home station. Since the TF had two armor and two infantry companies assigned, the number of dismounted patrols conducted could significantly increase. We expanded the R&S plan to include six dismounted infantry platoons from the two infantry companies. We incorporated these assets into the continuous R&S plan for our future use at later NTC rotations and home-station field exercises. Knowing and tracking the current R&S asset status helped to create a viable R&S plan that was effective and reduced the amount of changes needed in the plan. The TIO tracked the operational status of TF R&S assets to insure accurate knowledge of all assets available. This allowed the section to maintain an accurate status on vehicles available for use in future R&S planning.

Lessons Learned

As with any major field problem, the NTC brought out many lessons learned. A point that became glaringly obvious was that on-going operations require **continuous IPB**. Instead of beginning each planning session with receipt of the brigade order, the staff became adept at looking further ahead for future operations. What developed was the use of the S3 map as the current operations board and the S2 map as the future operations and planning board. As the TF TOC was on the move nearly all the time, the TIO updated the S3 map and rode in the S3 M577 with the TF XO. The S3 Air rode in the S2 M577 to assist in controlling the bat-

tle. This allowed a backup operational control system so that if either tracked vehicle was destroyed, the other could continue with an intelligence and an operations officer controlling the battle. During brief halts, the TIO and I would quickly update each other on the current situation and future enemy COAs to make sure we were both operating with the same information and providing the same assessment to the commander and S3.

The need for **detailed reporting** proved to be another lesson we learned. For example, spot reports sent to the TOC gave center-mass grids for obstacles. This gives a basic idea of what is out there, but nothing specific. With no follow-up reporting, changes to the plan and development of more accurate enemy assessments is harder to accomplish. Accurate reporting develops the situation and assists in modifying the plan for success. Detailed reports of actual size, direction, and left and right grid coordinates decrease major movement backups and maintains the flow of the battle.

One of the hardest things to do at the NTC, other than defeating the Krasnovians, was the **night-shift sleep plan**. This problem does not have an easy fix and requires planning before movement from the home station. Invariably the night shift would get little, if any, sleep. When they would normally be sleeping, the TOC was moving, executing battles, or attempting to set up—not an environment conducive to sleep. We developed a fluid schedule to ensure everyone got at least four hours of sleep. Part of this schedule involved using the TIO as the day-shift leader and the intelligence analyst working in concert with him to receive information over the radio, plot the current enemy operations, and advise the S3 Air on planning during the absence of the 1st team. The NCOIC, with the S2 M577 track driver, acted as the night-shift team. When the TOC halted, the night shift immediately went to sleep and the shift changeover times were adjusted based on how the battle was going. The S2 was on a fluid schedule and was awake during the battle; the schedule allowed time for planning as well as briefing the TF Commander before he left the TOC.

Intelligence Annex to OPORD | Map References

PIRs | Course of Action

Weather Forecast | Solar/Lunar/Light Data

High ____ Low ____
Wind Speed ____
Direction ____
Precip ____

Enemy Situation/Aspects of Terrain and Weather

R&S/NAI Matrix

NAI	Target Dec	PIRs/IRs	Start	A	B	C	D	Sets	Marks	GSRs	Reports/Remarks

R&S Special Instructions

Figure 2. Example of a Single-Page Intelligence Annex/R&S Plan.

A concept that became well defined at the NTC was cross talk. One of the reasons the previously discussed battle was so successful was that cross talk between the Engineer, Air Defense Officer, FSO, S3, and S2 during planning and execution was excellent. This sounds like common sense; however, meshing the staff is not an easy thing to do. Soldiers and officers leave and arrive and must constantly be trained in their jobs. Staff interaction is critical to mission success.

Even if it is pouring rain and the TOC extension leaks, continuation of cross talk is important so that the information flow does not stop. It would seem as part of the normal operation. However, actually doing it and just talking about it are two different things. Without a staff that can work together, planning suffers, the operation does not come together, and the OPFOR wins yet another battle.

The final lesson learned is **knowledge of obstacles** on the battlefield. This includes antitank ditches, wire, mines, and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) strikes. Just because a battle is over does not mean that the obstacles go away as they do during computer exercises. Too often planning during computer exercises is done without consideration of obstacles' long-term effects. Obstacles and NBC strikes are hazards that remain on the real battlefield. Knowing where they are will assist in maintaining the momentum of the attack and ensures that a tank or Bradley will reach the objective.

Conclusion

As I learned from the O/C during the infamous AARs, many areas needing improvement will be highlighted. As it is impossible to fix all areas in time for the next battle, focus on fixing one or two major deficiencies at the NTC and fix the rest at the home station. Attempting to improve all inadequacies briefed will cause soldiers to become overwhelmed and mission performance will suffer.

The NTC rotation was an excellent vehicle for training and evaluation. Worries about performance and *"have I prepared everything in sufficient detail?"* increased as the rotation date approached; however, once in the desert, much of that tension and worry disappeared as the mission came to the forefront. Do not worry how you will do at the National Training Center; work to prepare and identify deficiencies at your home

station, fix them through training, and continue the mission. Let the O/Cs tell you where you can improve—that is their obligation to you in supporting your training event.

Battles do not start with the receipt of the first operations order. Plan for continuous operations and gather intelligence from as many sources as possible and disseminate it. Treat your NTC rotations as if they were real operations and not just another Army evaluation program—the training value will be tremendous.

As an endnote, the officer that inherited my job as the TF S2 integrated the one-page Annex B and one-page R&S plan into a one-page matrix (see Figure 2). This decreased the overall size of the TF order and created a format that decreases writing time and increases planning time.

Endnote

1. **FM 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, 1 April 1986.

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Training the Intelligence Task Force

by Captain John T. Chenery

An ignorant officer is a murderer.
—Sir Charles Napier

Nowhere in the profession of arms is this statement more true than in the intelligence field. As professionals we must take this critical role very seriously, and ensure our task force intelligence teams are highly trained and mission-ready.

This article will present a basic structure for an effective task force (TF) intelligence training program (ITP) beginning with the concept of how to focus and conduct the training, with recommendations of what to train, and follow with some politics and procedures involved in coordinating and executing the ITP. I will use as an example a program effectively used by the 187th Infantry Regiment ("Rakkasans"), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), following Operation DESERT STORM. The basic principles and tips were used in a divisional combat brigade intelligence TF. However, the following can and should be tailored to your specific situation and needs. Whatever you choose to do—do something and do it aggressively!

Central to any training program are our basic skills as intelligence soldiers, and our foundation doctrine. As General Carl Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, related in **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training—**

Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained.

I took this a step further to say that no soldier in "my" TF would ever fall to enemy action due to my own, or my intelligence section's failure to perform our mission. Each of you must internalize this as your solemn duty, and we must work together to ensure we live up to the mission.

The ITP established with the Rakkasans was designed with this duty in mind. The goal was to provide personnel assigned to the intelligence sections with the knowledge and skills needed to effectively support the TF in any foreseeable contingency. Thus, we operated with a requisite sense of urgency.

Concept Of Training Operations

The ITP consisted primarily of two major elements. First, there were bi-monthly three-hour technical proficiency sessions, for example, threat weapons, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), order of battle, etc. The brigade S2 conducted the initial training, with the battalion S2s conducting subsequent training sessions on a rotational basis. Second, the quarterly intelligence workshops drew on preceding sessions and focused on S2 collective tasks. These significant training events lasted six or more hours and incorporated a team building lunch.

An intelligence officer or soldier must be assertive, and never idle during an exercise

The TF intelligence team is comprised of all personnel assigned to the brigade intelligence sections and the habitually attached support units. Assigned soldiers had to attend, and attached personnel were invited. I recommend inviting all separate divisional battalions, internal brigade officers and noncommissioned officers, and selected tenant units on the installation. Include your branch detail officers, as they are part of the team and can offer a great deal to your ITP. Additionally, send your schedule with a personal note to fellow brigade S2s. This will further enhance a positive training relationship within the division. You are also responsible for training the TF battle staff on intelligence, so consider options to incorporate them into ITP sessions.

The usual training location was the central brigade classroom; however, instructors had the flexibility to choose the best training location. Sessions were conducted wherever the most training value could be obtained. This could mean the local training area for a threat weapons or a terrain oriented block of instruction, or the motor pool for equipment orientations. Instructors were required to coordinate the location and to informally present the training plan to the brigade S2 several weeks before. (I recommend the brigade S2 keep a couple of classes in his "hip-pocket" as back-ups.)

Using the brigade long-range calendar and input from the commanders and S3s, the brigade and battalion S2s formulated the intelligence long-range training plan and reviewed it monthly. I recommend focusing on those significant activities (SIGACTS) like the "ramping-up" for NTC rotations or brigade and division simulation exercises. Also, draw on G2 training conferences or other units' programs. Your focus, however, must be on your mission and your commander's intent for intelligence training.

The ITP should be both structured and formal in accordance with **FM 25-101**, but light-hearted enough to encourage free flow of information. This fosters a nonthreatening environment where soldiers can feel free to discuss issues and raise questions.

An example of a ramp-up would focus the ITP at least six months in advance, incorporating two or three workshops. This would build to a TF intelligence rehearsal two to four weeks prior to deployment. Final adjustments are then based on the exercise after action review (AAR). The full resources of the division can be working with you on this event, so take advantage of it. The perfect dress rehearsal incorporates the Division Simulation Center, filled with G2 opposing forces, support from other division intelligence soldiers, and your brigade operators. Bring in a battle captain or S3 in each simulated command post to stress the S2 from the operations side. Ask the executive officers or commanders to visit periodically for updates and to provide the S2s' guidance.

Mechanics Of Training

Training is submitted to the S3 according to unit guidelines and is projected on the brigades training schedule. Do not forget the headquarters commandant when coordinating your ITP since you must be available for all of his events as well. Then publish an intelligence SIGACTs list to help guide the program. Consider who will be the point on training; ideally, this would be an assistant brigade S2 or the NCOIC who would sort-out the details. Never forget, this is your program—you are the program's coordinator, executor and evaluator.

Focus. Since the purpose of an ITP is expansion of our knowledge base and elimination of the weak link in our intelligence teams, the heart and focus of the program must be skill development. This is the traditional military occupational standards (MOS) and officer military qualification standards. Other foundation documents are:

- ☐ Unit mission statements.
- ☐ Mission essential task lists.
- ☐ Unit standard operating procedures.
- ☐ Unit specific field manuals.
- ☐ Army doctrine.

Ensure the training adheres to the Army's task, condition, standard outline.

Key Topics. Training sessions must also incorporate the AARs of previous training events, or briefings from those just returning from a military school or training session. You must make information-sharing a habit in the TF. For instance, in the ramp-up scenario, have the most recently deployed S2 from within the TF and the division come brief their rotation from the intelligence perspective early in the ramp-up process. If preparing for an actual deployment, consider bringing in the TF S2 from the last unit to perform the mission. If the brigade can not fund the temporary duty, look to the G2 or at other training funds. Remember we are all part of the team—do not limit yourself.

Every program should incorporate training and capabilities demonstrations on divisional assets, or assets that can support the intelligence effort. Exploit TF support units for the unique knowledge they can impart to the team, and plan the appropriate unit to host the sessions. If aviation plays a large role in an upcoming rotation, have the aviation S2 present a

DATE	UNIT	TASK#	TASK	INSTR
30 Sep 0930-1200	Bde	01-3353.05-0630	Threat Update CI/IPW (Tactical) CI-G2I/DSEC 902D Briefing (Strategic CI Overview) **Bde S2 Time**	LT CPT 311 CI/G2 CPT CPT
14 Oct 0930-1630	Bde	01-3353.05-0630 01-3352.04-0460	**(Workshop)** Threat Update Automated Info Security G2/IPS Orient Visit Eagle Talon I Threat (WEO) OPLAN 5027-92 TAPES **Bde S2 Time (MI Reading List)**	 CPT CPT
29 Oct 0930-1200	HHOC	01-3353.05-0630	Threat Update Counter-Terrorism **Bde S2 TIme (ET I Prep)**	1LT CPT
12 Nov 0930-1200	2-187	01-3353.05-0630 01-3353.05-0280 01-3353.08-0310	Threat Update Prep of the Intel Annex Prep of the Intel Estimate FAISS Orientation **Bde S2 Time**	CPT CPT

Figure 1. Sample Brigade S2 Training Schedule.

workshop covering all aspects of their operations, support capabilities, and limitations. The training could be conducted "off-site" at the airfield where crew chiefs and pilots could offer their outside expertise.

This program is not easy, but as many of our leaders echo, this is not an amateur sport

Training should engage subject matter experts whenever possible to teach specific subjects. This adds a level of professionalism and a depth of knowledge not otherwise possible. An example is the challenge we encountered during early rumblings in Bosnia. We sought someone who could speak intelligently to the team (and later to all officers in the brigade) on the brewing situation. I certainly could have pointed at the map and spilled out the sparse summaries which came down through the division. But instead, we found a lieutenant in a sister TF with personal experience and advanced education on the region. I was not threatened by my lack of depth in the area, and was up-front on this when introducing him to "my team." The result was that we had a healthy exchange of important information and our stock as a collective intelligence team rose greatly.

Field Training Exercises (FTXs) and Deployments. When the task force deploys, or is involved in any multi-echelon training event, intelligence training accelerates. Each FTX offers a unique opportunity for intelligence-related training or development of the intelligence team. During your ITP planning, cover every moment and aspect of an FTX. Consider what you have planned for or with the scouts and what MI assets are deployed. An intelligence officer or soldier must be assertive, and never idle during an exercise.

Getting Started

Start by discussing your TF training evaluations and AARs with the battalion S2s and their senior NCOs to assess where you are as a team. Use soldier common skill test results, and any available evaluations as your points of reference. This can be further enhanced with a variety of low-threat methods and tools Consider the following example: The Rakkasan commander, now Lieutenant General Joseph Kinzer, distributed a blank world map to his assembled officers and had them do something seemingly simple: filling in the corresponding country names. This gave everyone a quick reality check, and the commander an assessment of his officers' basic knowledge of world geography and situations. Use your imagination, but quickly find the common ground and begin to build from there.

There are a number of personnel who are essential in your planning considerations regarding training:

- ☐ The G2 and G2 training officer. The G2 can provide you with truly invaluable assistance, guidance, and support for your program. If you are fortunate, his training officer has a program to support and coordinate TF ITPs within the division.
- ☐ The S3. As the brigade training officer, the S3 is absolutely key in the training of the intelligence TF. I am sure you are painfully aware of your lack of tasking authority Do not fight it—cultivate it. The sooner you make the S3 your ally, the sooner you can get down to business.
- ☐ The Executive Officer (XO). Your boss and his proxy, the XO, should always be kept in the loop with your endeavors; this is the stage where you can discuss the details.
- ☐ Battalion Commanders. Your office calls with battalion commanders are important to secure their input and concurrence. Allow their S2s to broach the subject with them first, however: do not infringe on that relationship.

Do not forget to include the Sergeant Major in your planning process. Ask for input or insight into what you plan to accomplish. Often you will benefit from his many years of experience in the training arena.

After adjusting fire based on the guidance of the brigade and battalion commanders, formulate your deskside pitch to the brigade commander. The S3 should be there in your corner and as the commander's trainer. This is show time. If you fail to sell the boss, do not get discouraged. Regroup and try again.

A formal brief at the brigade command and staff or training meetings officially begins the program. By now nothing you present will be new to the primary staff and commanders. The purpose here is for the brigade commander to tell his battalion commanders to execute.

Initiating the ITP with your first workshop is critical. Ask the brigade commander and G2 to attend and address the intelligence team. This emphasizes the importance of the training to your soldiers and ensures a successful initiation of your program. Other invitees should be: the Brigade XO and S3; battalion commanders and S3s; G2 trainer; MI Battalion S3; sister Brigade S2s; and separate battalion S2s.

Typical Session

After hearing appropriate comments and focus from the brigade S2, the typical session is turned over to the hosting S2 for the agenda and introductions of his team. They then conduct a 15- to 30-minute world-situation briefing by geographical and contingency area. Discussion includes current political, economic, and military events which may impact on commitment of U.S. forces. Ideally, each soldier assigned to the S2 briefs a portion of the threat update or a block of instruction. The benefits are that soldiers hone their briefing skills and techniques in a "low-threat" environment, and it keeps everyone current on the threat and contingency areas. The session may also include—

- ☐ A basic skills session. Follow the threat update with topics ranging from IPB and situation templates to preparation of the intelligence

estimate, and so forth. For this portion, draw on the strengths of the soldiers and NCOs. Have them assist with the technical training, and build them up to giving command post updates during workshops or FTXs. Challenge them—but do not push them too quickly beyond their skill level.

- ☐ The brigade S2 wrap-up. Following the training session, this is your time to wrap things up. Review where the TF is in the long-range training plan and remind everyone who will host the next session. Discuss the briefing techniques of trainers with input from the audience if appropriate. Afterward, provide each briefer with a one-on-one evaluation culminating with a written critique for him or her for later review. Likewise, have your senior NCO and S2 critique your presentations.
- ☐ A social or team building event. A great way to foster teamwork is through less formal activities. Try moving the team to a dining facility or installation club for lunch, or periodically go off post. Occasionally, it may be appropriate to split the team up, such as when NCOs may want "sergeants time" with the soldiers, or you may need the officers for critiques not appropriate in front of your soldiers. Remember, although the TF S2s do not work for you per se, you are the intelligence leader in the task force. Use this time to provide some mentorship.

Follow-up

Document each training event with a memo to the TF commanders and S2s detailing who and what was trained. List all soldiers in a matrix and the specific tasks they were trained in, as well as those not present and the reason. Also, send this to each participating commander and S2 outside the TF. You will find that this list will grow very quickly. Brief the memo and hand it out at the command and staff, again with a reminder of which battalion will host the next session. Take time to highlight noteworthy trainers and send a personal note from you and the brigade commander, if appropriate. This public recognition is invaluable to the development of the soldier, your training program, and to the prestige of the MI Corps.

This program is not easy, but as many of our leaders echo today, "this is not an amateur sport!" We must possess and inspire the will and the skill to motivate our intelligence team. We must guide and excite, push and pull our soldiers to, and beyond, their limits. Your goal for intelligence training is to develop your soldiers into competent and assertive MI professionals. Do this—and you and your intelligence team will be "Always Out Front!"

Captain Chenery is currently a student at the FBI National Academy at Quantico, Virginia. During seven years with the 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Fort Campbell, Kentucky, he served as a brigade and battalion S2, and HHOC Company Team Commander. Captain Chenery has a degree in Criminal Justice from Murray State University, Kentucky. Readers can contact the author at cheneryj@hoffman-emh1.army.mil.

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Making Tactical EW More Lethal

by First Lieutenant Daniel N. Zeytoonian

The Army will begin fielding one of its two versions of the Ground-Based Common Sensor (GBCS) at the end of this year. Both variants of the system (Heavy and Light) offer the advantage of jamming and direction-finding (DF) from the same platform. Until this system replaces existing collectors and jammers, we can alter our employment of these present systems to optimize our combat power. By flexibly employing our AN/PRD-12s (Lightweight Man-Transportable Radio Direction-Finding System (LMRDFS)) with our AN/TLQ-17A(V)3 TRAFFIC-JAM system, we can add value to the intelligence picture in a way we cannot if we leave this system in the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 TEAM-MATE, as designed. This change, along with some common-sense revisions of the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) , would help to guarantee effective electronic warfare (EW) support to the commander before the Army's newest generation of EW systems arrives.

How We Increase EW Lethality

Currently, the PRD-12 gives the TRQ-32 a high-frequency DF capability which it does not have on its own. It also gives the system a redundant capability to DF signals in the very-high-frequency range. This subcomponent is removable for dismounted use and can also be used in conjunction with the TLQ-17 using its alternating current adapter. If MI battalions can procure additional PRD-12s, we can double our DF capability by fielding them inside of our jammers. With a DF capability on each of our EW systems, we could more easily and more precisely locate enemy emitters. Without the additional PRD-12s, we could still accomplish this end by moving the PRD-12 from the TRQ-32 to a TLQ-17 in the same platoon.

We have already tested transferring our PRD-12s from our TRQ-32s to our jammers. In the phases of the battle where we are not conducting electronic attack (EA) missions, we use the PRD-12 for scanning, intercepting, and DFing. We are extremely careful not to jam while the PRD-12 is active as this would ruin the receiver. In the event that a TRQ-32 goes down, we immediately return the PRD-12 back to that system to maintain the integrity of the baseline and to allow that TRQ-32 use of its partially redundant system as a backup.

The intelligence product that results from accurate signals intelligence lends more credibility to the discipline, and will ultimately increase its usefulness to commanders...

This idea enables the direct support (DS) MI company to get two lines of bearing (LOBs)—a cut—without any augmentation. Augmented with an AN/TSQ-138 TRAILBLAZER, another TRQ-32, or TLQ-17 with a PRD-12, the company's collection and jamming (C&J) platoon could acquire three LOBs to a target—a fix. This capability would increase the accuracy of the fixes provided to the analysis and control team (ACT) during independent brigade operations. For example, the brigade commander could deploy the C&J platoon by air as part of a follow-on force after an airfield seizure to expand the lodgment. That force could immediately, move into positions and conduct electronic support (ES) and EA operations.

The additional DF capability would also enable the MI battalion to obtain fixes of targets in restrictive terrain. Depending on environmental and terrain factors, adding a fourth and even fifth LOB to the target would further reduce the elliptical error, giving us a more accurate target position. This is extremely helpful since the accuracy of one of the LOBs could have fallen victim to an anomaly, such as water, power lines, ore, dense underbrush, or buildings between the collector and the emitter. These anomalies would affect the path of the signal wave and "mislead" the system as to the emitter's true location. The intelligence product that results from accurate signals intelligence lends more credibility to the discipline, and will ultimately increase its usefulness to commanders in their mission planning, targeting, and cross-cueing efforts.

Adding a DF capability to the TLQ-17s also helps in maintaining continuity during movement. Previously, when a TRQ-32 relocated to reacquire line of sight during a battle, we lost a critical DF capability. Now, during site displacement that capability is less critical since we have TLQ-17s that can DF with their PRD-12s while another DF platform is moving.

MTOE and Doctrinal Changes

To achieve optimal success in this transitional organization, we would need to make some MTOE and doctrinal changes. (Some of these changes we need to make anyway.) I will discuss four main areas: vehicles, personnel, security, and communications.

Vehicles. Currently, the collection and jamming platoon headquarters element is authorized one M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)

on the MTOE. Giving the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant one vehicle to share makes little tactical sense. The platoon's command, control, and logistics element will be lost if that one vehicle is hit. Also, the platoon sergeant and leader occasionally have to be in different places at once. We try to design the logistical release point (LRP) so that it also doubles as a meeting of key leaders, but this may not always be possible. The platoon headquarters should have two M998 HMMWVs with drivers to effectively command, control, and resupply the assets in the platoon.

Personnel. To use the PRD-12 in conjunction with the TLQ-17, we would need to augment that jammer team with one soldier. Under this modification, one soldier would shift from the TRQ-32 team to the TLQ-17 team, leveling systems off at five soldiers apiece. The TRQ-32 currently uses six soldiers when it is running both operator positions during 24-hour operations. Usually, however, the analysis and control element (ACE) will tailor operating personnel based on the enemy's communications traffic patterns. During surge operations, the extra soldier on the TLQ-17 team could operate the PRD-12 while another soldier on his team scanned on the TLQ-17. During hours of light radio traffic, one TLQ-17 operator can operate both systems.

One problem this may present relates to transportation. Before I address the TLQ-17's problem transporting a five-person crew, let us take a look at the TRQ-32's current transportation problem. It is not clear how, on the TRQ-32 system, two 2-seater vehicles are expected to move the six MTOE-authorized personnel. Most units do not even address the problem since they do not have full crews. Some units have converted their chase vehicles into troop carriers. The U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command says this conversion is not allowed without a modified work order (MWO) approved by the Department of the Army (DA). If DA approved this MWO, we could submit a similar request to modify the M1037 chase vehicles in order to transport the proposed fifth member of the TLQ-17's crew.

Photo provided by SFC Gerry Cupp

An AN/TLQ-17 in operation with an AN/PRD-12.

Security. A rifle infantry squad could decimate an EW team. From this premise, we should evaluate tactical relationships that help ensure the EW teams' survivability on the battlefield. I believe that there are two options which help to protect them.

First, the DS MI company could arrange with its supported brigade that a section of that unit's maneuver force is responsible for providing security to each EW team. The team would integrate these additional assets into their movement, site reconnaissance, and site defense plans. This maneuver section with its additional firepower could help the team to break contact without sustaining losses in lives and critical systems, which may not be replaced in time of war.

The second option would give the maneuver battalions responsibility for supporting the teams by indirect fire only. The battalion's fire support officer would incorporate preplanned targets for the EW team to help it defend itself or break contact if attacked.

Communications. At this time, only the TRQ-32s are authorized manpack Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios. The Army fielded this radio to give the system a dismounted communications capability for use during low-level voice intercept missions. The teams also use the radio to communicate between the chase vehicle (which has no vehicle radios) and the system when the teams are separated. This happens during site reconnaissance and resupply, using the service station or the LRP methods. The TLQ-17 does not have this communications capability but should. I recommend adding the AN/PRC-119 manpack SINCGARS. Then, the TLQ-17 would have all of the benefits already mentioned plus an additional capability to net the PRD-12s with the rest of the baseline when we employ those systems together.

Conclusion

The equipment changes outlined in this article will increase the DS MI company's ability to wage EW while providing increased force protection to its EW teams. It would increase the usefulness of existing equipment by tactically tailoring it to the mission until newer equipment is fielded. Operations conducted at the NTC during May 1996 validated the practicality and effectiveness of these measures. We can and should optimize resources to provide the commander with the best intelligence picture we can give.

First Lieutenant Zeytoonian is currently S2, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has been an EW platoon leader and the Assistant J2 Operations Officer for JTF Dragoons and United States Forces, Haiti. He has a bachelor of science degree in Business Administration from Northeastern University. Readers can contact him at (318) 531-4520, DSN 863-4520, and by E-mail at zeytoond @polk-emh2.army.mil.

How to Net an AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 With an AN/PRD-12

by Captain Susan M. Miranda

Editor's Note: After attending several rotations at the various Combat Training Centers, I observed a disturbing trend: AN/PRD-12 teams did not know how to net their systems to the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2. At the tactical level, netting provides the combat commander with rapid location of enemy emitters. The purpose of this chart is to provide the user with a quick reference on how to net the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 and AN/PRD-12 SIGINT systems. This chart may be used to supplement tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) or other unit-internal references.

The AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 (TEAMMATE) is a mobile, multi-station, ground-based communication intercept and direction-finding (DF) system with data and voice communications capabilities. The system provides a high frequency (HF), very-high frequency (VHF), and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) communications intercept capability. This system also provides HF and VHF DF line of bearing (LOB) and fix capabilities with the TEAMMATE, AN/PRD-12, TRAILBLAZER, and QUICKFIX networks.

The PRD-12 is the Lightweight Man-Transportable Radio Direction-Finding System, providing search, intercept, and DF capabilities on HF, VHF, and UHF transmissions from tactical targets in the forward area. This system can be netted with other PRD-12s and TRQ-32A(V)2 systems to provide fix data. The system was designed to deploy in many types of terrain and under most weather conditions.

These two systems may be used in a group of up to four PRD-12 or TRQ-32A(V)2 systems to provide a DF network supporting rapid location of target emitters. One of the stations is initialized as the Net Control Station (NCS) while the other three are initialized as "slaves." When in this mode, the requesting operator presses a single key to command remote stations to take a LOB on a given frequency, then transmit their LOBs and locations in a programmed sequence. The requesting station automatically calculates and displays the cut or fix and elliptical error probability (EEP). The following chart indicates the steps for establishing the DF network.

The author wishes to thank Sergeant Stan Lacney and Staff Sergeant Michael Nieto from the 305th MI Battalion for their valuable assistance with this article.

Captain Miranda is the Editor of ***MIPB****. Readers can reach her at mirandas@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.*

Step	AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 Action
1. Tune radios to the correct frequencies.	Tune the bottom SINCGARS radio to the prescribed frequency. The "star" (*) function must be off. Baud rate must be set to 16000.
2. Fill the cryptographic gear.	Load the SINCGARS radio with a fill device, usually a KYK-13. **NOTE: SINCGARS must have a fill to establish the net.**
3. Tune the filters.	VHF bandpass filter must be tuned to the same frequency as the SINCGARS. Also, the three notched filters on the RF distribution unit at the bottom of rack #1 marked "VHF" should be tuned to the same frequency as the SINCGARS.
4. Set up the operator terminal for DF operations.	Go to "RESET SYSTEM PARAMETERS" on the DF main menu and "CONFIRM" with the F10 key. Select "MANAGE DF NETWORKS" and "CONFIRM" (F10). Select "TEAMMATE" mode and "CONFIRM" (F10). Select "ENABLE NETWORK" and "CONFIRM" (F10). Select your platform (NCS, SLAVE1, SLAVE2, SLAVE3). If you are the NCS, enable the "RETRANSMIT" function. "ENABLE" both operator positions and "CONFIRM" (F10). **NOTE: You now have "TM" on the bottom of your screen.**
5. Press F6 to generate a netted fix. **NOTE: Once you go into "TEAMMATE MODE," you are no longer capable of voice communications.**	

Step	AN/PRD-12 Action
1. Set up the AN/PRD-12 for netted operations.	Go to "STATION CONFIGURATION" and select your platform (NCS, SLAVE1,2,3), enter your grid location, and antenna configuration. Save the configuration. **NOTE: For the AN/PRD-12 to initiate a DATAFIX, an AN/PRD-12 must be the NCS. If the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 is the NCS, then ONLY an AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 can initiate a DATAFIX. The AN/PRD-12 will receive an error if it attempts a DATAFIX in this configuration when not NCS.**
2. Tune the radios to the correct frequencies.	Tune SINCGARS radio to the prescribed frequency. The "star" (*) function must be off. Baud rate must be set to 16000. **NOTE: Ensure the W-4 cable is connected to the AUD/FILL connector of the SINCGARS and the COMMS port connector of the OL-470 Receiver/Processor.**
3. Fill the cryptographic gear.	Load the SINCGARS radio with a fill device, usually a KYK-13. **NOTE: SINCGARS must have a fill to establish the net.**
4. Run BIT MENU test number 7 (DATA LINK) to ensure connections and crypto are operational.	
5. Follow these steps using your DISPLAY UNIT to enable DATAFIX.	Press F2 to access RCU panel. Press down arrow until net function is accessed. Press F3 to set NET mode to DATA. **NOTE: At this point, the F2 functions change from "EDITRCU" and "MANFIX" to "EDITOPS" and "DATAFIX", respectively.** Press F1 to access alternate function.
6. Press F2 to generate a Netted Fix.	**NOTE: The display will present target coordinates and three sets of EEP numbers; major axis, minor axis, and EEP.**

Tactical UAVs: A Supported Unit's Primer

by Captain Raymond D. Pickering

The Hunter tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Army's short-range UAV, may be replaced by the Outrider UAV. Outrider provides coverage of both the brigade and corps-division mission. It operates from 50 to 200 kilometers ahead of the forward line of own troops. The Outrider UAV is going through an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. Units should begin to see the systems in the summer of 1997.

Recent and unparalleled successes by tactical UAVs in live and virtual war games prove that Army intelligence is capable of supporting 21st century operations. At National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 96-10, Hunter UAVs flown by Alpha Company, 15th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), detected more than 60 percent of enemy assets. This resulted in the first defeat of the opposing force (OPFOR) in the defense ever achieved there. Virtual UAVs have repeated these accomplishments during simulation programs known as Combat Synthetic Test and Training Assessment Range (Combat STTAR), an NTC initiative designed to increase the play "box," and numerous Battle Command Training Program rotations. While helpful, the NTC rotations and virtual war games do not always provide all the information your unit needs to know about tactical UAV support in a real combat situation. The intent of this primer is to help your staffs develop UAV procedures and plans, so you are "ready now" to effectively use these "ghost riders" in the sky.

How They Work

In all aircraft, the pilot changes direction of travel, speed, and altitude by sending the commands through a joystick. In manned platforms, orders originate from a cockpit in the aircraft. UAVs receive their directions from a Ground Control Station (GCS) via line-of-sight (LOS) radio waves. A special antenna called a Ground Data Terminal (GDT) sends commands to and receives video imagery from the UAV at ranges up to 200 km. The tactical UAVs can use another UAV to relay information between the GCS and a "mission" UAV. This capability facilitates LOS communications in mountainous terrain, and extends the UAV's operational ranges to the maximum extent.

Tactical UAVs push the combat commander's "eyes" beyond the enemy's front lines without putting human lives at risk. The product comes in the form of live electro-optic and infrared (IR) video. The imagery, with telemetry text on the screen, gives target grid locations with a less than 100-meter error. Ground commanders can receive this timely combat information via several different communications media including—

- ☐ Voice radio for spot reports.
- ☐ Multiple Subscriber Equipment for voice and text.
- ☐ TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) for live video and snapshots.
- ☐ Near-real-time video feeds from remote video terminals (RVTs).

The capabilities of the standard imagery payloads on both the Outrider and Hunter UAVs are very similar. Their day and night cameras can detect patrols in the open five to seven km distant when flying about 9000 feet above ground level (AGL). Arms, legs, and shoulder-fired weapons are clearly distinguishable at 4000 feet AGL. UAV operators can easily detect tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and wheeled vehicles at 32,000 feet (10 km) AGL. They can recognize the difference between these targets at 16,400 feet (5 km) AGL. Distinguishing between different types of tanks and APCs occurs at about 6,000 feet (1.8 km) AGL.

What You Get

The UAV is a point sensor, not a wide-area surveillance asset



Figure 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles' Protocol.



Photos provided by SSG Malace

The Hunter joint tactical unmanned aerial vehicle.

like Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar System (Joint STARS), Guardrail, or QUICK FIX. It does, however, work extremely well in conjunction with these cueing sensors. Alerted by a Joint STARS indicator of enemy vehicle movement, the UAV can quickly move to the area of concern and determine the types and quantity of vehicles present. If the friendly commander so elects, the UAV can direct fires on the enemy formation and conduct an immediate battle damage assessment. In addition, UAVs can confirm or deny enemy activity at named areas of interest, and conduct point surveillance and route reconnaissance.

The effectiveness of its area searches is dependent upon the size and type of targets, and the terrain. The UAV will have difficulty locating small groups of dismounted soldiers in a 10 km by 10 km mountain range. If the target is a battalion of moving armored vehicles in this same terrain, it will be much easier to locate. Proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield can improve the effectiveness of UAV area reconnaissance by eliminating unlikely target locations.

Tactical UAVs are extremely hard for enemy air defense systems to detect and engage. Threat radars, designed to detect much faster-moving aircraft, skip over these slow-flying sentinels. If detected, the composite airframes provide very small radar cross-sections. Shoulder-fired IR missiles have difficulty getting a positive lock on the small power plants and, in most cases, cannot engage them as targets. The visual and auditory signatures of UAVs are miniscule. The Hunter has a less than 10 percent chance of detection by dismounted troops when operating at 3000 feet AGL. This percentage drops even lower when the UAV is at its higher collection altitudes.

Basic Operational Configuration

The primary elements of a tactical UAV operation include a launch and recovery site (LRS) and a mission planning and control site (MPCS). UAVs take off and land at the LRS in the same manner as do manned aircraft at a runway. Once in the air, the LRS hands control of the UAV over to the MPCS. This element flies the UAV on its collection mission and, when the mission is completed, returns control to the LRS for recovery. In most combat situations, the commander will locate the MPCS forward of the LRS in a "split-site" configuration. This improves UAV support to the unit and survivability of the runway site. Both elements can colocate if conditions are favorable.

Launch and Recovery Site. The LRS is the critical node of the UAV equation. Eighty percent of the unit's manpower and equipment are at this site. It requires the most intensive planning and resources. Besides launching and recovering UAVs, soldiers at this site conduct first-, and in some cases, second-echelon maintenance on the aircraft and shelters.

The Hunter and Outrider UAVs can operate from both primitive and paved runways. The surface can be dirt, grass, pavement, or concrete. Landing areas should be clear of tall obstacles such as power lines, trees and masonry structures. The site needs good drainage to ensure the serviceability of the landing area. The rocket-assisted take-off capability of the Hunter UAV eliminates the need for a 1200-foot runway for a rolling takeoff, but the UAV still needs a 600-foot landing area.

Because of its large signature and high priority on the enemy's targeting list, friendly commanders need to take special measures to protect the LRS. The first step is to position the site deeper in friendly territory, reducing the number of enemy artillery tubes that can range it. The second is to assign a combat arms security force for defense. Heavily involved with flight operations, organic UAV soldiers are capable of mounting only a limited defense. Without combat arms or other defensive augmentation, the LRS is "a lamb ready for slaughter."

Whether in the offense or defense, commanders must begin planning for the next LRS location. If enough equipment and soldiers are available, the LRS should "leapfrog" UAV elements forward or backward to the next preplanned LRS site. Using this method, the UAV commander would send a quartering party forward to the next LRS and begin setting up recovery equipment. The old site would launch UAVs while the new LRS was emplacing. These UAVs would conduct their missions and land at the new landing area. The unit could shuttle all or some of the air vehicles in this fashion. This method maintains continuous UAV support to the friendly unit.

Mission Planning and Control Site. Soldiers at the MPCS are responsible for coordinating the UAV collection plan with the supported unit's battle staff, operating the UAV during its mission, and reporting combat information. The

MPCS is important, but its loss will not result in a total cessation of UAV support. If destroyed, this element's mission can be assumed by the LRS with some degradation in command, control, and timely reporting. The site is small and can position itself anywhere a tactical operations center (TOC) can locate. The MPCS will have no more than four vehicles, several low-noise generators and one or two radar-type antennas.

For communications simplicity, the MPCS is near, if not a part of, the supported unit's TOC. The UAVs' planning range begins at this point. The primary tactical consideration for the MPCS is communications LOS to the supported unit TOC, the UAV or relay, and the LRS. Commanders can remote the GDT with fiberoptic wire to accommodate a TOC in a reverse slope location.

Opinions vary on locating a GCS in the TOC itself. Positive timely reporting and control of the UAV collection effort is maintained by leaving the GCS there. The simplicity and responsiveness provided by this configuration make it a very extremely attractive option for maneuver commanders. A danger exists, however, that a "back-seat driving" mentality will evolve. Past experiences has shown that battle captains tend to sit in the GCS ordering the payload and UAV operators to "fly over here" or "look at that." Focusing so intently on one system takes attention away from other parts of the battlefield, and leads to both airspace violations and deviations from the collection plan. If the commander wants a live video product in the TOC, an RVT or a hard-wired television monitor may be the solution.

Major Planning Concerns

Airspace, weather, and frequency management are critical components of effective UAV support. NTC rotations and computer simulations have not realistically addressed these issues. If not incorporated into mission planning and operating procedures, these issues could result in the loss of U.S. soldiers on a real battlefield who expected, but did not receive, UAV support.

A Hunter UAV gets a rocket-assisted launch.

Airspace. At most NTC rotations and at combat simulation exercises, the UAVs can operate freely behind enemy lines, reacting quickly to changes on the ground. In a "shooting war," this may not be the case. The airspace in combat is strictly controlled by the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) to prevent collisions between different types of aircraft and indirect fire projectiles. UAVs receive special flight restrictions from the ACA. This is due to their small size, slow cruising speed, and limited ability to see and avoid other aircraft.

Under the strictest conditions, the ACA controls every aspect of a UAV's flight on the Air Tasking Order (ATO). This order is normally published 24 hours in advance. The ATO encloses the LRS and surveillance areas in restricted operating zones (ROZs) for periods when UAVs are flying. These sites are connected by Standard Army Flight Routes (SAFRs) with defined altitudes, way points and timelines. UAVs cannot deviate from these parameters without approval from the ACA. Since the ATO is difficult to change, and the battlefield changes easily, supported units need to coordinate for both primary and secondary ROZs and SAFRs. Even if the UAV does not use the back-up routes or ROZs, it is better to have them, than to try to haggle for airspace in the middle of a battle.

If more liberal restrictions are in place, the ACA will grant a "blanket altitude" authorization. Operators will still launch and recover the UAVs in a restricted zone and send it forward on an approved route and altitude. At a designated release point, the UAV can move anywhere laterally or horizontally as long as it remains within a certain altitude window and the blanket boundaries. The capabilities of the payload, enemy air defenses, and high traffic altitudes for manned aircraft determine the operating envelope. Under these conditions, if an unanticipated enemy move is detected, a UAV can quickly be retasked to confirm the action, provide more detailed information, and direct deep fires if needed.

While UAV-supported units like the flexibility and responsiveness of the blanket altitude, traditional combat pilots do not, notably fast movers. Flying at speeds in excess of 500 knots, looking for the target, and monitoring the plethora of cockpit information, pilots are uncomfortable working in close proximity to UAVs. Also, nearly all combat theaters' ACAs are members of the Air Force and pilots themselves. These factors added together could make ACAs extremely reluctant about granting this less restrictive UAV control measure.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the "experts" on UAVs in

combat, use a variation of the blanket altitude which addresses the concerns of fast moving aircraft. The IDF creates zones in the blanket airspace defined by clearly identifiable terrain features. If pilots have to punch through the blanket altitude, they can contact the air authority to see if the zone has UAV activity. If it is active, the pilots can determine if they want to break the UAV altitude from that zone or enter from another non-active one. This approach to manned and unmanned airspace deconfliction could prove to be the best solution.

Weather. Weather is a primary concern, as it is for all flight operations, but there are some special considerations for tactical UAVs. Meteorological factors not only influence the performance of the aircraft, but also the intelligence payload. Commands anticipating UAV support for wartime contingencies or exercises must research the area of operation for data on meteorological trends. This information will provide an accurate standard of how much UAV coverage they can anticipate.

Precipitation, winds, and temperature all degrade the operating parameters of UAVs, but icing presents the biggest problem. No tactical UAV in the Army inventory possesses a de-icing capability. When UAVs are operating in temperatures below freezing and in visible moisture, ice develops on the wings and fuselages, increasing drag and weight. This ultimately results in the aircraft crashing. The UAV's small size and power plant exacerbate these conditions.

Cross-winds in excess of 20 knots create dangerous conditions for takeoff and landings. An LRS site with a cross-wind runway can overcome this limitation. High winds (35 knots plus) at operating altitudes also create dangerous flying conditions.

Tactical UAVs can operate in light rain. Both the Hunter and Outrider UAVs have their propellers and fuselages treated to deal with precipitation. Light rain does degrade the quality of the UAV imagery, but the product is still exploitable. The Hunter UAV can operate in rainfall up to two inches per hour. The quality of the imagery in these conditions, however, is too poor to gather any information. Precipitation does not drastically degrade operations at the MPCS, but commanders must closely monitor the LRS to confirm water is not building up and that muddy runways are still negotiable.

Fog and low cloud ceilings primarily reduce the effectiveness of the payloads. The IR camera can easily penetrate light fog, but it is not able to penetrate heavy fog or clouds. Combat theaters with low ceilings make UAV operations extremely difficult. In order to collect needed exploitable imagery, tactical UAVs must fly lower, increasing their potential for detection and exposure to enemy air defense artillery gun systems. Also, fog makes landing extremely difficult.

Frequency Management. The electronic tether between the GCS and the UAV is susceptible to interference and jamming. The problem in nearly all cases comes from friendly units. Low-power transmitters in the UAV frequency range do not cause many problems, but high-power transmitters like tropospheric scattering systems do, especially when they are located in close proximity to a GCS. A good unit signal officer can eliminate this problem by providing a sufficient buffer between frequencies and appropriate distances between transceivers.

Frequency management will become much more difficult when each maneuver brigade has its own UAV platoon. UAV-supported units from different corps, divisions, and brigades will share common boundaries, fly the same type of UAVs, and operate them simultaneously. Radio waves, however, do not adhere to unit boundaries. Without proper management, one brigade's GCS could send commands to an adjacent unit's UAV that could receive and execute the electronic order. Video downlinks from different UAVs can become tangled, sending imagery from the first brigade's aerial sensor to an RVT in the second brigade's sector causing serious confusion. Corps and division frequency managers need to direct all UAV-related transmissions. Because of the limited number of frequencies and the transmission ranges, managers may have to do this on an hourly basis.

Conclusion

"A picture is worth a thousand words." UAV imagery is worth a thousand lives—enemy soldiers killed, friendly soldiers protected. These robotic spy planes are the first step into bringing the MI Branch into 21st century; high technology brings along a need for higher understanding. The key to effectively employing these assets is to know their requirements, capabilities, and limitations.

This primer has covered the basics of UAV operations in direct support of tactical units. There is much more to learn. You can find more information in the Army's Draft **FM 34-25-2**, **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles**, or by contacting the Joint UAV Training Center at (520) 533-2750 or DSN 821-2750 or Delta Company, 304th MI Bn at (520) 533-5000 or DSN 821-5000. The Joint UAV Training Center also has information available on the Internet at URL http: //desert-thunder. army. mil /delta/ index.htm

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CTC NOTES

by Lieutenant Colonel Christian A. Abbott

BCTP Policy on UAVs During BCTP Rotations

This article presents the policy of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) on the types, use, and allocation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) during the Warfighter-exercise (WFX) portion of BCTP rotations. This policy applies to all of the units participating in BCTP division and corps rotations, both standard and non-standard. Only the tactical Hunter and Predator Medium-Altitude Endurance UAVs are authorized to participate in BCTP WFXs. Any exceptions to this policy must be approved by the commander of BCTP.

The Predator UAV must be requested through routine close-air support channels. Specific allocation will be based on mission, equipment, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) from the training unit's higher headquarters.

The Hunter UAV will support both division and corps. Each organization will be authorized to fly one 8-hour mission per 24-hour period. The **maximum** time authorized for UAV support will be 16 hours of coverage per day. This support will be executed in accordance with the tactical UAV operational requirements document. Corps competitive play in a division WFX does not change the maximum authorized coverage policy.

The BCTP UAV policy also includes the following stipulations:

- ☐ The training units must support the cost of using UAVs in their respective WFXs.
- ☐ The use of UAVs during a unit WFX must be coordinated as part of the Start of Exercise Memorandum of Agreement (STARTEX MOA) between and BCTP the training unit's higher headquarters. All personnel who plan, control, and operate the UAV system must adhere to the requirements and milestones established in the STARTEX MOA.
- ☐ UAVs will be included in the simulation control plan developed by BCTP.
- ☐ UAV workstations are required to work for the BCTP Exercise Control Cell during the WFX.

For more information about the BCTP UAV policy, readers may contact Lieutenant Colonel Chris Abbott at BCTP. You can reach him at (913) 684-5909/5917, DSN 552-5909/5917, and via E-mail at abbottc@leavemh1.army.mil.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

by Major Michael D. Vance, USAR

MICAT—Defining Training Standards and Qualification

The Military Intelligence Combat Assessment Tables (MICAT) define an emerging program that supports the Army's goal for maintaining a flexible, deployable, and lethal combined arms team. It will provide MI commanders the framework with which to develop a tactical training program, and evaluate and qualify their units. The MICAT program is an initiative of the Deputy Commanding General, Brigadier General John W. Smith, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, to standardize guidance on how MI should train to achieve collective proficiency on mission essential tasks, and to qualify as combat ready. These tables articulate how MI units at all echelons will train their soldiers on assigned systems, including the training for the functional entities that are crew-based (Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Analysis and Control Team (ACT)). This training encompasses the relevant unit mission critical tasks and the individual occupational skills required for MI units to achieve training standards.

Table I-III	Preliminary skills qualification test, general and MOS specific
Table IV	Individual qualification
Table V-VII	Section and crew collective critical tasks and intelligence support
Table VIII	Section and crew qualification
Table VI	Unit mission essential tasks
Table VII	Unit qualification

Figure 1. MI Combat Assessment Table Organization.

MI Qualification Tables

MICAT development is based on training and qualification tables that mirror the successful tank gunnery model from the U.S. Army Armor School. The methodology for MICAT is crawl, walk and run, and the main emphasis is on crew and section qualification.

MICAT will identify the critical individual and collective tasks required for MI information systems and operational elements, and define the conditions and standards for evaluation and qualification. The tables for individual qualification will focus on competency, and will include upper skill-level tasks for certification of supervisors and leaders. Section and crew tables look to the critical collective tasks performed to support intelligence operations. Tables will work with the Mission Essential Task List and unit tactical standard operating procedures to ensure applicability to their specific mission and battle focus. MICAT culminates with Table XII evaluation of the ACE or ACT, demonstrating the capability to synchronize section activities to support intelligence operations and the combat commander.

MICAT takes a step beyond the current **Military Intelligence Collective Training Standard Document, Volumes I and II, ARTEP 34-113-11 and -12**. MICAT will include tables for the majority of current and future intelligence systems and processors. Information derived from the Advanced Warfighter Exercises (AWEs) will drive the critical tasks selected for individual MOSs and collective tasks for the sections and crews. Once defined, the MICAT for sections like the Ground-Based Common Sensor and the UAVs will provide a training focus for supervisors and leaders. The tasks critical to the total intelligence effort can be planned, resourced, and trained to qualify individuals, sections, and teams as combat ready.



Figure 2. Standards for MI Training.

Prescriptive Training

Two documents are in development that prescribe MICAT training strategies and qualification requirements for MI units. **Department of Army Pamphlet 350-XX, Standards in Crew-Served Systems Training (Military Intelligence)**—

- ☐ Provides requirements for MICAT qualification.
- ☐ Recommends training strategies and frequencies.
- ☐ Resources requirements to assist commanders in determining and planning MICAT training.

FM 34-XX, MICAT Individual/Crew/Platoon Training Evaluation for Military Intelligence Crew-Served Systems, is the second document. It will describe MICAT and explain all the components, tables, and detailed evaluation procedures. Each MICAT developed for system teams or crews and functional entities will be published separately, with "leader books" provided for commanders.

MICAT standards will be the same for both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) MI elements. Only the frequency of evaluations for RC elements is different. This ensures a commonality and standardization for MI training focus across both components, enhancing readiness and compatibility upon mobilization. MICAT qualification should be a mandatory post-mobilization training requirement for RC MI elements.

MICAT clearly identifies the requirements for intelligence training. With critical individual and collective tasks presented in qualification tables, a clearer picture of the requirements for intelligence readiness training is gained. Then it can be compared with similar qualification programs existing in combat arms branches. MICAT will focus on training planning and effective use of resources. The commander can directly state his requirements and his resource needs to maintain a proficient, integrated, and synchronized MI element.

Summary

MICAT is still in early development, but is receiving high priority at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. It is a concept that provides focus and framework for training and qualification standards necessary to support Army XXI. MICAT is not just another

evaluation requirement for the commander. It is a tool to develop training and obtain resources, ensuring the technical and tactical competence of MI soldiers, sections, and teams. It sets the standard for qualifying AC and RC MI elements to ensure readiness and compatibility. It will enable an MI battalion to evaluate its combat readiness on an equal level with other combat arms elements in a division. MICAT is a simple, effective, and necessary component to training that is long overdue.

Major Vance is currently serving on active duty doing special work with the Directorate of Operations, Training and Doctrine, USAIC&FH. He is a reservist assigned as the Corps MI Support Element Chief, 319th MI Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. He has a bachelor of arts degree in Clinical Psychology from Western Washington University. Readers who wish to contact him may do so by E-mail at majvance@sprynet.com, (206) 968-7018, and DSN 782-7018.

Expect Too Much

(Continued from page 12)

rivalry with SIGINT and HUMINT. The synergy of intelligence production at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations will be mutually supporting if the PMJ is creative in managing diminishing resources.

Third, we should exploit civilian continuing technical education through distance learning. I recommend the establishment of an MI university for continuing education on the INTELINK, and requiring participation to qualify for promotion and retention. Warrior Net XXI distance learning is essential for MI soldiers to stay current in Intelligence BOS combat developments. MI should issue **all** soldiers assessed into MI a laptop computer to keep and master through their careers. Promote "propay" for tactical skills, similar to language proficiency pay.

S2—Best Job in the Army!

Great expectations are justified of S2s! The juxtapositioning of intelligence disciplines at varying levels of operations is made doable if the myths are debunked and professional courtesies are extended within MI. The combat commander will watch for production results. Plan for success.

Endnotes

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2. **Army Regulation 350-50, Combat Training Centers Program**, 1996.

3. **TRADOC Pamphlet 525-75, INTEL XXI, A Concept for Force XXI Intelligence Operations**, 1 November 1996; MG Charles W. Thomas' Memorandum to CG Training and Doctrine Command, "Chief of Staff of Intelligence Priorities—Second Update," 3 May 1996.

4. John Kao, **Jamming: The Art and Discipline of Corporate Creativity**, (New York, NY: Harper Business, 1996).

5. CG USAIC Memorandum,"Military Intelligence Officer Structure Task Force," 13 December 1996; Office of the Chief of MI Outbrief to DCG USAIC, "Military Intelligence Officer Structure Task Force 27-31 January 1997," 31 January 1997.

6. RAND/Arroyo Center Study, **Staff Turbulence and Personnel Management**, 1996.

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8. LTG Paul E. Menoher, Jr., departing Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence DAMI-ZA message 270633Z Feb 97, Subject: Farewell.

Major Richardson is an action officer at TRADOC ODCSINT, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Interested readers can contact him via E-mail at richardi@emh10.monroe.army.mil and by telephone at (757) 727-4298 and DSN 680-4298.

Successful Lieutenant

(Continued from page 27)

rable of your Army career. I will not mislead you and tell you that every day will be pleasant, but as you meet all the challenges, your confidence will grow. You will experience both great successes and many disappointments along the way. If you remember the points in this article and use your common sense, you are well on your way. Learn from your mistakes and do not repeat them.

In closing, you will note that nowhere in this article did I discuss Officer Evaluation Reports or how to impress your senior rater. If you always lead by your example, train your troops, take care of soldiers, maintain both your equipment and your integrity, and develop yourself as a professional, those matters will take care of themselves.

Captain Courtney is currently the commander of Alpha Company, 306th MI Battalion at Fort Huachuca. Captain Courtney has a bachelor of arts degree in International Relations from Ball State University. Readers can reach him by E-mail at courtneyc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

PROPONENT NOTES

MI Branch Detail Outreach Program

Each year, the MI Branch assesses almost 400 second lieutenants to active duty. Of these, some sixty percent serve a four-year detail in one of the combat arms branches or in Chemical Branch. They attend the combat arms or chemical officer basic course. After their initial details, these officers attend the MI Officer Transition Course (MIOTC) and the MI Officer Advanced Course (OAC) at Fort Huachuca.

The MI Branch Detail Outreach Program encourages the MI Corps leadership to demonstrate their interest in the professional development and future of our detailed officers. In January 1997, most senior intelligence officers (SIOs) received a list of the detailed MI officers in their areas. We requested that those SIOs coordinate with subordinate G2s and the MI commanders in the area to contact each detailed officer face to face. The intent is to introduce the detailed officers to senior MI leadership, and to provide information and advice on a career in MI. It was our intent that the SIOs help the officers look to their futures as MI professionals and, where possible, include them in MI officer professional development sessions and activities.

We find that the great majority of the detailed officers attending MIOTC have not had prior contact with other MI officers before arriving for their courses at Fort Huachuca. This should not be the case, and the MI Branch Detail Outreach Program can go a long way to enhance the situation.

Each MI officer in the field can be a part of the MI Branch Detail Outreach Program. Our battalion and brigade S2s should identify the detailed officers in their units and provide them information and insight on the MI profession.

Some installations will allow the SIO to begin the MI experience for our detailed officers during their final year before MIOTC. When this is possible, it strengthens the officers' understanding of MI, even though they have not yet received formal MI training.

Additionally, all MI officers in the field can be active recruiters for MI. Many top quality officers in other branches could best serve the Army in MI or in the upcoming Functional Area 34 (Intelligence Officer)[1]. Where appropriate, we urge MI officers to encourage outstanding officers from other branches to request Functional Area 34 or to branch transfer to MI.

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) stands ready to assist in this endeavor. SIOs who did not receive a printout of the detailed officers in their geographic areas should contact LTC George K. Gramer, Jr., at (520) 533-1173, DSN 821-1173, and E-mail gramerg@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

MI Officer Structure Task Force

During the 1996 MI Functional Review for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), MI leadership decided to convene a complete review of MI officer structure. The central problem is that the Army is unable to fill all MI field grade officer requirements. The MI Officer Structure Task Force met from 27 through 31 January 1997. The intent was to examine the entire MI officer structure and align it with current force requirements and those planned for Force XXI.

As the Army drawdown progressed in the early 1990s, the MI officer corps suffered significant reductions. In addition to the elevated importance of joint assignment, mission expansion, the voluntary release programs, the MI Corps struggled to meet requirements with a reduced inventory.

The MI Officer Structure Task Force (TF), consisting of representatives from nearly every major command (MACOM) and agency with MI officers in their structures, examined every MI-coded position using a five-step methodology. This process ensured that the right officer grade and area of concentration applied to each MI officer position in the force.

TF members also helped define the roles and missions of the future Functional Area 34 (Intelligence Officer). The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI TF will use the recommendations for the new information operations career field. Implementation of this concept will occur beginning in late 1997.

The field will receive the results of the MI Officer Structure Task Force to provide comments. Recommendations approved by the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, will go to a general officer steering committee. Questions may be directed to CPT Duane A. Dannewitz, (520) 533-1180, DSN 821-1180, and at E-mail dannewitzd@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

OAC Branch Mix Program

Selected MI officers may now attend other branch OACs. MI sends one officer to each Infantry, Armor, Air Defense, Engineer, Aviation, and Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course. Sub-

mit applications through the Captains' Assignments Officer at MI Branch. Potential candidates must have a tactical background and a "strong manner of performance." Assignment officers will make recommendations to the Chief of the MI Corps for final approval. This program is open to both male and female MI officers. The point of contact is Ms. Charlotte I. Borghardt, (520) 533-1188, DSN 821-1188, and E-mail borghardtc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

Warrant Officer Future Focus Workshop

The Warrant Officer Future Focus Workshop met in Washington, D. C., from 19 through 21 November 1996. This group is co-sponsored by the Warrant Officer Career Center and Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The group consists of senior warrant officers from HQDA, MACOMs, proponent offices, and designated organizations. The purpose of the workshops is to identify and discuss issues of concern to warrant officers as we evolve toward the 21st century.

The key issues facing the warrant officer corps, and the MI Warrant Officer Corps in particular, are recruiting and retention. MI is experiencing significant shortages in our senior warrant officer grades. Possible incentives to retention and examining promotion zones were two of the areas examined to determine their effect on retention. Recruiting potential warrant officer applicants remains an area of concern in several MI MOSs. We have increased our accession goals for MOS 350B (All-Source Intelligence Technician) and MOS 350D (Imagery Intelligence Technician) for the coming year. MOSs 352D (Emitter Location/Identification Technician) and 352H (Morse Intercept Technician) will not access this year because of overstrengths in both. The enlisted feeder MOSs of 98D (Signals Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare (SIGINT/EW) Emitter Locator/Identifier) and 98H (SIGINT/EW Morse Interceptor) will soon consolidate. Once that occurs, the warrant officer MOSs will also consolidate.

The workshop will take place every six months. If you have issues that you believe affect the future of the warrant officer corps, forward them to OCMI. The point of contact is Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex A. Williams, OCMI Warrant Officer Professional Development Manager, (520) 533-1183, DSN 821-1183, and E-mail williamsx@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

Endnote

1. The FA 34 officers will serve at echelons above corps only. They will have limited but very focused MI training enabling them to perform MI staff functions at that echelon. A concrete definition is being fleshed out by the OPMS XXI TF and the OCMI.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

by Lieutenant Colonel James A. Chambers, (U.S. Army, Retired)

1997 MI Corps Hall of Fame

The MI Corps Hall of Fame (HOF) is proud to announce the four most recent inductees. This high honor recognizes the outstanding contributions made by these distinguished Americans to our country, our Army, and our Corps. The 1997 HOF inductees are: James D. Davis, Retired SIES-5; Sergeant First Class Benjamin T. Hodge (Deceased); Master Sergeant Roy H. Matsumoto (Retired); and Major General John F. Stewart, Jr. (U.S. Army, Retired). The 1997 HOF induction ceremony to honor these distinguished individuals takes place at 1000 hours, Friday, 27 June 1997.

During the 1997 HOF activities, the MI Corps and Fort Huachuca will dedicate the sports complex in the new academic area. It will be named the "Eifler Sports Plaza" in honor of Colonel Carl F. Eifler, (U.S. Army, Retired), a 1988 inductee into the HOF.

James D. Davis, SIES-5 (Retired)

Mr. Davis served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence for manpower, U.S. Army, from 1987 to his retirement in 1996. He was responsible for Army intelligence policy, planning, programming, and operational activities throughout the Army and directed intelligence support to the Headquarters, Department of the Army decisionmaking process.

U.S. Army photos

Mr. Davis was a driving force behind many initiatives that have affected civilian intelligence em-

ployees not only in the Army, but also in the Air Force and Navy. The U.S. Intelligence Community recognized and used his expertise for the conceptualization and creation of the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) which has significantly improved recruitment, retention, and development of DOD civilians engaged in intelligence activities. Under his direction, CIPMS has become a model alternative Army personnel management system. Mr. Davis was a leader in the creation of the Senior Intelligence Professional and Senior Intelligence Executive Service Programs within CIPMS. The U.S. Congress authorized and the Secretary of Defense approved establishment of this program that, through the creation of senior graded positions, is viewed as a major step to retain the necessary civilian technical and leadership talent in Service intelligence organizations.

Mr. Davis was one of the prime designers of the continued development and use of the Army Intelligence Force Integration Master Planner. This is an advanced state-of-the-art artificial intelligence system that manipulates and displays total Army intelligence requirements and resource data. It supports the Army planning, programming, budgeting and execution systems, and the National Foreign Intelligence Program Capabilities Program and Budget System. Decision analysis aids enable the development of precise costs and benefits of courses of action and real-time analysis of alternatives.

Mr. Davis also structured and directed Army analysis in support of Vice President Gore's National Performance Review Reinvention Lab for Intelligence Support to Land Warfare, the intelligence components of the Commission on Roles and Missions, and the development of Intelligence XXI, the vision of where Army intelligence must be in 2010 to support Force XXI. Mr. Davis was a strong advocate for the marriage of Army scientific and technical enterprise with academia at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The sharing of university expertise enhances the Army scientific and technical mission, and the opportunity to focus on real issues enriches the experiences of the university academics. He regularly represented ground component intelligence elements in defense, industrial, and academic analyses and studies. Mr. Davis was also a guest lecturer at the Army Management Staff College and in Harvard University's Program on Information Resources Policy.

Mr. Davis' career serves as the ultimate professional role model for Federal employees. From an intelligence electronic warfare cryptomaintenance specialist to Senior Intelligence Executive Service and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence for Manpower at Department of Army, he has blazed a trail of excellence. In the wake of his efforts, the intelligence integration initiatives, and CIPMS in particular, have left their indelible marks on the future of Army intelligence.

Sergeant First Class Benjamin T. Hodge (Deceased)

Sergeant First Class Hodge entered active service in 1979 and served in Berlin, Germany. On his return from Germany, he attended the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, California, for basic Arabic language training, and then the Tactical Interrogation Course at Fort Huachuca. He later served with the 519th MI Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 1981 to 1992. His other positions included interrogator, team sergeant, platoon sergeant, and battalion S2.

During this time he served with great distinction as an interrogator during Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada, assisting in the establishment of the joint enemy prisoner of war facility. His efforts were instrumental in the collection and analysis of data to determine the size, location, and resources of the Cuban force, and also the identification of the 10 individuals involved in the assassination of Maurice Bishop.

In 1989, he deployed with the 519th MI Battalion to Panama for Operation JUST CAUSE. While in Panama, SFC Hodge served as an interrogator and also established an automated database for identifying prisoners and documents for the Joint Interrogation Facility. In 1990, he again deployed with the 519th MI Battalion to Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD, during which time he served as the Battalion S2 and Liaison Officer with the local community. During Operation DESERT STORM, he served as Shift NCOIC and Senior Interrogator for the XVIII Airborne Corps Confinement Facility that interrogated and processed more than 8,000 prisoners.

SFC Hodge then volunteered for service in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Bosnia. He deployed 5 April 1994 to join Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT as an Arabic translator. On 15 April 1994, he met his untimely death in a helicopter crash while flying on a mission in support of the Task Force.

Master Sergeant Roy H. Matsumoto (Retired)

Roy H. Matsumoto entered the Army 12 November 1942. He attended the MI Service Language School at Camp Savage, Minnesota. He went through basic training with the 442d Regimental Combat Team in Camp Shelby, Mississippi, graduating in August 1943.

Later that year, he became a member of a 14-man language team assigned to the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as "Merrill's Marauders". He was assigned to the 2d Battalion, consisting of the Blue and Green Combat Teams. In early March 1944, Japanese forces surrounded the Blue Combat team while establishing a road block in the vicinity of Walawbum, in northern Burma. On 5 March 1944, after 38 hours of combat, Sergeant Matsumoto located a Japanese telephone line nearby. Borrowing a field phone, he tapped the line and, in the course of listening, learned the coordinates of a hidden ammunition dump. He relayed the information to his headquarters, and the ammunition dump was destroyed. In another intercept the same day, Sergeant Matsumoto identified the movement of a large Japanese force toward the road block. Forewarned, the 2d Battalion evacuated in time to avoid confrontation with a nominally superior enemy force. For these two intelligence accomplishments, then Staff Sergeant Matsumoto received the Legion of Merit from General Frank Merrill, Commanding General of Merrill's Marauders.

One month later in April 1944, while assigned to the Green Combat Team, SSG Matsumoto volunteered for another intelligence mission that saved his unit from possible annihilation. For 10 days, a superior Japanese force surrounded the battalion on a hilltop near the village of Nhpum Ga, Burma. With casualties at 40 percent, their supplies cut off, and no prospect of rescue, the Marauders faced dire straits. At this juncture, SSG Matsumoto volunteered to infiltrate enemy lines to obtain information. Moving under the cover of darkness, armed only with grenades, he sneaked into enemy territory far enough to learn of the enemy's plan to attack the U.S. position early the next morning. Again forewarned by the information SSG Matsumoto obtained, the Green Combat Team booby trapped and vacated their foxholes and moved into new positions. When the Japanese attacked the following morning, they received heavy fire from the waiting Green Combat Team. During the heat of the battle, SSG Matsumoto, stripped to the waist and waving a carbine, stood up in his foxhole and imitating a Japanese officer, called out the order to charge. Many did so and were met by the Marauders' bullets. Later on the morning of 7 April, a body count revealed 54 enemy killed, including two officers. There were no friendly casualties.

On 19 July 1993, MSG Matsumoto received recognition for his outstanding contribution during the siege at Nhpum Ga. He was inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Major General John F. Stewart, Jr. (Retired)

From 1983 to 1985, General Stewart commanded the 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps. He led the brigade in its successful intelligence operations during Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, accomplishing all of the brigade's primary missions within 48 hours. As Director, Intelligence, U.S. Southern Command from 1985 to 1989, General Stewart directed all intelligence operations in the region. He directed the planning phases for what would be Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

He planned and executed successful joint intelligence operations against drug traffickers. These operations helped reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. Through his efforts, a communications and intelligence architecture between the U.S. military and U.S. embassies was established. As Commander, Army Intelligence Agency, and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, he reoriented Army intelligence so its priority became the needs of combat commanders. For the rest of his career, he continued to stress the importance of making intelligence products responsive to the needs of all warfighters.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991, General Stewart was the G2, U.S. Army Central Command and 3d Army. Once again, he was almost solely responsible for the close and continuous intelligence ties the U.S. Army had with its sister

Services and the U.S. allies. These ties were instrumental in acquiring the vital intelligence necessary for the overwhelming victory achieved by coalition forces.

In 1991, General Stewart directed the Army DCSINT's MI Relook Task Force. He made a comprehensive study of the emerging Army intelligence direction, structure modernization, and budget from the Grenada and Panama operations and the Gulf War. Based on the conclusions of this study, he made six major recommendations accepted by the Army Staff. From his recommendations emerged Army intelligence of the 21st century. He later used these same recommendations as the foundation for new systems and organizations, developing doctrine and instruction, as commander of the USAIC&FH. As the principal intelligence advisor to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe, for all threat assessments, force structure, operations, training, budgets, and relations with allies from 1991 to 1993, he directed intelligence operations to focus on current areas of interest in southern Europe, Africa, and the Levant States. He was the driving force behind the modernization agencies.

General Stewart was Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca from 1993 to 1994. During his tenure, he developed integrated training simulations for all aspects of intelligence. This was the first training that integrated all intelligence military occupational specialties and ranks taught at Fort Huachuca. General Stewart saw an urgent need to bring intelligence doctrine into the 1990s and beyond. He directed that doctrine be updated to reflect Army intelligence's current and future missions. The intelligence force structure was revamped to reflect its new missions, new equipment, and reduced personnel assets. One priority was to develop doctrine for joint operations. He pioneered efforts to integrate all Army intelligence-related software. General Stewart determined the total Army intelligence needs and directed software development to meet the current and projected needs, making intelligence more responsive to the user. He also advocated the increased use of automation, not only in training but also in units.

General Stewart's significant contributions to military intelligence have spanned the entire spectrum of intelligence operations. His contributions to intelligence and his vision of what intelligence can and should be will last for many years to come.

Colonel Carl F. Eifler (Retired)

Colonel Eifler is a 1988 Hall of Fame inductee. During the 1997 HOF activities, Fort Huachuca will dedicate the sports complex in the new academic area in honor of Colonel Eifler. He is a legendary hero of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He enlisted in the Reserves as a private in 1928 and received a commission after completing his officer training through correspondence courses.

Introduced to intelligence while working undercover as a customs agent in Mexico, Mr. Eifler uncovered a Japanese spy ring that was attempting to sway Mexico over to the Axis powers. His customs superiors ignored this information, so he reported it to his Reserve unit advisor, Lieutenant Colonel (later general) Joseph S. Stilwell. This initial contact began a lifelong friendship between the two.

In early 1941, Captain Eifler received a call to active duty and took command of Kilo Company, 35th Infantry Regiment. Then in 1942 he was suddenly assigned to the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) (later renamed the OSS) in Washington, D.C. General William J. Donovan, the COI, wanted to establish a paramilitary unit in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, but Theater Commander General Stilwell opposed this. Because of his long acquaintance with General Stilwell, General Donovan chose Eifler to train and command a group of saboteurs being sent to the CBI Theater.

Captain Eifler hand-picked the first 21 members of Detachment 101. He took the detachment through both American and British secret operations schools. He overcame Colonel Stilwell's opposition and began operations behind enemy lines in Burma. Detachment 101, known as the "Kachin Raiders," established radio bases and befriended local natives, recruiting, training, and employing many of them as agents. He established schools where the natives could be taught all aspects of espionage and sabotage.

During World War II, Detachment 101 and its native agents were extremely effective behind the lines in Burma. The original detachment grew from Eifler's hand-picked 21 to more than 700 agents. Their operations involved direct action against the enemy. Besides providing intelligence, these agents rescued more than 200 downed airmen from capture, sabotaged the railway system, and cleared the enemy from a 10,000-square-mile area. They are credited with 5,428 known Japanese dead and some 10,000 wounded, while the detachment had only

22 Americans and 184 natives killed.

Colonel Eifler's personal courage is renowned in MI. He was awarded the Air Medal for his piloting of small unarmed aircraft over Japanese occupied, uncharted jungle. He often flew to remote airstrips behind enemy lines to contact his agents. He also flew out the first captured Japanese pilot from enemy territory. In November 1943, a B-24 bomber crashed in the Bay of Bengal, leaving nine survivors afloat. Disregarding his personal safety, Colonel Eifler rescued the crew in a small, untested, and unarmed vessel through 450 miles of Japanese controlled waters. For this act of bravery, Colonel Eifler received the Legion of Merit.

In December 1943, Colonel Eifler was again assigned to Washington, D.C. This time, Eifler was asked if it was possible to kidnap the head scientist working on the atomic bomb in Germany. Although this was considered impossible, Colonel Eifler said he could do it. Again, he hand-picked a team and began training. The plan was well into training and reconnaissance when the mission ended because of the successful testing of our own atomic bomb.

Colonel Eifler's next assignment was to penetrate mainland Japan by way of Korea. He recruited Korean agents from prisoner of war camps and trained them in secret operations. His agents were ready to infiltrate Japan in two-man submarines when the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Eight days later Japan surrendered.

Colonel Eifler retired from the Army in 1947 having sustained serious head injuries from combat operations. However, the intelligence community did not forget him. In 1951, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency asked Eifler if he would be interested in smuggling arms into French Indochina. He refused, saying he would do anything that would help his country, but not as an unprotected civilian. Later, the CIA asked him to go behind enemy lines in Korea with his own unit. He accepted, but CIA physicians refused to allow it, simply stating "this man has had enough." Colonel Eifler devoted his life to government service and, specifically, to intelligence. From his work as an undercover agent in Mexico, through his command of the Kachin Raiders, OSS Detachment 101, to the many appeals of CIA and the U.S. Government, Colonel Eifler remains a legend and a hero in military intelligence.

Mr. Chambers is the Deputy Chief in the Office of the Chief of MI. Readers can contact him via E-mail at chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-1178 and DSN 821-1178.

S2's Ten Tenets

(Continued from page 8)

prevents them from being valuable members of the group (staff), they can become dysfunctional and actually cause the unit more harm than good. Learn the personalities of the others who are putting together the plan or fighting the battle. Each individual has strengths and weaknesses. If you are a war-gaming machine or computer smart, help out another staff officer who may be an artillery genius but does not know how to input his status report in PowerPoint graphics. Work together to win together.

This also applies to your own S2 section. Train the intelligence soldiers to be a cohesive, goal-oriented team. One S2 I knew routinely took personal credit for the work of his subordinates. If your assistant S2 comes up with a new whiz-bang method for calculating enemy battle damage, heap praise on him and let others know what a great job he did. Nothing will destroy trust on a team quicker than a "spotlight" S2.

Be Honest With Yourself And Others. The **worst** thing an S2 can do is be dishonest with himself or others. I think all of us at one time or another have seen an S2 slip over to the dark side of the force and make something up if he does not know the answer. If you do not know, say so. The commander is counting on you to give him straight, accurate information. His decisions directly impact the lives of soldiers. The embarrassment of not knowing the answer to a question is nothing compared to putting a soldier in harm's way. Also, be able to identify your own strengths and weaknesses. I never believe S2s who say they did everything brilliantly. Some are great at situational templates, some at tactics, others at the command estimate process. If you know where you are weak, admit it, and focus your training and education in that direction.

Conclusion

These are my principles for being a successful S2. Are they all-encompassing? No. Are there things I left out? Of course. Are they valid? Absolutely. If you follow them, it will help make your tenure as the "deuce" the most rewarding time of your career.

Captain Weed is currently the S2 of the United Nations Command Security Battalion–Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, Korea. He has served as a company commander at Fort Lewis, Washington; and assistant brigade S3, and targeting officer at Camp Casey, Korea. Captain Weed has a bachelor's degree in Journalism from the California Polytechnic University at Pomona. He can be reached at eajs-mi@emh7.korea. army.mil.

RESERVE COMPONENT

AGR MI Sergeant Major Position

The U.S. Army Reserve's (USAR) TRADOC Liaison NCO position at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH). The position, formerly coded for fill by 79-series career management field (CMF), will now be coded for fill by 96/98 CMF. Sergeant Major Clark Sullins, a 98H and Sergeants Major Academy graduate is now the USAR's senior MI Army Guard and Reserve (AGR) NCO. The point of contact (POC) is SGM Clark Sullins, USAIC&FH, (520) 533-4213 and DSN 821-4213.

RC Intelligence Training Opportunities

Senior Cryptologic Reserve Officer Course (CY 610/611)—This prestigious course, sponsored by the National Security Agency, is designed for Reserve Component (RC) MI captains and field grade officers. It is conducted in two separate 2-week courses offered over a 2-year period. Candidates must possess a Top Secret clearance with access to SI/TK.

National Intelligence Familiarization Course—The Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) conducts this week-long RC course, designed to provide company grade officers and senior NCOs with an orientation on national intelligence agencies. The orientation includes visits to most of these agencies. Candidates must possess a Top Secret clearance with access to SI/TK.

The POC is MAJ Croker, U.S. Army Reserve Center (USARC), commercial (404) 629-7912 and E-mail at crokerwi@usarc-emh1.army.mil. There is no DSN number.

RCSIP

The Reserve Component Support and Integration (RCSI) Plan (RCSIP) is the operational element of the INSCOM initiative to engage RC assets to support the echelons above corps MI force. The plan flows real-world missions to the RC MI units and the individual mobilization augmentees (IMA), fosters habitual RC-Active Component (AC) relationships, and establishes the automation connectivity so critical to RC training and our contributory support of the AC. Headquarters, INSCOM hosts an annual RCSI workshop of AC and RC elements that has superseded the former IMA conference. The second workshop, held in February 1997, focused on establishing the AC-RC ties upon which all else depends. POC: William Boik (MAJ USAR), INSCOM, (703) 706-1156, DSN 235-1156, and via E-mail waboik @vulcan.belvoir. army.mil.

RC MI Participation In OJE

To date more than 750 RC MI personnel have mobilized in support of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). Nearly all of the USAR's MI units and the Army National Guard's 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) have participated in the 270-day rotations. Indeed, the reservoir of accessible qualified soldiers in some military occupational specialties, such as 96B (Intelligence Analyst), have been nearly exhausted. The RC MI Force Design Update being implemented this fiscal year has anticipated the OJE requirement for discrete functional modular teams that answer to specific AC requests for augmentation.

The enduring lessons from each rotation mandate both a sustained AC-RC peacetime relationship and detailed predeployment coordination. These steps insure a maximum of utility from the mobilized RC force. One step has already been taken. The Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC) have been enlisted into the effort to prepare the mobilizing RC MI soldiers. By their good efforts, the RC soldiers report prepared to work the designated systems. POC: Ms. Linda Hein, USARC, (404) 629-7917 and E-mail heinlind@usarc-emh1.army.mil.

RC 98GZZ Training Concept

The USAIC&FH has recommended a training strategy to address the RC's requirement to qualify its 98G (Voice Interceptor) soldiers in low-density languages. Training will occur by phase, depending on the RC soldiers' assigned unit. Details regarding phasing follow in Figure 1. The POC is Major Tom Bergfeld, USAIC&FH Dir. of Operations, Training, and Doctrine at (520) 533-2085, 821-2085, and via E-mail bergfeldt@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

PHASE 1: Graduate from the 2-week and 2-day 98GZZ course at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

PHASE 2: Complete an appropriate 30-day live environment training.

PHASE 3: Graduate from the 2-week RC additional skill identifier K3 course (Communications Electronic Warfare Equipment Operator Course).

NOTE: RC soldiers assigned to units aligned to support AC corps and theater may not require PHASE 3.

Figure 1. The RC 98GZZ Training Concept Phasing.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 by Jeffery J. Barnett (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 169 pages.

Get this book, read it, take lots of notes; then reread it every year or so. Jeff Barnett makes a convincing case for developing a type of *Blitzkrieg* for aerospace operations. He projects a vision of what technology will probably exist in the year 2020. Assuming his vision is correct, he then describes new ways in which war could be conducted. All of this reflects someone who recognizes that we are in a revolution in military affairs (RMA). He tries to figure out what this means for the United States, decides where this road can take us, and concludes with how we exploit this RMA today to deter or win wars of tomorrow. This is an excellent work which will help us plot the way to prevent a future war. Should prevention fail, this work also forms the basis of a doctrine which we could use to defeat peer or niche competitors.

Nearly everyone agrees we are in the midst of an RMA. COL Barnett assumes an RMA must combine an underwriting of new technology, a fundamental change in concept of operations (doctrine), and a new organizational structure which best synergizes all components into a new form of war. The book addresses all three topics but applies them specifically to the aerospace aspects of a future war. Since all aspects of warfare are now interdependent to varying degrees, and since what he is espousing is a way of thinking as opposed to what to think, much of the contents of this book will apply to land and sea warfare.

Technological advances in four areas will drive the RMA in the coming years. They are, information, command and control (C^2), penetration, and precision. Future commanders will have quantities and qualities of information which are exponentially above what we have today. Given revolutionary methods of information transfer, recognition, and filtering, commanders can execute efficient and incredibly devastating near-real-time attacks. New advances in stealth, hypersonic transport, and electronic warfare will allow some platforms to penetrate defenses where they can deliver brilliant munitions to within feet of an intended target. These technologies and capabilities need some type of concept to exploit their effects.

The author's "new way" operational concept is called parallel war. Parallel war involves simultaneously striking at strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity. When the effects are coordinated and continued at rates faster than an enemy can react or repair, an enemy is rapidly shocked into paralysis. Quickly destroying an enemy saves us the greatest amount of resources in terms of human lives, materiel, money, and public support. All of this sounds very familiar to **FM 100-5, Operations**, readers. However, Colonel Barnett assumes an RMA must involve a new organization.

The C^2 structure is the aerospace organization most in need of change with this new type of information based parallel war. He advocates a more automated and flatter C^2 system to exploit the technology and doctrine.

How is the commander going to get all these huge volumes of information? Who will sift through it and how? Who will determine what units get what information, in what amounts, and within what timelines? All MI professionals must wonder about the answers to these questions. Read **Future War** and extrapolate some of Colonel Barnett's doctrinal and operational concepts. This book should definitely be on your "must read" list right now.

Captain Roger F. Cavazos
Fort Benning, Georgia

Special Operations—Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice by William H. McRaven (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 416 pages, $24.95.

This is an excellent book for special operators and the intelligence personnel who support them. The author, a Navy SEAL team commander, develops a theory of special operations that seeks to explain why *"a small force can defeat a much larger or well-entrenched opponent."* Acknowledging his debt to the U.S. Army's nine principles of war, Commander McRaven refines and focuses them into his six principles of special operations: *simplicity*, *security*, *repetition*, *surprise*, *speed*, and *purpose*. Through the application of these principles, a small force conducting a direct action or a recovery mission can achieve relative superiority at the right place and for the necessary length of time.

Commander McRaven then examines eight classic special operations in fascinating detail, including the rescue of Mussolini (1943); the 6th Ranger Battalion's prisoner of war rescue at Cabanatuan (1945); the Son Tay raid (1970); the Israeli rescue at Entebbe (1976); and the raids on Fort Eban Emael (1940), Alexandria (1941), Saint Nazaire (1942), and the Tirpitz (1943). He uses many written sources and personal interviews with surviving participants to sketch out what happened in each operation. At the end of each episode, he conducts a common-sense analysis of the mission and looks at when and for how long relative superiority was achieved by the attacking special operations force. He then uses his six principles to explain what went right or wrong with the operation.

Whether Commander McRaven has created an advance in how we think about special operations, or simply built a semantic construct that allows him to interpret each case in an interesting way, the missions he recounts are fascinating reading. In short, good history, plus an analytical approach worth thinking about if you are involved with or support special operations units.

Chief Warrant Officer Four
Dennis E. Renken
Sierra Vista, Arizona

Gang Intelligence Manual: Identifying and Understanding Modern-Day Violent Gangs in the United States by Bill Valentine (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995), 250 pages.

Fifteen years ago the L.A. Police Department and the L.A. Sheriff's Office came up with well-thought-out plans to crush violent street gangs. Millions were spent, officers were trained, areas were microscopically examined, intelligence was both collected and analyzed, heads were busted, and significant arrests made.

With the outbreak of rioting in South Central L.A., following the trials of police officers charged with beating of Rodney King, it was evident that those efforts had failed. The main instigators of those riots were identified as members of street gangs—Crips and Bloods. The gangs had not only survived but had multiplied tenfold.

Thus begins the introduction to Mr. Valentine's **Gang Intelligence Manual**. He states plainly that his intent is to help the police officer or lay person to understand gangs and their sometimes unique manners, motives, methods and aims. While the book initially offers little of apparent interest to the intelligence professional, the **Gang Intelligence Manual** is a difficult book to put down.

As the reader gets deeper into this book, he begins asking many questions such as the following. Is all this information being organized and databased? Who is doing the collection, analysis, and confirmation? Did "intelligence" really "fail" in LA? If so, where? In the "street-level" collection? Analysis? Was accurate intelligence ignored? Could (did?) we apply the "extended-family" social patterns of these gangs to the clans of Mogadishu or the gangs of Haiti? Obviously, there are more than a few intelligence mental exercises here. While the signals and imagery folks can perhaps nap, the human intelligence and order of battle types should fairly salivate over the possibilities.

While casting light on gang culture, Mr. Valentine also comes across as one trying to describe the vastness of a problem others do not see. He also appears to reflect the policeman's frustration with a problem having perhaps overwhelmed both the law enforcement and judicial

systems—overcrowded penal systems and ineffective "punishment" for criminals who fear neither cops nor jail.

The **Gang Intelligence Manual** is an informational text in which the author achieved a goal for which many professional writers should aspire, namely a style so smooth it goes unnoticed. This text is neither so bad it is distracting nor so elegant the reader misses the information in amazement of the prose. There is nothing ponderous here. Mr. Valentine's delivery is crisp and the message is distinct. The content notwithstanding, this would be a great model for journalism students.

Mr. Valentine's effort is certainly relevant. There exists a need for such a book, and it goes beyond simply shedding light on what before appeared meaningless "fence graffiti" or a somewhat cryptic tattoo. While not "good news," this **is** a good read.

Chief Warrant Officer Five
Richard E. Cameron, Retired
Sierra Vista, Arizona

Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy—A Report of the CSIS Americas Program by George A. Fauriol, Ed. (Washington D.C.: The Center of Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 236 pages, $29.95.

Haitian Frustrations is a book with a series of 18 essays that examines the crisis in Haiti through the 1994 military intervention and the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The book includes assessments of Haiti's economic and political reconstruction efforts. The authors focus on U.S. policy and associated diplomatic efforts, the character of civil-military politics in Haiti, and the challenges facing Haitian reconstruction.

The authors, including scholars and participative policy makers, paint an enduringly pessimistic view of the Haitian society. This book benefits those MI professionals involved in Caribbean stability and support operations or pursuing relevant academic interests.

Collectively, the essays chronologically and systematically discuss the puzzling Haitian culture and its pervasive and seemingly permanent socioeconomic malaise. As part of the backdrop, some topics include traditional Haitian politics and the military, the U.S. occupation in the early 1900s, the Duvaliers, and past and present U.S. policies. The authors discuss, among other things, the recurring oppressive nature of Haitian domestic politics and the short-sightedness of U.S. policy, which, arguably at times, has and continues to worsen an already bad situation.

Most of the short compositions address policymaking issues that are mostly beyond the control of U.S. military and MI decisionmakers. Interspersed throughout the text are references to Haitian policymakers and groups, with their respective histories and affiliations. For example, in "Reforming the Security Apparatus," the author offers an especially pointed and clear argument that rebuilding the Haitian security structure requires the presence of two tenuous elements. The first is *"rational behavior by the conflicting segments of Haitian society,"* and the second is a *"sustained U.S. commitment."* The former remark implies the difficulties in helping develop a functional democratic society and, of course, the latter comment can and will be addressed by U.S. national-level policymakers. The authors briefly refer to the Forces Armees d'Haiti role in law enforcement, and the augmentative vigilante group called the "attaches" and their "help" and other such groups.

In summary, **Haitian Frustrations** provides its readers many well thought-out and clearly stated views on rebuilding Haiti. The authors appear to have used sound research and academic reasoning in developing their assessments, though the discerning reader may find fault with selected aspects of their findings. The MI professional concerned with Haiti, the Caribbean or other related academic pursuits would gain from reading this book.

Sergeant First Class
Randy S. Heinrich
Sierra Vista, Arizona

The Gatekeepers by Daniel Graham, Jr. (Riverdale, NY: Bain Publishing Enterprises [distributed by Simon & Schuster, New York, NY], 1995), 456 pages, $22.00 U.S./$31.00 Canada.

The author, Daniel Graham, Jr., is a former U.S. Army military intelligence officer and the son of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Daniel O. Graham, the distinguished former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and co-founder of "High Frontier," a revolutionary predecessor "think tank" for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He has, with **The Gatekeepers**, set his mark as the most dynamic and exciting new author of science fiction in the last decade. As noted in the words of legendary astronaut, Dr. Buzz Aldrin, in the book's preface—

*Although **The Gatekeepers** is fiction, the technologies described herein are real. The plot relies on three technologies that I have watched develop over my career. Brilliant Pebbles is the ballistic missile interceptor system developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Single-Stage-to-Orbit spacecraft, one promising design for totally reusable spacecraft, has been successfully test flown. You may have seen photographs of the McDonnell Douglas DCX hovering over the desert. The Solar Power Satellite, capable of providing clean, inexhaustible electric power, remains in the laboratory. Any nation, or any individual like hero Rolf Bernard, who controls these technologies, controls access to the unlimited wealth in space. They become 'the gatekeepers' to national security, technological and indeed, economical progress—our future. In a dramatic way, Dan Graham makes the case for deploying each of these technologies.*

This book offers is readers spell-binding excitement as hero Rolf Bernard, president of a large aerospace company, after being thwarted by antagonistic bureaucrats, decides to replace the government monopoly of space with his own. In doing so, he plots not only save his company, but also to humiliate his enemies, secure his place in history, and convince his estranged wife to come back to him, all by seizing and controlling inner space. Can he do it? Read The Gatekeepers and find out.

The Gatekeepers is must reading for all military professionals, but especially military intelligence professionals. It will educate and introduce you to the next twenty years of space development while thrilling you with one of the most entertaining and exciting reads in recent memory. Happy reading!

Major Ed Coet (Retired)
Copperas Cove, Texas

Persian Postcards: Iran After Khomeini by Fred A. Reed (Vancouver, BC: Talonbooks, 1994) 288 pages $14.95.

When the average American thinks of Iran, several images come to mind such as terrorism, war, and crowds of people in the streets shouting "death to America." Few if any recent English language books have been published which help the MI professional gain a better understanding of modern Iran. **Persian Postcards** is the exception. It is an excellent guide to the people, religion, politics, and world view of modern Iran. Its Canadian author, Fred Reed, spent 10 years traveling throughout Iran interviewing people from all walks of life to augment his own research. While the book is very informative, the reader must be thick skinned enough to read through Reed's heavy criticism of U.S. policy toward Iran to fully understand the work.

Reed's account of the Iran-Contra affair from the Iranian view point (interwoven with Western sources) is of interest to the military reader. The effect of U.S. weapon shipments, particularly the TOW missile, on an Iranian offensive named Val Fajr VIII, is credited with cutting off the Iraqis from the Persian Gulf. In addition, Reed discussed "limited battlefront intelligence" released by the United States to Iran during the war but does not discuss its effect.

Reed's book is organized thematically, discussing the effects of the Iran-Iraq War, the roles of mullahs and women in society, current politics, etc. Perhaps most important for the MI professional, he provides an excellent discussion throughout the book on Iran's perceptions of the world and the West in particular. He also discusses in some detail the role of the Komiteh (Revolutionary Guards) in surveillance of the population. In **Persian Postcards**, Reed has demystified Iran in much the same way Hedrick Smith did with the former Soviet Union in his book **The Russians**. You will find no detailed references to military operations or strategic intentions but you will gain a greater understanding Iran's perception of the Persian Gulf region and the world.

Captain Christopher J. Courtney
Sierra Vista, Arizona

110th Military Intelligence Battalion

Azure, a chevronnel debased or below two griffins: heads in fess point erased addorsed and conjoined of the like. Azure (Oriental Blue) is the primary color associated with MI. Gold is emblematic of excellence and achievement. The chevron, a symbol of strength and support, suggests a mountain peak and connotes the unit's affiliation with the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). The griffins, ever vigilant and alert, appear above the mountain peak, epitomizing the unit's motto and mission.

On 28 June 1988, the unit was constituted in the regular Army as four provisional companies attached to the 10th Support Command. Then on 13 December 1988, the 110th MI Battalion was activated at Fort Drum, New York as a separate battalion of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). It comprises a headquarters and headquarters services company, a collection company, an intelligence and surveillance company, and the division's long-range surveillance detachment.

In August 1990, the 110th MI Battalion deployed soldiers to Saudi Arabia in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. In August 1992, the unit deployed personnel and equipment to beleaguered Dade County, Florida, to provide Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operations in support of civil authorities. Just two months later, soldiers in the unit deployed to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance in Operation RESTORE HOPE. At the same time, assets of the Battalion conducted continuous interrogation and counterintelligence operations. Using a wide range of interrogation, elicitation, screening and source operations, the counterintelligence/prisoner of war teams provided a steady stream of information concerning humanitarian requirements, significant personalities, illegal weapons caches, and other tactical and strategic intelligence.

In September 1994, the battalion deployed to the Republic of Haiti in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The unit produced 354 critical source reports, accounting for 57 percent of all signals intelligence (SIGINT) reporting in the theater. Most notably during the deployment, the battalion issued three CRITIC messages during a tense 48- to 60-hour timeframe prior to the restoration of President Aristide to power.

The 110th MI Battalion has often been recognized for its many contributions. Among their awards are the 1994 National Security Agency (NSA) Director's Trophy; this was the only time that a tactical unit directly subordinate to a division has received this prestigious honor. The battalion's reporting contributed immeasurably to NSA products as cited in a letter of appreciation from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director of NSA stating that *"We were able to present the clearest possible picture to the national command authority; Presidential speeches were altered based upon our input. The 110th MI Battalion is providing critical information...which goes into intelligence products disseminated throughout the Department of Defense at the operational and tactical levels."* In July 1996, the Battalion received the Army Superior Unit Award for outstanding meritorious performance during peacetime.

Today, the 110th MI Battalion continues to prepare for its standing mission to rapidly deploy worldwide and conduct intelligence and electronic warfare operations in support of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). It does this by maintaining a robust schedule of training events and temporary duty assignments to various worldwide locations. The Battalion also continues to support the ongoing humanitarian missions in both Bosnia and Haiti with personnel and resources, and eagerly awaits its next mission.

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

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PIN 075329000